CVE-2025-47757: Fujielectric Monitouch V-SFT RCE Flaw

CVE-2025-47757 Overview

CVE-2025-47757 is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in Fuji Electric V-SFT v6.2.5.0 and earlier. The flaw resides in the set_plc_type_default function within VS6MemInIF.dll, a component used to parse V7 and V8 project files. Opening a specially crafted V7 or V8 file triggers the condition, allowing attackers to crash the application, disclose memory contents, or execute arbitrary code. V-SFT is widely deployed engineering software for configuring Monitouch human-machine interface (HMI) devices used in industrial control system (ICS) environments. Exploitation requires local access and user interaction, typically through social engineering that convinces an engineer to open a malicious project file.

Critical Impact
Successful exploitation enables arbitrary code execution on engineering workstations that configure Monitouch HMI devices, providing a foothold into operational technology (OT) environments.

Affected Products

Fuji Electric Monitouch V-SFT v6.2.5.0
Fuji Electric Monitouch V-SFT prior versions (v6.x branch)
VS6MemInIF.dll component handling V7 and V8 file parsing

Discovery Timeline

2025-05-19 - CVE-2025-47757 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-47757

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is an out-of-bounds read classified as [CWE-125]. It exists in the set_plc_type_default function exported by VS6MemInIF.dll. The function processes programmable logic controller (PLC) configuration data embedded in V7 and V8 project files used by V-SFT v6. When the file contains malformed length fields or index values, the function reads memory past the end of an allocated buffer. The condition produces three potential outcomes: application crash, leakage of adjacent heap memory, or arbitrary code execution if the leaked data is used as a control-flow primitive. The EPSS probability is 0.191 percent.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing or insufficient bounds validation on attacker-controlled size or offset fields parsed from the V7 or V8 file. The set_plc_type_default routine trusts values read directly from the file header or PLC configuration block. Without verifying that the resulting read remains within the source buffer, the function dereferences memory at arbitrary offsets relative to the parsed structure.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is local and requires user interaction. An attacker crafts a malicious .V7 or .V8 project file and delivers it through phishing, supply chain compromise, or shared network drives. When an engineer opens the file in V-SFT v6, the out-of-bounds read executes in the context of the user. The attacker gains code execution on an engineering workstation, which typically holds privileged access to HMI devices and downstream ICS assets.

No public proof-of-concept or exploit code is available for CVE-2025-47757. Technical specifics of the malformed file structure are referenced in the JVN Security Advisory.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-47757

Indicators of Compromise

Unexpected crashes of V-SFT.exe referencing VS6MemInIF.dll in Windows Error Reporting (WER) logs
Receipt of V7 or V8 project files from untrusted email senders, USB drives, or external file shares
V-SFT.exe spawning child processes such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe shortly after opening a project file
Anomalous outbound network connections from engineering workstations following the opening of a project file

Detection Strategies

Monitor process telemetry on engineering workstations for V-SFT.exe crashes and abnormal child process creation chains
Hunt for V7 and V8 files arriving through email gateways, web downloads, or removable media using file extension and magic-byte inspection
Apply YARA rules against project file repositories to flag files containing malformed PLC configuration headers
Correlate user-initiated file opens with subsequent process injection or memory allocation events indicative of shellcode execution

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable Windows Defender Exploit Guard or equivalent exploit mitigation auditing for V-SFT.exe
Forward endpoint detection and response (EDR) telemetry from OT engineering workstations to a centralized SIEM for ICS-aware analytics
Track file integrity of VS6MemInIF.dll to identify unauthorized modifications or rollbacks to vulnerable versions
Alert on V-SFT process activity outside documented maintenance windows

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-47757

Immediate Actions Required

Inventory all engineering workstations running V-SFT v6 and identify installations at v6.2.5.0 or earlier
Restrict the opening of V7 and V8 files to project artifacts originating from verified internal sources
Apply application allowlisting to limit execution to signed and authorized V-SFT binaries
Isolate engineering workstations from general corporate networks using firewall rules and network segmentation

Patch Information

Fuji Electric provides updated V-SFT v6 installers through the Fuji Electric Document Download portal. Administrators should download the latest V-SFT v6 release that supersedes v6.2.5.0 and replace existing installations. Confirm successful patching by verifying the version string and the hash of VS6MemInIF.dll against vendor-published values. Refer to the JVN Security Advisory for coordinated disclosure details.

Workarounds

Block delivery of .V7 and .V8 file attachments at email and web gateways until patching is complete
Open untrusted project files only inside isolated virtual machines without network access to OT assets
Train engineering staff to validate the provenance of any V-SFT project file before opening it
Remove or rename VS6MemInIF.dll on workstations that no longer require V7 or V8 file compatibility, accepting the loss of those parsing features

bash

# Verify installed V-SFT version and DLL hash on Windows
wmic product where "Name like 'V-SFT%%'" get Name,Version
certutil -hashfile "C:\Program Files (x86)\FUJI ELECTRIC\V-SFT6\VS6MemInIF.dll" SHA256