CVE-2025-41109: Ghost Robotics Vision 60 Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2025-41109 Overview

CVE-2025-41109 affects the Ghost Robotics Vision 60 quadruped robot running firmware version 0.27.2. The robot exposes three RJ45 connectors and a USB Type-C port without any authentication controls. An attacker with physical proximity to the platform can plug in a rogue device, receive an IP address from the robot's internal router, and reach internal services. Because the onboard Robot Operating System 2 (ROS 2) stack runs without authentication by default, the attacker can observe sensor data, telemetry, and control topics once connected.

Critical Impact

Physical port access grants unauthenticated network access to the robot's ROS 2 bus, exposing full sensor, telemetry, and command data.

Affected Products

• Ghost Robotics Vision 60 (hardware platform)
• Ghost Robotics Vision 60 Firmware version 0.27.2
• Deployments relying on the default ROS 2 configuration

Discovery Timeline

• 2025-10-22 - CVE-2025-41109 published to NVD
• 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-41109

Vulnerability Analysis

The Vision 60 platform integrates a compute module, an internal router, and multiple physical interfaces used for maintenance, payload integration, and networking. The router runs a DHCP service that automatically leases IP addresses to any device attached to the exposed RJ45 ports. No 802.1X, MAC filtering, or link-layer authentication is enforced.

An attacker who reaches the robot physically can attach a small Wi-Fi access point or a laptop to one of the RJ45 jacks. The router treats the device as trusted and provisions it onto the internal network. Once addressable, the attacker can enumerate hosts, sniff ROS 2 Data Distribution Service (DDS) traffic, and publish arbitrary messages to any topic. The USB Type-C port compounds the risk by exposing additional management channels without credential checks.

Because ROS 2 nodes on the Vision 60 do not enable Secure DDS (SROS 2), all inter-node communication is transmitted in cleartext. This exposes lidar scans, camera feeds, IMU readings, motor commands, and navigation state to any adjacent participant on the bus.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authentication mechanism on both the physical network interfaces and the ROS 2 middleware. The condition maps to [CWE-798] (Use of Hard-coded Credentials) in the CVE record and reflects a broader failure to enforce identity on any device that connects to the robot's internal fabric.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires adjacent-network access, achieved by physical contact with a Vision 60 unit. Typical scenarios include an unattended robot during charging, transport, or field deployment. After plugging into an RJ45 port, the attacker acts as a peer on the internal LAN and can pivot to any exposed service without providing credentials.

No public proof-of-concept has been published. The vulnerability is straightforward to reproduce with commodity hardware such as a pocket Wi-Fi router or a USB-to-Ethernet adapter paired with a laptop running standard ROS 2 tooling (ros2 topic list, ros2 topic echo).

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-41109

Indicators of Compromise

• Unexpected DHCP leases assigned by the robot's internal router to unknown MAC addresses.
• New ROS 2 participants appearing on the DDS discovery multicast that do not match the robot's inventory of nodes.
• USB device enumeration events on the Vision 60 compute module referencing storage, HID, or Ethernet gadget classes not part of the approved payload list.
• Rogue Wi-Fi access points broadcasting near operational areas where Vision 60 units are deployed.

Detection Strategies

• Baseline the DHCP lease table on the internal router and alert on any lease outside the approved MAC allowlist.
• Capture DDS discovery traffic (UDP 7400 range) and flag unknown participant GUIDs joining the ROS 2 domain.
• Enable USB device logging on the onboard Linux system and forward udev events to a central log store.

Monitoring Recommendations

• Forward router, udev, and ROS 2 daemon logs to a centralized log store for correlation across fleet units.
• Monitor physical operator handoffs and match them against expected maintenance windows.
• Track RF spectrum near deployment sites for unauthorized Wi-Fi access points that could bridge back to an attacker.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-41109

Immediate Actions Required

• Restrict physical access to Vision 60 units, especially during charging, transport, and staging.
• Physically seal or disable unused RJ45 and USB Type-C ports using tamper-evident covers.
• Segment any operational Wi-Fi or wired network the robot bridges to, so that a compromised robot cannot pivot into enterprise infrastructure.
• Contact Ghost Robotics for guidance on firmware updates addressing the missing authentication controls.

Patch Information

No vendor patch is referenced in the NVD entry at the time of publication. Operators should review the INCIBE Security Notice on Ghost Robotics Vulnerabilities for coordinated advisory updates and engage Ghost Robotics support for firmware releases beyond 0.27.2.

Workarounds

• Enable Secure DDS (SROS 2) with certificate-based authentication and encryption for all ROS 2 nodes running on the robot.
• Configure the internal router with MAC allowlists and disable DHCP for unused ports, requiring static assignments for approved payloads.
• Deploy 802.1X port-based authentication on any switch the robot connects to during ground operations.
• Log and review every physical connection event as part of pre- and post-mission checklists.

# Example: enable SROS 2 and restrict ROS 2 discovery to a trusted subnet
export ROS_SECURITY_KEYSTORE=/var/sros2/keystore
export ROS_SECURITY_ENABLE=true
export ROS_SECURITY_STRATEGY=Enforce
export ROS_DOMAIN_ID=42
export ROS_AUTOMATIC_DISCOVERY_RANGE=SUBNET
export ROS_STATIC_PEERS=10.0.0.10;10.0.0.11