Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-102508 Overview
Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) contains multiple cryptographic defects in its OPC UA driver that allow network-positioned attackers to impersonate OPC UA servers. The flaws affect versions 0.9.0 through 0.13.1 and stem from improper certificate validation [CWE-295] and broken message signature verification. Attackers between client and server can read, forge, or modify secure-channel traffic, including user credentials transmitted by the client. The defect manifests differently across versions, with some releases logging failed signature checks without enforcement and others inverting the verification logic entirely. Apache has released version 1.0.0 to remediate the issue.
Critical Impact
A network-positioned attacker can impersonate the OPC UA server, decrypt user passwords, and manipulate industrial control traffic without detection.
Affected Products
- Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) versions 0.9.0 through 0.11.0
- Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) versions 0.12.0 through 0.13.1
- All PLC4X installations using the OPC UA driver before 1.0.0
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-30 - CVE-2026-102508 published to NVD
- 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-102508
Vulnerability Analysis
The OPC UA driver in Apache PLC4X fails to enforce cryptographic guarantees required by the OPC UA secure channel protocol. In versions 0.9.0 through 0.11.0, the driver logs failed message signature checks but never rejects the underlying messages. The same versions lack any mechanism to verify the server certificate, taking it directly from an unauthenticated GetEndpoints discovery response and using it to encrypt the user's password.
Versions 0.12.0 through 0.13.1 introduced a more severe regression. The signature check logic is inverted, causing the driver to accept invalid signatures and reject valid ones. Server certificates are accepted by default without validation against a trust anchor. These defects compound with policy negotiation weaknesses that allow endpoints to silently downgrade security.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper verification of cryptographic signatures combined with missing certificate chain validation. The driver defaults to a security policy of None across all affected versions. Starting with 0.12.0, the driver continues silently at a weaker security policy than the one configured. Starting with 0.13.0, endpoint selection prefers the weakest matching endpoint, further undermining defense-in-depth assumptions.
Attack Vector
An attacker with a network position between the OPC UA client and server intercepts the initial GetEndpoints discovery exchange. Because the client accepts the returned server certificate without validation, the attacker substitutes an attacker-controlled certificate. The client then encrypts user credentials with the attacker's public key during session establishment. Combined with the broken signature enforcement, the attacker forges secure-channel messages in both directions and maintains a full man-in-the-middle position.
See the Apache Security Discussion Thread and the Openwall OSS Security Update for advisory details.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-102508
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected OPC UA server certificates appearing in client trust exchanges or session logs
- OPC UA sessions negotiated at security policy None or Basic128Rsa15 when Basic256Sha256 is expected
- Repeated GetEndpoints discovery requests originating from unusual network segments between PLC4X clients and OPC UA servers
- Client log entries reporting signature verification failures that are not followed by session termination
Detection Strategies
- Inventory all deployments of Apache PLC4X and confirm the version of the PLC4J OPC UA driver in use
- Inspect application logs for signature verification warnings that were logged but not enforced in versions 0.9.0 through 0.11.0
- Monitor OPC UA session establishment traffic for security policy downgrades and unexpected endpoint selection
- Compare observed server certificates against a known-good pinned certificate or configured trust store
Monitoring Recommendations
- Capture OPC UA handshake traffic on operational technology (OT) network segments and alert on policy None sessions
- Log and review all certificate fingerprints presented during OPC UA discovery and session activation
- Alert on client processes that continue sessions after logging signature validation failures
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102508
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache PLC4X to version 1.0.0, which corrects signature verification and enforces certificate validation
- Configure a trust store or pinned server certificate for every OPC UA endpoint the client connects to
- Explicitly set the security policy to Basic256Sha256 with SignAndEncrypt and reject weaker negotiated policies
- Rotate any user credentials that may have been transmitted through affected PLC4X clients
Patch Information
Apache PLC4X 1.0.0 remediates the vulnerability. Version 1.0.0 verifies message signatures correctly, refuses to connect unless the server certificate can be verified against a configured trust store or pinned certificate, defaults to Basic256Sha256 with SignAndEncrypt, and fails the connection if the negotiated security policy is weaker than the one configured.
Workarounds
- Restrict OPC UA client-server traffic to isolated OT network segments with strict access control lists
- Terminate OPC UA sessions through an authenticated gateway that enforces certificate validation independently
- Disable the PLC4X OPC UA driver until an upgrade to 1.0.0 can be completed
# Configuration example: enforce strong security policy and trust store in PLC4X 1.0.0
opcua:tcp://plc.example.com:4840?securityPolicy=Basic256Sha256&messageSecurity=SignAndEncrypt&keyStoreFile=/etc/plc4x/client-keystore.p12&trustStoreFile=/etc/plc4x/server-truststore.p12
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

