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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-103512

CVE-2026-103512: Perforce P4 Search Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-103512 is an authentication bypass flaw in Perforce P4 Search that allows attackers with stolen tickets to circumvent host-based restrictions. This post covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-103512 Overview

CVE-2026-103512 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Perforce P4 Search versions prior to 2026.4.2. The product trusts a client-supplied address when validating certain authentication requests. An attacker holding a stolen P4 Server ticket can bypass host-based ticket restrictions and trusted-address controls. The attacker gains access to P4 Search as the ticket's owner, inheriting that account's privileges within the search service. The flaw is tracked under CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing and requires network access with low privileges to exploit.

Critical Impact

An attacker with a stolen P4 Server ticket can spoof the client address, defeat host-binding controls, and impersonate the ticket owner against P4 Search.

Affected Products

  • Perforce P4 Search versions prior to 2026.4.2
  • Deployments relying on host-based ticket restrictions for P4 Search access control
  • Environments where P4 Server tickets may be exposed to untrusted hosts or users

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-05 - CVE-2026-103512 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-103512

Vulnerability Analysis

P4 Search authenticates callers by validating a P4 Server ticket against the originating client address. Host-binding is intended to tie a ticket to the specific IP address that requested it, so a stolen ticket cannot be replayed from another host. The vulnerable code path accepts the client address from the request itself rather than deriving it from the trusted network layer. An attacker who has obtained a valid ticket can therefore assert any address, including one on the ticket's allowlist or a trusted-address range, and pass the host-binding check.

Once the spoofed address is accepted, P4 Search treats the request as originating from the ticket owner. The attacker can then query indexed repository content, metadata, and search results that the compromised identity is permitted to see. The impact scope is confined to the P4 Search service rather than the broader P4 Server, but it undermines a defense that administrators rely on to contain ticket theft.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper trust of client-controlled input during authentication. P4 Search uses an address value supplied in the request to evaluate ticket host restrictions instead of the authenticated transport-layer source address. This matches [CWE-290], where an authentication decision depends on information an attacker can forge.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires the attacker to already possess a valid P4 Server ticket, for example through credential theft, workstation compromise, or recovery from logs or backups. The attacker then sends a crafted authentication request to P4 Search that both presents the stolen ticket and declares a client address accepted by the ticket's host-binding policy. No user interaction is required, and the attack is launched over the network. See the Perforce Security Advisory on CVE-2026-103512 for vendor details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-103512

Indicators of Compromise

  • P4 Search authentication events where the client-asserted address does not match the network-layer source address observed by upstream proxies or firewalls.
  • Successful P4 Search sessions originating from IP ranges that are inconsistent with the user's historical access patterns or geographic baseline.
  • Repeated P4 Search queries by a single ticket owner from multiple distinct source addresses within a short time window.

Detection Strategies

  • Correlate P4 Search access logs with firewall, load balancer, and reverse-proxy logs to identify mismatches between declared and observed client IPs.
  • Alert on P4 Search authentications that succeed despite ticket host-binding policies that should have rejected the originating network path.
  • Baseline per-user P4 Search activity and flag deviations in source address, query volume, or indexed repositories touched.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward P4 Search and P4 Server audit logs to a centralized analytics platform for long-term retention and cross-source correlation.
  • Monitor ticket issuance and reuse patterns to surface tickets being exercised from unexpected hosts.
  • Review administrative accounts and service accounts with broad P4 Search visibility more aggressively than standard users.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-103512

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade P4 Search to version 2026.4.2 or later on all affected instances.
  • Invalidate and reissue existing P4 Server tickets that may be in circulation, prioritizing privileged and service accounts.
  • Restrict network reachability to P4 Search so it is only accessible from trusted management and client networks.

Patch Information

Perforce has addressed the issue in P4 Search 2026.4.2. The fix changes how P4 Search determines the client address when evaluating ticket host restrictions, removing reliance on client-supplied values. Refer to the Perforce Security Advisory on CVE-2026-103512 for release notes and upgrade guidance.

Workarounds

  • Shorten P4 Server ticket lifetimes to reduce the window during which a stolen ticket can be replayed.
  • Enforce network-layer access controls, such as firewall rules or mutual TLS, that constrain which hosts can reach the P4 Search endpoint.
  • Require multi-factor authentication and conditional access for workflows that produce P4 Server tickets to limit theft opportunities.

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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