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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-106038

CVE-2026-106038: Mooncake Store Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-106038 is an authentication bypass flaw in Mooncake Store that allows attackers to force-delete objects without proper authentication. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-106038 Overview

CVE-2026-106038 is a missing authentication vulnerability [CWE-306] in Mooncake Store master through version 0.3.13.post1. The flaw exposes object-deletion remote procedure calls on the coro_rpc port without any authentication. Unauthenticated network attackers can invoke Remove, RemoveByRegex, RemoveAll, and BatchRemove operations against the master service. Attackers forge requests with the force flag enabled to bypass lease checks, delete keys matching arbitrary regular expressions, or wipe the entire store. The result is cache loss, downstream request failures, and degraded service for workloads that depend on Mooncake as a key-value cache tier.

Critical Impact

Any unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the Mooncake master coro_rpc port can erase the full cache or selectively purge entries, breaking dependent AI inference and KV-cache pipelines.

Affected Products

  • Mooncake Store master branch
  • Mooncake Store releases up to and including 0.3.13.post1
  • Deployments exposing the coro_rpc master service port on reachable networks

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-06 - CVE CVE-2026-106038 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-106038

Vulnerability Analysis

Mooncake Store is a distributed key-value cache used in large language model inference pipelines. The master service exposes administrative RPCs over the coro_rpc transport, including object-removal operations. These RPC handlers do not authenticate callers or validate that requests originate from authorized clients. An attacker that can reach the master port can call Remove, RemoveByRegex, RemoveAll, or BatchRemove directly.

The handlers accept a force boolean that bypasses lease and reference-count checks intended to protect in-use objects. Setting force=true lets an attacker delete entries even when active clients hold leases. RemoveByRegex compounds the impact by accepting an attacker-supplied regular expression that matches arbitrary key sets. RemoveAll clears the full key space in a single call.

The practical outcome is cache integrity loss and service disruption. Dependent inference workloads experience cache misses, latency spikes, and request failures while the store repopulates.

Root Cause

The master service RPC endpoints omit authentication and authorization checks. The force flag was designed as a privileged administrative override but is honored unconditionally when supplied by any caller. See the Mooncake master_service.cpp source for the affected handler implementation.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the coro_rpc port of a Mooncake master instance. The attacker sends a crafted Remove, RemoveByRegex, RemoveAll, or BatchRemove request with force set to true. No credentials, prior access, or user interaction are required. Refer to the VulnCheck advisory and GitHub Issue #4474 for additional detail.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-106038

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected spikes in cache-miss rates on inference clients backed by Mooncake Store
  • Master service logs showing Remove, RemoveByRegex, RemoveAll, or BatchRemove calls from unknown source addresses
  • Requests to the coro_rpc master port containing the force flag set to true from non-administrative hosts
  • Sudden drops in object counts or memory footprint on the Mooncake master without a corresponding operator action

Detection Strategies

  • Enable verbose RPC logging on the Mooncake master and alert on removal operations outside maintenance windows
  • Correlate cache eviction events with network flows to the coro_rpc port to identify unauthorized source IPs
  • Baseline normal removal volumes per client and alert on regex-based deletions matching broad patterns such as .*

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Monitor the Mooncake master coro_rpc port with network flow logging and restrict visibility to known client subnets
  • Track object-count metrics and request-failure rates on dependent inference services for anomaly detection
  • Forward master service logs to a central log platform and build detections for high-volume removal RPCs

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-106038

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network reachability to the Mooncake master coro_rpc port using firewall rules or network policies, allowing only trusted client hosts
  • Audit recent master service logs for unauthorized Remove, RemoveByRegex, RemoveAll, or BatchRemove calls
  • Isolate Mooncake master instances from untrusted networks and the public internet until a fixed release is deployed

Patch Information

No fixed version is listed in the NVD entry at publication. Monitor the Mooncake GitHub repository and Issue #4474 for an upstream fix. Upgrade beyond 0.3.13.post1 once an authenticated or lease-enforcing release becomes available.

Workarounds

  • Deploy Mooncake master services behind a network boundary that enforces mutual TLS or an authenticating proxy
  • Apply host-based firewall rules on master nodes to allow coro_rpc connections only from known worker and client IPs
  • Segment Mooncake infrastructure into a dedicated VLAN or Kubernetes namespace with NetworkPolicy restrictions
  • Monitor and rate-limit removal RPCs at a service mesh layer where feasible
bash
# Example iptables restriction limiting coro_rpc access to trusted clients
# Replace <MOONCAKE_PORT> with the configured coro_rpc port
# Replace <TRUSTED_CIDR> with your authorized client subnet
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <MOONCAKE_PORT> -s <TRUSTED_CIDR> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport <MOONCAKE_PORT> -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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