Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-100848 Overview
CVE-2026-100848 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in AzuraCast, an open-source web radio management suite distributed as the Composer package azuracast/azuracast. The flaw affects versions before 0.23.8 and resides in the station "Remote Relay" URL handling path. AzuraCast validates the Remote Relay URL only for syntactic correctness and an http/https scheme through Utilities\Urls::parseUserUrl, used by StationRemote::getUrlAsUri. The code performs no host or IP address restriction, allowing authenticated users with the station-scoped RemoteRelays permission to point requests at internal network resources. The weakness is tracked under [CWE-918].
Critical Impact
An authenticated low-privileged user can coerce AzuraCast to repeatedly issue HTTP requests to loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints, exposing internal services and cloud instance credentials.
Affected Products
- AzuraCast (Composer package azuracast/azuracast) before 0.23.8
- AzuraCast main branch at commit bcf8754eef3a268ad82c3db4d81f7920c3c28b56 (2026-07-31)
- All AzuraCast deployments exposing the station Remote Relay configuration to users with the RemoteRelays permission
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-27 - CVE-2026-100848 published to NVD
- 2026-09-28 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-100848
Vulnerability Analysis
AzuraCast allows station operators to configure a Remote Relay URL that the application periodically polls to collect Now Playing metadata. The relay URL is accepted after only two checks: valid URL syntax and an http or https scheme. No allowlist, denylist, or DNS resolution check restricts the destination host.
After configuration, the background job AbstractRemote::getNowPlayingAsync dispatches outbound HTTP requests to the stored URL on a recurring schedule. Because the request originates from the AzuraCast server, it bypasses perimeter firewalls and reaches hosts reachable from the server's network namespace. The requests happen automatically without additional user interaction once the URL is saved.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing destination validation in Utilities\Urls::parseUserUrl. The function treats the user-supplied URL as a trusted input after confirming scheme and syntax. There is no check against loopback ranges (127.0.0.0/8, ::1), private ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local ranges (169.254.0.0/16), or known cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254.
Attack Vector
An attacker holding the station-scoped RemoteRelays permission submits a Remote Relay URL such as http://127.0.0.1:<port>/ to probe internal services, or http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ to query the AWS Instance Metadata Service. The AzuraCast scheduler then issues repeated outbound requests to the chosen target. In cloud environments, this can expose IAM credentials, user-data scripts, and other sensitive metadata that would otherwise be unreachable from outside the host.
See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-4h6m-rrxm-7w3m and the VulnCheck Advisory on AzuraCast for additional technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-100848
Indicators of Compromise
- Remote Relay URL configurations that resolve to loopback, private, or link-local address ranges
- Outbound HTTP requests from the AzuraCast host targeting 169.254.169.254 or other cloud metadata IP addresses
- Repeated AzuraCast background requests to internal ports typically associated with databases, admin consoles, or orchestration APIs
- Audit log entries showing RemoteRelays-scoped users modifying station relay URLs to internal destinations
Detection Strategies
- Inspect the AzuraCast database for station remote entries whose stored URL hosts resolve to RFC1918, loopback, or link-local addresses
- Monitor egress proxy logs for AzuraCast-originated requests whose destinations fall outside expected streaming provider ranges
- Correlate changes to station relay settings in the AzuraCast audit trail with subsequent anomalous outbound HTTP traffic
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable network flow logging on the AzuraCast host and alert on connections to 169.254.169.254, 127.0.0.0/8, and internal management subnets
- Instrument the AzuraCast PHP process to log outbound HTTP targets from AbstractRemote::getNowPlayingAsync
- Review user accounts holding the RemoteRelays permission and track configuration changes they perform
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100848
Immediate Actions Required
- Audit all station Remote Relay URLs and remove any that target internal, loopback, or cloud metadata addresses
- Restrict the RemoteRelays permission to trusted operators only until a patched release is available
- Place AzuraCast behind an egress proxy that denies connections to RFC1918 ranges and known metadata IPs
- On AWS deployments, enforce IMDSv2 to require session tokens that an SSRF-only primitive cannot easily obtain
Patch Information
No patched version is available at the time of the advisory. The project tracker lists the fix for AzuraCast 0.23.8, which had not been released when CVE-2026-100848 was published. Monitor the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-4h6m-rrxm-7w3m for the official patch commit and upgrade as soon as a fixed build is published.
Workarounds
- Deploy AzuraCast in a network segment that cannot reach internal management services or cloud metadata endpoints
- Use host-based firewall rules on the AzuraCast server to block outbound traffic to 169.254.169.254 and private subnets
- Revoke the RemoteRelays permission from any station-scoped role that does not require it
- Front AzuraCast outbound HTTP traffic with an authenticated forward proxy that enforces a destination allowlist
# Example iptables rules to block SSRF-relevant destinations from the AzuraCast host
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 169.254.169.254 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 127.0.0.0/8 ! -o lo -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 172.16.0.0/12 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j REJECT
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

