Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-109170 Overview
CVE-2026-109170 is a Hibernate Query Language (HQL) injection vulnerability in LogicalDOC Community Edition through version 9.3. The flaw resides in DocumentsDataServlet and stems from the unvalidated indexed request parameter being concatenated directly into an HQL query. Authenticated users with read access to any folder can inject boolean HQL expressions to bypass folder scope and read-permission checks. Successful exploitation enables enumeration of restricted document metadata and extraction of database contents. The weakness is tracked under CWE-89 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command).
Critical Impact
Authenticated attackers can bypass folder and permission boundaries to exfiltrate document metadata and arbitrary database contents from LogicalDOC installations.
Affected Products
- LogicalDOC Community Edition versions up to and including 9.3
- The vulnerable component is logicaldoc-webapp/src/main/java/com/logicaldoc/web/data/DocumentsDataServlet.java
- Deployments exposing the Documents data endpoint to authenticated users
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109170 published to NVD
- 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-109170
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability affects the document listing endpoint handled by DocumentsDataServlet. The servlet builds an HQL query by appending request parameters directly into the query string using Java's String.formatted() method. The indexed parameter is not sanitized, parameterized, or type-checked before being inserted into the HQL predicate A.indexingStatus = %s.
An authenticated user with read access to any single folder can inject HQL fragments through this parameter. Injected boolean expressions evaluate against the database as part of the composed query, breaking out of the intended indexingStatus filter. Attackers can then neutralize folder-scope joins and permission predicates downstream in the query, exposing document metadata outside the user's authorized scope.
Root Cause
The root cause is string concatenation of untrusted input into an HQL statement without parameter binding. Hibernate supports named parameters (:name syntax) backed by Query.setParameter(), which the surrounding code already uses for other fields such as filename. The indexed branch bypassed this safe pattern and interpolated the raw parameter value, producing a classic injection sink.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the LogicalDOC web application and valid authenticated credentials with read access to at least one folder. The attacker submits a crafted indexed parameter in a request to the Documents data servlet. The injected HQL alters query logic to return rows the caller is not authorized to see, including metadata from restricted folders and, through tautologies or UNION-style constructs, broader database contents.
// Patch excerpt from DocumentsDataServlet.java
// Before (vulnerable): raw concatenation of request parameter into HQL
// if (StringUtils.isNotEmpty(request.getParameter(INDEXED)))
// query.append(" and A.indexingStatus = %s".formatted(request.getParameter(INDEXED)));
// After (fixed): named parameter binding
Map<String, Object> params = new HashMap<>();
if (StringUtils.isNotEmpty(request.getParameter(INDEXED))) {
query.append(" and A.indexingStatus = :indexingStatus");
params.put("indexingStatus", request.getParameter(INDEXED));
}
if (filename != null) {
query.append(" and lower(A.fileName) like :fileName ");
params.put("fileName", "%%%s%%".formatted(filename.toLowerCase()));
}
Source: GitHub commit c3bbfd4
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-109170
Indicators of Compromise
- Requests to the Documents data endpoint containing non-numeric values, quotes, spaces, or HQL keywords (or, and, select, from, union) in the indexed query parameter.
- Application logs showing Hibernate parsing errors, unexpected QuerySyntaxException entries, or anomalous query shapes originating from DocumentsDataServlet.
- Document listing responses that return records from folders the authenticated principal does not own or have mapped permissions for.
Detection Strategies
- Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) signature matching HQL metacharacters and keywords on the indexed parameter of the Documents data URL.
- Review access logs for authenticated users issuing high-cardinality or repeated requests to the document data servlet with varying indexed values, consistent with boolean-based extraction.
- Correlate database query telemetry with application request logs to identify queries whose predicates do not match the issuing user's folder scope.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose Hibernate query logging in non-production environments to establish a baseline of expected DocumentsDataServlet queries.
- Alert on authentication sessions that generate large volumes of document metadata reads shortly after login.
- Monitor outbound data volumes from the LogicalDOC application tier for enumeration patterns consistent with database exfiltration.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109170
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade LogicalDOC Community Edition to the fixed release that contains commit c3bbfd4641f1cd2b340f114ea198d3f65b6581ee.
- Restrict access to the LogicalDOC web interface to trusted networks until the patch is applied.
- Audit application and database logs for prior exploitation attempts against the indexed parameter.
Patch Information
The vendor fix replaces the unsafe String.formatted() concatenation with a Hibernate named parameter binding (:indexingStatus). The change is published in the upstream patch commit against the 9.3 branch. Additional context is available in the VulnCheck advisory and the LogicalDOC community discussion.
Workarounds
- Place the LogicalDOC application behind a reverse proxy or WAF that rejects requests where the indexed parameter contains non-numeric characters.
- Reduce the attack surface by revoking folder read permissions from accounts that do not require document browsing.
- Rotate credentials for any accounts whose activity logs show suspicious use of the Documents data endpoint.
# Example NGINX rule to block non-numeric values in the `indexed` parameter
location /data/documents.xml {
if ($arg_indexed !~ "^[0-9]*$") {
return 400;
}
proxy_pass http://logicaldoc_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

