Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-100227 Overview
CVE-2026-100227 is an improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability in Apache CXF's JAX-RS XML Security module. The JAX-RS XML Signature interceptors XmlSigInHandler, XmlSigInInterceptor, and the streaming XmlSecInInterceptor fail to confirm that the XML passed to the application is actually covered by the signature. An attacker with any document signed by a trusted key can wrap it in unsigned content. The application then treats the entire payload as signed, enabling an XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) attack. Apache has released fixed versions 4.2.4, 4.1.9, and 3.6.13.
Critical Impact
Remote attackers can forge trusted content in signed XML messages, breaking integrity guarantees in services that rely on JAX-RS XML Signature verification.
Affected Products
- Apache CXF versions prior to 4.2.4 (4.2.x branch)
- Apache CXF versions prior to 4.1.9 (4.1.x branch)
- Apache CXF versions prior to 3.6.13 (3.6.x branch)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-09 - CVE-2026-100227 published to NVD
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-100227
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw sits in Apache CXF's JAX-RS XML Security module, which provides XML Digital Signature validation for REST services. The signature interceptors validate that a signature in the document is cryptographically correct and chains to a trusted key. They do not verify that the elements consumed by the application logic are the same elements covered by that signature's Reference URIs.
This gap allows an XML Signature Wrapping attack. An adversary who obtains any single document signed by a trusted key can embed it as a child element inside attacker-controlled, unsigned XML. The interceptor confirms the embedded signature is valid, marks the message as trusted, and passes the outer wrapper to the application. The application then processes attacker-chosen content under the authority of a legitimate signer.
The weakness maps to [CWE-362] in the NVD entry, though the behavior is characteristic of improper signature scope verification in XML security processing.
Root Cause
The interceptors XmlSigInHandler, XmlSigInInterceptor, and XmlSecInInterceptor validate signature cryptography without enforcing that signed references cover the elements delivered to application handlers. Signature validity and signature coverage are treated as the same property. They are not. Any mismatch between signed scope and consumed scope lets unsigned content inherit trust from a signed sibling.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to a JAX-RS endpoint that uses the vulnerable interceptors and accepts XML input. The attacker needs one legitimately signed XML document produced by any trusted key accepted by the service. The attacker constructs a new XML message that includes the original signed element as a nested child, then adds unsigned elements that the application will read. The service accepts the request as signed and acts on the attacker-controlled fields.
No authentication, user interaction, or elevated privileges are required beyond possession of a single valid signed message. Integrity of application data is the primary impact; confidentiality and availability are not directly affected.
No public proof-of-concept exploit is listed in the enriched data, and the vulnerability is not present in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-100227
Indicators of Compromise
- Inbound XML requests to JAX-RS endpoints that contain multiple elements with the same QName, where only one carries a ds:Signature reference.
- SOAP or REST payloads where the Reference URI in a ds:Signature points to an element nested inside another element that the application processes.
- Signed XML documents received through channels or workflows that normally do not deliver signed messages for the targeted operation.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory services that use org.apache.cxf.rs.security.xml.XmlSigInHandler, XmlSigInInterceptor, or XmlSecInInterceptor and flag any running on CXF versions earlier than 4.2.4, 4.1.9, or 3.6.13.
- Parse XML payloads at an inspection layer and compare the DOM tree subtree referenced by each ds:Reference with the elements consumed by downstream business logic. Alert on divergence.
- Review application logs for authorization decisions tied to signed messages where the executed action does not match the originally signed template of fields.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose logging on CXF signature interceptors and ship logs to a central analytics pipeline for correlation across endpoints.
- Monitor the Apache CXF release feed and the Apache Mailing List Thread for follow-on advisories.
- Alert on unexpected changes to classpath artifacts matching cxf-rt-rs-security-xml-*.jar in production deployments.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-100227
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache CXF to 4.2.4, 4.1.9, or 3.6.13 depending on the branch in use.
- Identify every JAX-RS service that validates XML signatures and prioritize patching those exposed to untrusted networks.
- Rotate any signing keys that may have had signed documents captured by third parties, since a single captured message is enough to drive the attack.
Patch Information
Apache CXF maintainers released fixed builds in versions 4.2.4, 4.1.9, and 3.6.13. Details are published on the Apache Mailing List Thread and mirrored in the OpenWall OSS-Security Update. Confirm the dependency version resolved at build time matches a patched release, since transitive dependencies can pull older CXF artifacts.
Workarounds
- Where immediate upgrade is not possible, place a validating XML gateway in front of the JAX-RS service that rejects messages containing elements not covered by the ds:Signature references.
- Restrict acceptance of signed XML to trusted network segments and authenticated clients to shrink the attack surface until patching is complete.
- Disable the vulnerable interceptors on endpoints that do not require XML signature validation.
# Maven dependency update example - set CXF to a fixed release
mvn versions:set-property -Dproperty=cxf.version -DnewVersion=4.2.4
mvn versions:set-property -Dproperty=cxf.version -DnewVersion=4.1.9
mvn versions:set-property -Dproperty=cxf.version -DnewVersion=3.6.13
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

