CVE-2025-23309: NVIDIA Display Driver DoS Vulnerability

CVE-2025-23309 Overview

CVE-2025-23309 affects the NVIDIA Display Driver on Windows systems. The driver contains an uncontrolled DLL loading path weakness classified under [CWE-427]. A local attacker with low privileges can place a malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) in a search path location that the driver processes before the intended system directory. When a user runs an affected driver component, the malicious DLL loads into the process. This enables denial of service, escalation of privileges, arbitrary code execution, and data tampering.

Critical Impact
A local, low-privileged attacker can hijack DLL loading in the NVIDIA Display Driver to execute code, escalate privileges, tamper with data, or cause denial of service on affected Windows systems.

Affected Products

NVIDIA Display Driver for Windows
Refer to the NVIDIA Customer Support Advisory for exact affected branches and versions
Systems running vulnerable driver versions with local user access

Discovery Timeline

2025-10-10 - CVE-2025-23309 published to NVD
2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-23309

Vulnerability Analysis

The NVIDIA Display Driver loads one or more DLLs using a search order that includes directories writable or influenceable by a local user. This weakness maps to [CWE-427] Uncontrolled Search Path Element. When a privileged driver component or helper process attempts to load a required library by name rather than by fully qualified path, Windows resolves the name using its standard DLL search order. An attacker can plant a malicious library earlier in that search order and cause the driver process to load attacker-controlled code within its trust context.

Exploitation requires local access, low privileges, and user interaction. The scope is changed, meaning the compromised component can affect resources beyond its own security boundary. Successful exploitation impacts confidentiality, integrity, and availability at a high level, allowing code execution in a more privileged context than the attacker started with.

Root Cause

The root cause is unsafe DLL resolution. Driver components reference libraries without pinning them to an absolute, protected path, or without enforcing safe search flags such as LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32. Windows then falls back to searching directories including the application directory and, under certain conditions, the current working directory. If any of these locations is writable by a standard user, the attacker's DLL wins the search race.

Attack Vector

An attacker with local user access places a crafted DLL matching the name of a library expected by an NVIDIA Display Driver component. The attacker then triggers execution of that component, either by launching it directly, waiting for the user to launch it, or leveraging an autostart integration. When the target process loads the planted DLL, the attacker's DllMain executes inside the driver component's process, inheriting its privileges and access. See the NVIDIA Customer Support Advisory for vendor-specific details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-23309

Indicators of Compromise

Unexpected DLL files present in directories adjacent to NVIDIA Display Driver executables or user-writable directories on the PATH
NVIDIA driver processes loading modules from non-standard paths outside C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation
Child processes spawned by NVIDIA driver components that perform unusual activity such as network connections, credential access, or persistence installation
Newly created or modified DLLs with timestamps close to observed NVIDIA process crashes or restarts

Detection Strategies

Monitor image load events (Sysmon Event ID 7) for NVIDIA driver processes and alert on DLLs loaded from unusual paths
Baseline the expected module list for each NVIDIA driver binary and flag deviations
Correlate user-writable directory writes of .dll files with subsequent process starts of NVIDIA components
Enable Windows Defender Application Control or WDAC signer rules to detect unsigned or unexpectedly signed DLLs loading into vendor processes

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable command-line, module load, and file creation auditing on all endpoints running NVIDIA drivers
Ingest endpoint telemetry into a centralized data lake for retrospective hunting across historical module load events
Track privilege escalation patterns following NVIDIA driver process starts, including token elevation and new service creation
Review autoruns and scheduled tasks that invoke NVIDIA binaries from user-writable locations

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-23309

Immediate Actions Required

Update the NVIDIA Display Driver to the fixed version identified in the NVIDIA Customer Support Advisory
Inventory endpoints and workstations to identify systems running vulnerable driver branches
Restrict local administrative rights and remove write permissions from directories on the DLL search path
Audit for suspicious DLLs in directories adjacent to NVIDIA driver executables and remove any unauthorized files

Patch Information

NVIDIA has published a security bulletin with fixed driver versions. Consult the NVIDIA Customer Support Advisory and the NVD CVE-2025-23309 Details page for the authoritative list of affected and patched versions. Apply the vendor-provided driver update through GeForce Experience, the enterprise driver channel, or manual installation from NVIDIA's official download site.

Workarounds

Enforce least privilege so standard users cannot write to directories in the DLL search path of NVIDIA processes
Apply AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control policies that block execution and loading of unsigned DLLs from user-writable locations
Restrict interactive logon on servers and shared workstations that host NVIDIA driver components
Disable or remove unused NVIDIA helper utilities until the driver update can be deployed

bash

# Configuration example
# PowerShell: locate NVIDIA driver processes and inspect loaded module paths
Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.Path -like "*NVIDIA*" } |
  ForEach-Object {
    $_.Modules | Select-Object @{n='Process';e={$_.ModuleName}}, FileName
  } |
  Where-Object { $_.FileName -notlike "C:\Windows\System32\*" -and
                 $_.FileName -notlike "C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\*" }