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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-102511

CVE-2026-102511: Apache PLC4X SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-102511 is an SSRF flaw in Apache PLC4X that lets attackers redirect connections to arbitrary hosts via spoofed UDP discovery responses. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-102511 Overview

CVE-2026-102511 affects the Apache PLC4X project, specifically the Go implementation (PLC4Go) and the Java implementation (PLC4J). The vulnerability stems from improper verification of the source of a communication channel [CWE-129] in the Automation Device Specification (ADS) discovery mechanism. An attacker on an adjacent network can send a spoofed User Datagram Protocol (UDP) datagram to a discovering host. The discovery routine derives the returned connection address from the AmsNetId field inside the response body rather than the datagram's actual source address. A single crafted response can insert an inventory entry pointing at an attacker-controlled host, redirecting subsequent ADS sessions and any configured route credentials.

Critical Impact

A spoofed discovery response can redirect ADS sessions and route credentials to an attacker-chosen host, while malformed datagrams can crash discovery listeners or spin a Modbus discoverer in an infinite CPU loop.

Affected Products

  • Apache PLC4X PLC4Go from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0 (github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4go)
  • Apache PLC4X PLC4J ADS and Modbus drivers from 0.10.0 before 1.0.0
  • Apache PLC4X PLC4J EtherNet/IP driver from 0.11.0 before 1.0.0

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-30 - CVE-2026-102511 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-102511

Vulnerability Analysis

The PLC4X ADS discovery protocol broadcasts UDP requests and collects responses from devices on the local network. The discovery handler parses each response and constructs an inventory entry describing how to reach the device. The connection endpoint is taken from the AmsNetId claimed in the response body. This value is attacker-controlled input and is never cross-checked against the datagram's source IP address. An adversary that can inject one UDP packet toward the discovering host controls the address written into the inventory.

Any application that later opens an ADS session against a discovered device sends its handshake, including configured route credentials, to the attacker-chosen host. The redirect target is not constrained to the local subnet.

The same discovery paths also contain parsing weaknesses that enable denial of service. In PLC4Go, a short version block in an ADS discovery response triggers a panic that terminates the listener goroutine for the remainder of the discovery call. Legitimate devices that respond afterward are silently dropped. In PLC4J, the ADS and EtherNet/IP discoverers propagate unhandled exceptions from malformed responses and stop processing. The PLC4J Modbus discoverer can be pushed into an infinite loop by a scanned host that returns a partial response, consuming a full CPU core.

Root Cause

The discovery result trusts protocol-body fields for routing decisions. The code path never validates the response origin against the UDP datagram's actual source address, and the parsers lack defensive bounds checks and exception handling for truncated payloads.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires the target application to opt into the discovery Application Programming Interface (API) and, for the redirect variant, to act on discovered items by opening a connection. The attacker must be able to deliver UDP datagrams to the discovering host, which typically means adjacent network access. No authentication or user credentials are required to send the spoofed response.

The vulnerability mechanism is described in the Apache Mailing List Thread and the OpenWall OSS-Security Discussion. No verified proof-of-concept code has been published.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-102511

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected ADS discovery responses arriving from hosts outside the expected industrial control system (ICS) subnet.
  • Discovery inventory entries containing AmsNetId values that resolve to routable addresses outside the local network segment.
  • Abrupt termination of PLC4Go discovery goroutines or PLC4J discovery threads accompanied by panic or exception traces in application logs.
  • Sustained 100% utilization of a single CPU core in a process performing PLC4J Modbus discovery.

Detection Strategies

  • Correlate UDP source addresses on ADS discovery ports with the AmsNetId values recorded by the discovery API, flagging mismatches.
  • Monitor application logs for panic stack traces originating from PLC4Go ADS discovery code paths and unhandled exceptions from PLC4J discoverers.
  • Baseline the set of hosts that legitimately respond to ADS, EtherNet/IP, and Modbus discovery, and alert on new responders.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Instrument hosts that invoke PLC4X discovery APIs with process-level CPU and thread telemetry to catch runaway Modbus discovery loops.
  • Capture and retain UDP flow records for ADS discovery traffic to support post-incident source verification.
  • Alert on outbound ADS session initiations to destinations outside the ICS segment.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102511

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all consumers of PLC4Go and PLC4J to Apache PLC4X version 1.0.0, which derives the connection address from the datagram's source address and logs a warning when the claimed AmsNetId disagrees with it.
  • Audit applications that call the PLC4X discovery API and inventory any that automatically open ADS sessions against discovered devices.
  • Rotate any ADS route credentials that may have been exposed to unverified discovery targets.

Patch Information

Apache PLC4X 1.0.0 fixes the improper verification of the communication channel source and hardens the discovery parsers against malformed datagrams. PLC4Go consumers must update the github.com/apache/plc4x/plc4go Go module to the release corresponding to Apache PLC4X 1.0.0. PLC4J consumers must update the ADS, Modbus, and EtherNet/IP driver artifacts to 1.0.0.

Workarounds

  • Disable calls to the PLC4X discovery API until the upgrade to 1.0.0 is deployed, since discovery is opt-in.
  • Restrict ADS, EtherNet/IP, and Modbus discovery traffic to trusted VLANs using firewall or switch access control lists.
  • Require operators to manually validate discovered device addresses before applications open ADS sessions against them.
bash
# Configuration example: block inbound ADS discovery responses from outside the ICS VLAN
# Adjust interface and subnet to match the environment
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p udp --sport 48899 ! -s 10.20.30.0/24 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p udp --dport 48899 ! -s 10.20.30.0/24 -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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