Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2025-5829 Overview
CVE-2025-5829 is a stack-based buffer overflow [CWE-121] in Autel MaxiCharger electric vehicle (EV) charging stations. The flaw resides in the autocharge feature's handling of JSON messages. The firmware fails to validate the length of user-supplied data before copying it into a fixed-length stack buffer. A physically present attacker can trigger the overflow without authentication to execute arbitrary code in the context of the device. The issue was reported through Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-26330 and tracked publicly as ZDI-25-348.
Critical Impact
Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution on the charger, giving attackers full control over charging operations, firmware, and any connected network interfaces.
Affected Products
- Autel MaxiCharger AC Elite Business C50, AC Pro, and AC Ultra (American and European standard firmware)
- Autel MaxiCharger DC Compact Mobile, DC Compact Pedestal, DC Fast, and DC HiPower (American and European standard firmware)
- Autel MaxiCharger DH480 and Single Charger (American and European standard firmware)
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-06-25 - CVE-2025-5829 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2025-5829
Vulnerability Analysis
The autocharge subsystem in the MaxiCharger firmware accepts JSON-formatted messages over a locally accessible interface. One of the message handlers copies a user-controlled string field directly into a stack-allocated buffer of fixed size. Because the handler does not enforce a maximum length, oversized input writes past the buffer boundary, corrupting the saved return address and adjacent stack frame data. Attackers who redirect control flow gain code execution within the firmware's execution context, which on embedded chargers typically runs with elevated privileges and direct access to charging controllers and network stacks.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing input length validation on JSON message fields prior to a copy operation into a fixed-length stack buffer. The handler relies on the caller to produce well-formed data, violating the principle of defensive input handling at trust boundaries. Classified as [CWE-121] Stack-based Buffer Overflow, the pattern is consistent with unchecked strcpy- or memcpy-style operations against attacker-controlled strings.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires physical access to the charger (AV:P). An attacker interacts with the device's local interface — typically Bluetooth Low Energy or an exposed management channel used by the autocharge function — and submits a crafted JSON payload containing an oversized field. No authentication or user interaction is required. Once the overflow executes attacker-supplied code, the charger can be used to pivot into connected networks, manipulate power delivery, or persist malicious firmware. Full technical details are published in the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-25-348.
Stop Remote Code Execution Before It Runs
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Stop Exploit AttemptsDetection Methods for CVE-2025-5829
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected reboots, service crashes, or watchdog resets on MaxiCharger units coinciding with Bluetooth or local interface activity.
- Unknown Bluetooth pairings or sessions established with chargers outside of commissioning windows.
- Charger firmware integrity mismatches against the vendor-provided baseline hash.
Detection Strategies
- Monitor charger syslog and diagnostic feeds for malformed JSON parse errors or autocharge handler faults.
- Correlate physical access events (site cameras, badge logs) with any out-of-band charger behavior changes.
- Perform periodic firmware attestation to detect unauthorized modification of the device image.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward charger telemetry and management-plane logs to a centralized SIEM for anomaly baselining.
- Alert on new or unauthorized Bluetooth connections to chargers deployed in public or semi-public locations.
- Track outbound network traffic from charger VLANs to detect post-exploitation command-and-control activity.
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-5829
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all deployed Autel MaxiCharger units across the affected AC and DC product families and verify installed firmware versions.
- Restrict physical access to charging units by enabling tamper enclosures, locked cabinets, or supervised installation areas.
- Disable or constrain the Bluetooth and local management interfaces when not required for commissioning or servicing.
Patch Information
Autel has not published a vendor advisory URL in the referenced sources at the time of writing. Operators should contact Autel support directly and consult the Zero Day Initiative Advisory ZDI-25-348 for the latest remediation status, then apply any firmware update distributed through the Autel Charge Cloud or OTA update channel.
Workarounds
- Segment chargers onto a dedicated VLAN with strict egress filtering to limit lateral movement after exploitation.
- Where operationally feasible, keep the autocharge feature disabled until a patched firmware release is deployed.
- Enforce physical security controls — bollards, enclosures, CCTV coverage — around unattended charger installations.
# Example: isolate charger VLAN with egress restrictions (illustrative only)
# Replace interface and subnet values with site-specific configuration
iptables -A FORWARD -i vlan-ev-chargers -o wan0 -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -i vlan-ev-chargers -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -i vlan-ev-chargers -d management-server-ip -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

