Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-110724

CVE-2026-110724: API Gateway Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-110724 is an authentication bypass flaw in API Gateway versions up to 1.7.3 that allows attackers to circumvent rate limiting by manipulating X-Forwarded-For headers. This article covers technical details, affected versions, security impact, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-110724 Overview

CVE-2026-110724 is a rate-limiting bypass vulnerability in the Eclipse ECSP api-gateway project affecting versions up to and including 1.7.3. The default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, derives per-client bucket keys from the leftmost value of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP request header. The gateway does not validate this header against a trusted-proxy list. An attacker can supply arbitrary header values to generate unlimited independent rate-limit buckets. This bypasses rate limiting on every route using the shipped default configuration. The flaw is classified under [CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management].

Critical Impact

A single remote attacker can trivially defeat the gateway's request-rate controls on all routes using the default configuration, enabling abuse of downstream APIs, brute-force attacks, and resource exhaustion against protected services.

Affected Products

  • Eclipse ECSP api-gateway versions up to and including 1.7.3
  • Deployments using the default ClientIpKeyResolver rate-limit key resolver
  • Any route behind the gateway relying on the shipped default rate-limit configuration

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-110724 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-110724

Vulnerability Analysis

The Eclipse ECSP api-gateway ships with ClientIpKeyResolver as the default rate-limit key resolver. This component is responsible for mapping each incoming request to a bucket used by the gateway's token-based rate limiter. The resolver reads the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For request header and uses that value directly as the bucket identifier.

The X-Forwarded-For header is a client-controlled input when requests reach the gateway without passing through a trusted reverse proxy that overwrites it. Because the resolver performs no validation against a configured list of trusted proxies, any value supplied by the client is accepted. Each unique header value produces a distinct bucket with its own fresh quota.

An attacker exploiting this issue can issue requests at effectively unlimited rates by rotating the X-Forwarded-For value on every request. This defeats protections against credential stuffing, API scraping, and backend resource exhaustion on all routes using the default configuration.

Root Cause

The root cause is implicit trust in a client-supplied header. The ClientIpKeyResolver treats the leftmost X-Forwarded-For entry as authoritative client identity without reconciling it against a trusted-proxy list or falling back to the transport-layer source address. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-4j9j-mx7g-p9p6 for the maintainer analysis.

Attack Vector

Exploitation is network-based and requires no authentication or user interaction. An attacker sends HTTP requests to any route protected by the default rate-limit configuration, assigning a unique or random value to the X-Forwarded-For header on each request. The gateway allocates a new bucket per value, so the per-client quota is never reached. The vulnerability mechanism is documented in GitHub Pull Request #330 and the GitLab CVE Assignment Work Item #405. No proof-of-concept code is required beyond standard HTTP tooling that permits custom header values.

Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails

Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.

Stop Identity Attacks

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-110724

Indicators of Compromise

  • High-volume request streams to a single route where each request carries a different X-Forwarded-For value
  • Sequential or randomized IP values in X-Forwarded-For that do not correspond to known upstream proxy ranges
  • Downstream service error rates or latency increases without a corresponding rise in rate-limit rejections at the gateway
  • Authentication endpoints receiving sustained request volume with low rate-limit trigger counts

Detection Strategies

  • Correlate the transport-layer source IP with the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value and alert on mismatches when traffic does not transit a trusted proxy
  • Baseline the cardinality of distinct X-Forwarded-For values per source IP over short time windows; flag outliers
  • Monitor gateway rate-limit bucket metrics for abnormal creation rates on routes that should serve a stable client population

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward gateway access logs with full header context into a centralized analytics platform for header-cardinality analysis
  • Instrument the rate limiter to emit metrics on bucket creation rate, bucket count, and resolved key per request
  • Alert when a single TCP source generates requests across more than a threshold number of distinct X-Forwarded-For values per minute

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-110724

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade api-gateway to a version containing the fix from GitHub Pull Request #330 as soon as it is available
  • Audit all deployed routes to identify those relying on the default ClientIpKeyResolver configuration
  • Place the gateway behind a trusted reverse proxy or load balancer that overwrites the X-Forwarded-For header for untrusted clients
  • Review authentication and sensitive-write endpoints for signs of abuse during the exposure window

Patch Information

The maintainers addressed the issue in GitHub Pull Request #330. Operators should track the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-4j9j-mx7g-p9p6 for the fixed release version and apply it to all affected deployments.

Workarounds

  • Replace ClientIpKeyResolver with a custom key resolver that uses the transport-layer remote address when the request does not originate from a trusted proxy
  • Configure a trusted-proxy allowlist and only honor X-Forwarded-For values when the immediate peer is on that allowlist
  • Strip or overwrite the X-Forwarded-For header at the ingress layer (reverse proxy, CDN, or load balancer) before the request reaches the gateway
  • Apply additional rate limiting at the ingress tier using the real client IP, independent of the gateway's bucket logic

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.