Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-100849 Overview
CVE-2026-100849 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in AzuraCast, a self-hosted web radio management suite. The flaw affects AzuraCast versions prior to 0.23.8 and resides in the webhook URL validation routine used by the Generic and Discord webhook connectors. A station-scoped user holding only the WebHooks permission can configure a webhook pointing at loopback, RFC1918 private, or hostname-based internal targets. The server then issues outbound HTTP POST requests containing Now Playing data to attacker-chosen destinations. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-918.
Critical Impact
A low-privileged station user can coerce the AzuraCast server into issuing arbitrary POST requests against internal, loopback, or private-network targets, enabling internal reconnaissance and interaction with non-public services.
Affected Products
- AzuraCast self-hosted web radio management suite
- All versions prior to 0.23.8
- Deployments exposing the Generic or Discord webhook connectors
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-27 - CVE-2026-100849 published to NVD
- 2026-09-28 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-100849
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in the AbstractConnector::getValidUrl() method located at backend/src/Webhook/Connector/AbstractConnector.php. This method is shared by the Generic and Discord webhook connectors to validate user-supplied destination URLs before the server dispatches outbound HTTP requests. The validator restricts only hosts whose literal IP falls inside the link-local ranges 169.254.0.0/16 or fe80::/10.
Loopback addresses such as 127.0.0.1, IPv6 ::1, and RFC1918 private ranges including 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, and 192.168.0.0/16 are not blocked. Any non-literal-IP hostname forces the IP parsing call to throw an exception, which short-circuits the check entirely and allows the request through. An attacker can therefore target internal metadata services, administrative interfaces, or databases reachable from the AzuraCast host.
The PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test endpoint lets the same low-privileged user trigger the outbound request on demand without waiting for a Now Playing event.
Root Cause
The URL validator implements an allow-by-default policy, blocking only two narrow IP ranges while failing closed on exceptions during IP parsing. Hostnames that fail IPv4 or IPv6 parsing bypass the block list entirely rather than being rejected as unsafe. This design violates the SSRF prevention guidance of validating the resolved destination against a deny list of private, loopback, and metadata ranges.
Attack Vector
An authenticated user with the station-scoped WebHooks permission creates a Generic or Discord webhook pointing at an internal URL such as http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin or http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ using a hostname that resolves to the target. The attacker then calls the PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test endpoint. The AzuraCast backend performs the outbound POST, delivering Now Playing JSON to the chosen internal service and returning indirect indicators of response behavior.
See the VulnCheck Advisory and the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4 for additional technical detail.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-100849
Indicators of Compromise
- Webhook configurations referencing loopback hosts (127.0.0.0/8, ::1), RFC1918 ranges, or cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254
- Outbound HTTP POST requests from the AzuraCast process to internal network segments or non-radio service ports
- Repeated calls to the PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test endpoint from a single low-privileged account
Detection Strategies
- Review audit logs for creation or modification of Generic and Discord webhook entries by users holding only the station-scoped WebHooks permission
- Inspect the AzuraCast reverse proxy or egress firewall for outbound requests whose destination host does not match known webhook providers
- Correlate webhook test API calls with unexpected traffic toward private IP ranges or hostnames that resolve internally
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable application-level logging of resolved webhook destination IPs and alert on any address inside private, loopback, link-local, or cloud metadata ranges
- Monitor DNS resolution performed by the AzuraCast backend for internal hostnames
- Track the rate of PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test invocations per user and alert on anomalies
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100849
Immediate Actions Required
- Audit all existing webhook configurations and remove entries pointing at non-public destinations
- Restrict the station-scoped WebHooks permission to trusted administrators until a patched release is deployed
- Place the AzuraCast server behind an egress proxy that denies outbound traffic to private, loopback, link-local, and cloud metadata ranges
Patch Information
At the time of the advisory publication no patched version was available. The fix is expected in AzuraCast 0.23.8 or later. Operators should track the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4 for release availability and upgrade immediately once a patched build ships.
Workarounds
- Enforce network-layer egress filtering that blocks the AzuraCast container or host from reaching 127.0.0.0/8, ::1, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, and fe80::/10
- Disable the Generic and Discord webhook connectors if they are not required for operations
- Revoke the WebHooks permission from non-administrative station roles until an upstream fix is deployed
# Example egress restriction using iptables on the AzuraCast host
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner azuracast -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner azuracast -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner azuracast -d 172.16.0.0/12 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner azuracast -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner azuracast -d 169.254.0.0/16 -j REJECT
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

