Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-101054 Overview
CVE-2026-101054 is an improper access control vulnerability in the Thinkware U3000 dashcam through firmware version 1.02.04. The flaw resides in the get_file function exposed by the TCP Service component, which handles access to /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf. A remote attacker can reach the service over the network and retrieve the file without authentication. Because wpa_supplicant.conf typically stores Wi-Fi network credentials in plaintext or recoverable form, exploitation leads to disclosure of wireless configuration data. The vendor was contacted but did not respond to the disclosure, and a public exploit exists.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated remote attackers can read the Wi-Fi supplicant configuration file from the device, exposing network credentials and enabling further compromise of connected networks.
Affected Products
- Thinkware U3000 dashcam firmware up to and including 1.02.04
- TCP Service component exposing the get_file function
- Devices exposing /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf through the vulnerable service
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-28 - CVE-2026-101054 published to NVD
- 2026-09-28 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-101054
Vulnerability Analysis
The Thinkware U3000 exposes a TCP service that implements a get_file function for retrieving files from the device filesystem. The function does not enforce access controls on the requested path, allowing clients to request sensitive files including /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf. The weakness is classified under [CWE-266] Incorrect Privilege Assignment, reflecting the mismatch between the privileges required to read supplicant configuration and the privileges granted by the service.
An attacker with network reachability to the dashcam can issue a request to the TCP Service and receive the contents of the supplicant configuration file. The file commonly contains the service set identifier (SSID), pre-shared key (PSK), and other network parameters used by the device to join wireless networks. Disclosure of these values enables an attacker to join the same wireless network, intercept device traffic, or pivot to other hosts.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing authorization and path validation in the get_file handler. The service treats file-retrieval requests as privileged operations should, but applies none of the access checks required to protect credential material. There is no authentication requirement, no allowlist of permitted paths, and no filtering of sensitive configuration files.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the TCP Service exposed by the dashcam. No authentication, user interaction, or elevated privileges are needed. An attacker on the same Wi-Fi network or any network path that reaches the device can issue a crafted request to the get_file function and receive the contents of /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf. Technical reproduction steps are published in the GitHub Findings Report.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-101054
Indicators of Compromise
- Inbound TCP connections to the Thinkware U3000 management service from unexpected hosts
- Requests to the device that reference /tmp/wpa_supplicant.conf or invoke the get_file function
- Unusual traffic volume from the dashcam shortly after a file-read request, indicating credential reuse
- Appearance of the device's Wi-Fi credentials being used by unknown clients on the wireless network
Detection Strategies
- Capture and inspect traffic to and from the dashcam, flagging any session that transfers configuration file content
- Monitor DHCP and association logs on the wireless access point for new clients joining with credentials known to be stored on the device
- Correlate dashcam network activity with known IP ranges of trusted mobile applications used to manage the device
Monitoring Recommendations
- Place the dashcam on an isolated VLAN or guest SSID and alert on any cross-VLAN traffic attempts
- Log and retain full packet captures from the dashcam segment for post-incident analysis
- Rotate Wi-Fi pre-shared keys on a schedule and alert when devices fail to reauthenticate as expected
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-101054
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network access to the Thinkware U3000 so that only trusted management hosts can reach its TCP services
- Move the device to a dedicated SSID with a unique pre-shared key that is not reused on any other network
- Rotate the Wi-Fi PSK on any network whose credentials may have been stored on an exposed device
- Review wireless access logs for unauthorized clients that may have used disclosed credentials
Patch Information
The vendor did not respond to the disclosure, and no vendor-supplied patch is referenced in the available advisories. Monitor the VulDB entry and the GitHub Findings Report for updated firmware availability.
Workarounds
- Block inbound connections to the dashcam's TCP management port at the network boundary
- Disable the device's Wi-Fi functionality when not required for firmware updates or data transfer
- Use a segregated wireless network for the dashcam so that credential disclosure does not expose production networks
- Decommission affected devices in environments where network isolation is not feasible
# Example: isolate the dashcam on a dedicated VLAN and block lateral access
# Replace interface and subnet values with those used in your environment
iptables -A FORWARD -i vlan_dashcam -o vlan_corp -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -i vlan_corp -o vlan_dashcam -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -i vlan_corp -o vlan_dashcam -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

