Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-110726 Overview
CVE-2026-110726 affects the Eclipse ECSP api-gateway component in versions up to and including 1.7.3. The default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, extracts the per-client bucket key from the leftmost value of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. Because the header is attacker-controlled and not validated against any trusted-proxy allowlist, a single client can generate unlimited rate-limit buckets by rotating the header value. This bypasses request-rate limiting on every route that relies on the shipped default configuration. The weakness is classified under CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source.
Critical Impact
An authenticated attacker can fully bypass gateway rate limiting, enabling resource exhaustion against protected backend services.
Affected Products
- Eclipse ECSP api-gateway versions ≤ 1.7.3
- Deployments using the default ClientIpKeyResolver configuration
- Downstream services protected only by the gateway's rate limits
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-110726 published to NVD
- 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-110726
Vulnerability Analysis
The api-gateway ships a default key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, that identifies clients for rate-limit accounting. The resolver reads the first entry in the X-Forwarded-For header and treats it as the authoritative client IP. Rate-limit buckets in the gateway are keyed on this value. Because HTTP clients can set X-Forwarded-For to any string, each unique value produces a new bucket with a fresh quota.
An attacker iterating through randomized header values obtains an effectively unbounded request budget. The gateway continues to accept and forward traffic to downstream routes, defeating the throttling control. This leads to backend resource exhaustion, degraded availability for legitimate users, and amplification of brute-force or scraping campaigns.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper trust of a client-supplied header without verification against a trusted-proxy list [CWE-348]. The resolver assumes X-Forwarded-For originates from a known upstream proxy, but no such validation exists in the default configuration. Any value present in the leftmost position is accepted as ground truth for client identity.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires only network access and low-privilege credentials sufficient to reach a rate-limited route. The attacker sends repeated requests, rotating the X-Forwarded-For header value on each request. Each unique value creates an isolated rate-limit bucket, allowing the attacker to exceed the intended per-client request budget by orders of magnitude. No special tooling is required; standard HTTP clients suffice. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-ch6x-rg7q-7jfx for the vendor description.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-110726
Indicators of Compromise
- High volume of requests from a single TCP source IP presenting many distinct X-Forwarded-For values within a short window
- X-Forwarded-For header values containing non-routable, malformed, or randomized IP strings
- Sudden spikes in backend request rates without corresponding growth in unique source IPs at the network layer
Detection Strategies
- Correlate the gateway access log's observed socket IP against the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value and alert on high cardinality mismatches
- Baseline the ratio of unique X-Forwarded-For values per source IP and flag deviations
- Monitor rate-limit bucket creation metrics for abnormal growth
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable structured logging of X-Forwarded-For, remote socket address, route, and rate-limit bucket key for every request
- Forward gateway and backend access logs to a central analytics platform for correlation
- Alert on backend latency or error-rate increases that coincide with elevated gateway throughput
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-110726
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade api-gateway to a version later than 1.7.3 that includes the fix from Pull Request #330
- Replace the default ClientIpKeyResolver with a resolver that uses the authenticated principal or the remote socket address as the bucket key
- Restrict trust of X-Forwarded-For to requests arriving from a defined set of upstream proxies
Patch Information
The upstream fix is tracked in Eclipse ECSP api-gateway Pull Request #330 and documented in GHSA-ch6x-rg7q-7jfx. CVE coordination details are available in the Eclipse GitLab CVE Assignment Work Item #404. Operators should upgrade to the patched release and validate rate-limit behavior after deployment.
Workarounds
- Configure the gateway to ignore X-Forwarded-For unless the connecting peer is an allow-listed trusted proxy
- Implement a custom key resolver that keys on the authenticated subject or the direct TCP remote address
- Enforce defense-in-depth rate limits at an upstream load balancer or web application firewall that validates client identity independently
# Configuration example
# Prefer the authenticated principal; fall back to the direct remote address.
# Do not trust X-Forwarded-For unless the peer is a known proxy.
spring:
cloud:
gateway:
default-filters:
- name: RequestRateLimiter
args:
key-resolver: "#{@principalOrRemoteAddrKeyResolver}"
redis-rate-limiter.replenishRate: 10
redis-rate-limiter.burstCapacity: 20
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

