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CVE-2025-5826: Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2025-5826 is an RCE flaw in Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Business C50 that allows network-adjacent attackers to inject arbitrary AT commands without authentication. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2025-5826 Overview

CVE-2025-5826 is an input misinterpretation vulnerability [CWE-115] affecting Autel MaxiCharger electric vehicle charging stations. The flaw resides in the ble_process_esp32_msg function, which processes Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) messages destined for the ESP32 subsystem. A network-adjacent attacker within BLE range can inject arbitrary AT commands into the device without authentication. Successful exploitation permits execution of AT commands in the context of the charging station firmware, impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The issue was reported through the Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-26368 and published as advisory ZDI-25-345.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers within Bluetooth range can inject AT commands into Autel MaxiCharger stations, altering device behavior and compromising charging operations.

Affected Products

  • Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Business C50, AC Pro, and AC Ultra (American and European standard firmware)
  • Autel MaxiCharger DC Compact Mobile, DC Compact Pedestal, DC Fast, and DC HiPower
  • Autel MaxiCharger DH480 and MaxiCharger Single Charger

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-06-25 - CVE-2025-5826 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-5826

Vulnerability Analysis

The MaxiCharger exposes a BLE interface used for provisioning and local management. Messages received on this channel are parsed by the ble_process_esp32_msg routine before being forwarded to the ESP32 microcontroller. The function misinterprets attacker-controlled fields in the message body, treating data bytes as control information. This parser confusion allows AT command sequences supplied over BLE to reach the ESP32 command interpreter and execute as if issued by the device itself. Because authentication is not enforced on the vulnerable code path, any client capable of pairing with or communicating over the BLE channel can trigger the condition. The attack is constrained to adjacent-network reach, meaning the attacker must be within Bluetooth radio range of the charging station.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper type and boundary interpretation of BLE message input, classified under [CWE-115: Misinterpretation of Input]. The firmware fails to validate that message fields match the expected structure and delimiters before passing them to the AT command handler on the ESP32. Attacker-supplied bytes consequently cross a trust boundary intended to separate BLE transport data from device control commands.

Attack Vector

An attacker positions a BLE-capable device within range of the targeted MaxiCharger and establishes a connection to its BLE service. The attacker then crafts a message that ble_process_esp32_msg will misparse, embedding AT command strings in fields that are forwarded without sanitization to the ESP32. Executed AT commands can be used to modify charger configuration, alter network settings, or disrupt charging sessions. No credentials, user interaction, or prior access to the device management portal are required. Technical details are documented in the Zero Day Initiative advisory ZDI-25-345.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2025-5826

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected BLE pairing or connection events logged by MaxiCharger units outside normal commissioning windows.
  • Unexplained changes to charger configuration parameters, Wi-Fi credentials, or OCPP backend endpoints.
  • Charging sessions that terminate abnormally or report inconsistent telemetry to the Autel cloud backend.

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor BLE radio activity near deployed chargers using wireless intrusion detection sensors and alert on unauthorized connections.
  • Compare charger configuration state against a known-good baseline on a scheduled basis to detect unauthorized AT command effects.
  • Correlate charger backend telemetry with physical site access logs to identify anomalous local interactions.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on MaxiCharger management backends and forward events to a centralized SIEM for analysis.
  • Track firmware version and configuration drift across the fleet of charging stations.
  • Review ZDI advisory ZDI-25-345 for updated indicators and apply vendor-supplied detection guidance when published.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-5826

Immediate Actions Required

  • Inventory all deployed Autel MaxiCharger units and identify firmware versions currently in use.
  • Restrict physical access to charging stations to reduce the opportunity for BLE-range attacks.
  • Disable the BLE provisioning interface on units that no longer require local configuration, where the product permits.

Patch Information

Autel has not published a vendor advisory URL in the referenced sources at the time of writing. Operators should contact Autel support and monitor the Zero Day Initiative advisory ZDI-25-345 for firmware update availability. Apply vendor firmware updates immediately upon release and validate successful installation across the fleet.

Workarounds

  • Limit the time window during which BLE is active, enabling it only during authorized commissioning or maintenance.
  • Deploy chargers in locations that limit proximity by unauthorized individuals, such as fenced or monitored areas.
  • Monitor Bluetooth spectrum near charging infrastructure for unauthorized devices attempting pairing.
bash
# Example operational control: schedule physical inspection and BLE audit
# Run a weekly site survey with a BLE scanner to enumerate devices advertising near chargers
sudo hcitool lescan --duplicates | tee ble_scan_$(date +%F).log

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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