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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-108162

CVE-2026-108162: Pingvin Share X Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-108162 is an authentication bypass flaw in Pingvin Share X that allows attackers to evade rate limits and brute-force credentials. This post explains its technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-108162 Overview

CVE-2026-108162 is a rate limit bypass vulnerability in Pingvin Share X versions prior to 1.22.0. The flaw resides in backend/src/main.ts, which unconditionally trusts proxy headers by calling app.set("trust proxy", true). Unauthenticated remote attackers can rotate spoofed X-Forwarded-For header values to evade per-IP throttling on authentication endpoints. The weakness is tracked as CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source.

Critical Impact

Attackers can brute-force passwords and TOTP codes against /api/auth/signIn, /api/auth/signIn/totp, and /api/auth/resetPassword, while simultaneously forging the client IP recorded in server logs.

Affected Products

  • Pingvin Share X versions prior to 1.22.0
  • backend/src/main.ts component (Express trust proxy configuration)
  • Deployments exposing authentication endpoints without an upstream header-sanitizing proxy

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-10 - CVE-2026-108162 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-108162

Vulnerability Analysis

Pingvin Share X is a self-hosted file-sharing application built on NestJS and Express. The backend enables Express's trust proxy setting with a hardcoded true value. This instructs Express to derive the client IP from the leftmost entry in the X-Forwarded-For header, regardless of whether a trusted reverse proxy is actually in front of the application.

The application's rate limiter keys throttling buckets by the derived client IP. Because the IP is attacker-controlled through a request header, each spoofed value produces a new throttling bucket. Authentication endpoints that should block repeated failed attempts become open to high-volume credential and TOTP guessing.

The advisory also notes a logging integrity consequence. Audit records attribute authentication attempts to attacker-chosen IP addresses, undermining incident response and forensic attribution.

Root Cause

The root cause is misplaced trust in a client-controllable HTTP header. The Express trust proxy option must be scoped to the known upstream proxy addresses or disabled when no proxy is present. Setting it to the literal boolean true tells Express that every hop is trusted.

Attack Vector

An unauthenticated attacker sends repeated POST requests to /api/auth/signIn, /api/auth/signIn/totp, or /api/auth/resetPassword. Each request carries a different X-Forwarded-For value. The rate limiter treats each spoofed source as a distinct client and permits the request, enabling password spraying, credential stuffing, and TOTP brute force against six-digit codes.

typescript
// Patch from commit 25e9cee: backend/src/main.ts
  });

  app.use(cookieParser());
-  app.set("trust proxy", true);
+  app.set("trust proxy", process.env.TRUST_PROXY === "true");

  await fs.promises.mkdir(`${DATA_DIRECTORY}/uploads/_temp`, {
    recursive: true,

Source: GitHub Commit 25e9cee. The fix gates trust proxy behind the TRUST_PROXY environment variable so operators opt in only when a sanitizing reverse proxy is deployed.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-108162

Indicators of Compromise

  • High request volume to /api/auth/signIn, /api/auth/signIn/totp, or /api/auth/resetPassword within short time windows
  • Requests arriving with highly varied or sequential X-Forwarded-For values from a single upstream TCP source
  • Authentication failures logged against many distinct IPs that resolve to invalid, bogon, or private ranges
  • TOTP validation failures clustered against a single user account

Detection Strategies

  • Compare the TCP peer address of inbound connections against the X-Forwarded-For header values recorded by the application
  • Alert when a single peer address submits more than N X-Forwarded-For values per minute to authentication endpoints
  • Flag authentication log entries where the recorded client IP does not match the proxy's own view of the connection source

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Centralize Pingvin Share X access and authentication logs in a SIEM for correlation across request headers and TCP metadata
  • Instrument the reverse proxy to strip or overwrite X-Forwarded-For on ingress and record both the raw and sanitized values
  • Track baseline authentication failure rates per endpoint and alert on deviations consistent with brute-force activity

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-108162

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Pingvin Share X to version 1.22.0 or later
  • Set the TRUST_PROXY environment variable to true only when a trusted reverse proxy terminates client connections
  • Configure the upstream proxy to overwrite the X-Forwarded-For header rather than append to it
  • Rotate credentials for any account that experienced anomalous authentication activity prior to patching

Patch Information

The fix is delivered in Pingvin Share X release v1.22.0 via commit 25e9cee. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-7gx2-g6x2-7mjg and the VulnCheck advisory for full details.

Workarounds

  • Place Pingvin Share X behind a reverse proxy that normalizes or strips the X-Forwarded-For header before it reaches the backend
  • Enforce rate limiting at the proxy or WAF layer using the true TCP source IP for authentication endpoints
  • Temporarily disable password reset and TOTP endpoints at the proxy if an upgrade cannot be deployed immediately
bash
# Example: run Pingvin Share X with trust proxy disabled unless explicitly enabled
export TRUST_PROXY=false

# Example nginx snippet enforcing the real client IP and ignoring attacker-supplied headers
# nginx.conf
location /api/auth/ {
    proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addr;
    proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
    limit_req zone=auth_zone burst=5 nodelay;
    proxy_pass http://pingvin_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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