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CVE Vulnerability Database

CVE-2025-7226: Invt Hmitool VPM File RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2025-7226 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Invt Hmitool caused by an out-of-bounds write flaw during VPM file parsing. Attackers can exploit this to execute arbitrary code when users open malicious files.

Published:

CVE-2025-7226 Overview

CVE-2025-7226 is an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in INVT HMITool, a configuration utility used to design and deploy human-machine interface (HMI) screens for industrial control environments. The flaw resides in the parser that handles VPM project files. INVT HMITool fails to validate user-supplied data when reading VPM files, allowing a crafted file to write past the end of an allocated buffer. An attacker who convinces a user to open a malicious VPM file can execute arbitrary code in the context of the running process. The issue is tracked as ZDI-CAN-25048 and assigned [CWE-787].

Critical Impact

Successful exploitation gives an attacker arbitrary code execution on the engineering workstation running INVT HMITool, providing a foothold into operational technology (OT) environments.

Affected Products

  • INVT HMITool version 7.1.011
  • Workflows that import or open third-party VPM project files
  • Engineering workstations used to program INVT HMI devices

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-07-21 - CVE-2025-7226 published to NVD
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-7226

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability exists in the VPM file parsing logic within INVT HMITool 7.1.011. VPM files are structured project files consumed by the application during normal engineering workflows. The parser reads length and offset fields from the file without validating them against the size of the destination buffer. When a crafted VPM file supplies oversized or attacker-controlled values, the parser writes data past the end of an allocated buffer on the heap or stack.

This class of memory corruption ([CWE-787]) is well understood as an arbitrary code execution primitive. By controlling the data written out of bounds, an attacker can corrupt adjacent memory structures such as function pointers, vtables, or return addresses. Exploitation runs code in the security context of the user running INVT HMITool, which on engineering workstations is typically a local user with access to OT assets.

Exploitation requires user interaction, as the attack vector is local. A target must open the malicious VPM file or visit a page that delivers one. This makes phishing and supply-chain delivery of project files plausible vectors against control engineers.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing bounds validation on attacker-controlled length and offset fields parsed from VPM files. The application trusts the file contents when copying data into fixed-size buffers, producing an out-of-bounds write.

Attack Vector

An attacker crafts a malicious VPM file and delivers it via email, shared project repository, USB media, or a malicious web page. When an engineer opens the file in INVT HMITool, the parser triggers the out-of-bounds write and the attacker gains code execution under the user account.

No public proof-of-concept code is associated with this advisory. Refer to the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-25-477 for additional technical context.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-7226

Indicators of Compromise

  • VPM files received from untrusted sources or arriving via email, removable media, or external project shares
  • Unexpected crashes of HMITool.exe followed by spawning of child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe
  • Outbound network connections from HMITool.exe to non-INVT infrastructure shortly after a VPM file is opened
  • New persistence artifacts (scheduled tasks, Run keys, services) created on engineering workstations after VPM file handling

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor process lineage on engineering workstations for INVT HMITool spawning command interpreters or scripting hosts
  • Apply file integrity monitoring to project directories to flag VPM files introduced from outside approved engineering change workflows
  • Use endpoint detection and response telemetry to correlate VPM file open events with subsequent process injection, memory allocation anomalies, or unsigned module loads
  • Hunt for VPM files transiting email gateways or web proxies, as these files are rarely shared outside engineering channels

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward process, file, and module-load telemetry from engineering workstations to a centralized analytics platform
  • Alert on crash dumps for HMITool.exe to surface failed exploitation attempts
  • Track network egress from OT engineering hosts to identify command-and-control activity following exploitation
  • Review user reports of HMITool instability after opening project files as potential early indicators

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-7226

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict INVT HMITool to opening VPM files originating from trusted, internally controlled project repositories
  • Block VPM file attachments at email gateways and web proxies when not required for business operations
  • Isolate engineering workstations running HMITool from general-purpose internet browsing and email on the same host
  • Enforce least privilege so the user running HMITool cannot modify system-wide configurations

Patch Information

At the time of publication, no vendor advisory or patch URL is listed in the NVD entry for CVE-2025-7226. Consult Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-25-477 and contact INVT directly to confirm availability of a fixed release before continuing to deploy version 7.1.011.

Workarounds

  • Open VPM files only from validated, signed internal sources and reject files from external parties
  • Use a dedicated, network-segmented engineering workstation for handling untrusted or third-party project files
  • Apply application allowlisting to ensure HMITool.exe can only execute from approved paths and cannot spawn arbitrary child processes
  • Train control engineers to treat unsolicited VPM files as suspicious, similar to macro-enabled documents
bash
# Example Windows policy to block HMITool from spawning command interpreters
# (apply via WDAC, AppLocker, or EDR custom rule)
Block: Parent=HMITool.exe Child IN (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe)

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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