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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-106040

CVE-2026-106040: Mooncake Store Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-106040 is an authorization bypass flaw in Mooncake Store that lets unauthenticated attackers erase disk replicas across all tenants. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-106040 Overview

CVE-2026-106040 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in Mooncake Store, a distributed key-value cache used in large language model serving infrastructure. The flaw affects the master branch through version 0.3.13.post1. Unauthenticated attackers who can reach the coro_rpc master port can invoke the EvictDiskReplica and BatchEvictDiskReplica remote procedure calls. These calls erase disk replicas of any object across all tenants. When an object's only remaining replica resides on disk, invoking these RPCs causes permanent data loss.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated network attackers can permanently delete cached objects across all tenants by invoking unauthorized eviction RPCs on the Mooncake master service.

Affected Products

  • Mooncake Store master branch through 0.3.13.post1
  • Deployments exposing the coro_rpc master port to untrusted networks
  • Multi-tenant Mooncake Store clusters serving LLM inference workloads

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-06 - CVE-2026-106040 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-106040

Vulnerability Analysis

Mooncake Store is a disaggregated key-value cache that supports large language model serving by sharing cached tensors across inference workers. The master service coordinates object placement, replica tracking, and eviction decisions across the cluster. It exposes administrative operations through a coro_rpc endpoint.

The EvictDiskReplica and BatchEvictDiskReplica handlers in master_service.cpp do not verify the caller's identity or authorization. Any client capable of connecting to the master port can submit object keys for disk-replica eviction. The handlers execute the deletion regardless of tenant boundaries or ownership.

Because Mooncake tiers data across memory and disk, many objects exist only on disk after memory pressure forces eviction from RAM. Deleting the disk replica removes the last persistent copy, causing data loss for downstream inference consumers.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authorization check [CWE-862] in the RPC handlers that implement replica eviction. The master service treats connection-level reachability as sufficient privilege. It does not require authentication tokens, client certificates, or tenant scoping before performing destructive operations. See the referenced source code snippet in master_service.cpp for the vulnerable handler.

Attack Vector

An attacker with network access to the coro_rpc master port establishes a connection and invokes EvictDiskReplica with a target object key, or BatchEvictDiskReplica with a list of keys. The master service accepts the request without validation and removes the referenced disk replicas. Attackers can enumerate or guess keys across tenants to maximize impact. Refer to the VulnCheck security advisory and GitHub issue #4478 for additional technical context.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-106040

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected EvictDiskReplica or BatchEvictDiskReplica RPC invocations in master service logs
  • Spikes in disk-replica deletion counts that do not correlate with normal cache pressure or tenant activity
  • Inference workers reporting cache misses for objects previously confirmed as persistent
  • Connections to the coro_rpc master port originating from source addresses outside the cluster's trusted range

Detection Strategies

  • Enable verbose logging on the master service and audit all eviction RPC calls, correlating caller address with expected cluster membership
  • Baseline normal eviction rates per tenant and alert on deviations that could indicate abuse
  • Monitor network flows to the master port and flag connections from hosts outside the inference cluster subnet

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward master service logs to a central SIEM for continuous analysis of RPC method invocations
  • Track object availability metrics across tiers to detect sudden drops in disk-tier object counts
  • Alert on any coro_rpc connection attempts from non-allowlisted IP ranges

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-106040

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to the coro_rpc master port using host firewalls or network ACLs so only trusted inference workers can connect
  • Inventory all Mooncake Store deployments and confirm whether the master endpoint is exposed to untrusted networks
  • Audit recent master service logs for unexpected EvictDiskReplica or BatchEvictDiskReplica invocations
  • Ensure critical cached objects have replicas across multiple tiers to limit the blast radius of unauthorized eviction

Patch Information

At the time of publication, no fixed version is listed in the NVD entry. All releases through 0.3.13.post1 on the master branch are affected. Monitor the Mooncake GitHub repository and issue #4478 for a patched release that adds authorization checks to the eviction RPC handlers.

Workarounds

  • Place the Mooncake master service behind a network boundary that permits only inference worker IP addresses to reach the RPC port
  • Deploy a service mesh or TLS-terminating proxy in front of the master endpoint to enforce mutual authentication
  • Operate single-tenant clusters until authorization controls are available, limiting cross-tenant exposure
  • Increase replica counts and distribute replicas across memory and disk tiers to reduce the risk of total data loss
bash
# Example iptables rule restricting coro_rpc master port to trusted workers
# Replace <MASTER_PORT> and worker CIDR with environment-specific values
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <MASTER_PORT> -s 10.0.0.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <MASTER_PORT> -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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