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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2025-14763

CVE-2025-14763: Amazon S3 Encryption Client Key Vulnerability

CVE-2025-14763 is a missing cryptographic key commitment vulnerability in Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java that allows attackers with write access to manipulate encrypted data keys in instruction files. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact assessment, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2025-14763 Overview

CVE-2025-14763 is a missing cryptographic key commitment vulnerability in the Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java. The flaw affects deployments that store encrypted data keys (EDKs) in a separate S3 "instruction file" rather than in the object's metadata record. An actor with write access to the S3 bucket can replace the instruction file with a new EDK that decrypts to a different plaintext than the original. The issue is tracked under [CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm] and resolved in version 4.0.0 of the client.

Critical Impact

A bucket writer can substitute encrypted data keys to make ciphertext decrypt to attacker-chosen plaintext, breaking integrity guarantees for consumers of the encrypted objects.

Affected Products

  • Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java (versions prior to 4.0.0)
  • Deployments that store the EDK in an S3 instruction file rather than object metadata
  • Downstream applications that rely on the client to authenticate object plaintext

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-12-17 - CVE-2025-14763 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in the NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-14763

Vulnerability Analysis

The Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java performs client-side encryption of objects before uploading them to Amazon S3. Each object is encrypted with a data key, which is itself wrapped by a customer key material and stored as an encrypted data key (EDK). The client supports two storage locations for the EDK: within the object's S3 metadata, or as a separate "instruction file" object alongside the ciphertext.

When the EDK resides in an instruction file, the client does not enforce cryptographic key commitment between the EDK and the underlying ciphertext. Any actor with s3:PutObject permission on the bucket can overwrite the instruction file with a different EDK. A subsequent decryption succeeds and returns different plaintext, without any tampering indicator surfaced to the caller.

Root Cause

The root cause is the absence of a key commitment scheme binding the ciphertext, the wrapped data key, and the resulting plaintext. Authenticated encryption modes such as AES-GCM guarantee integrity of the ciphertext under a given key but do not commit to a single key. When an attacker controls which EDK is retrieved, decryption can be steered toward alternative plaintexts. Because the instruction file is a distinct S3 object with independent access control semantics, it can be modified without touching the encrypted data object itself.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the S3 bucket and permission to write the instruction file. An attacker uploads a substitute instruction file containing a new EDK that wraps a data key of their choosing. When a legitimate consumer downloads the object, the client fetches the malicious instruction file, unwraps the attacker-supplied key, and decrypts the ciphertext to a plaintext controlled by the attacker. The original object bytes remain untouched, which can bypass audit trails focused on the ciphertext object.

No verified public exploit code is available. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-x44p-gvrj-pj2r for the vendor's technical description.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-14763

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected PutObject or CopyObject events targeting .instruction suffixed objects in CloudTrail data event logs.
  • Instruction file objects whose LastModified timestamp is newer than the associated ciphertext object.
  • Divergence between object version histories where the instruction file has multiple versions but the ciphertext object does not.

Detection Strategies

  • Enable S3 data event logging in AWS CloudTrail and alert on writes to instruction files by principals other than the original object owner.
  • Enforce S3 Object Lock or bucket versioning and compare instruction file version IDs against a trusted manifest maintained by the producing application.
  • Inventory usage of the Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java across build pipelines and flag any version below 4.0.0.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Monitor IAM policy changes that grant s3:PutObject on prefixes containing instruction files.
  • Alert on any application error path that indicates decryption succeeded but downstream schema validation of the plaintext failed.
  • Track S3 access patterns for anomalous cross-account writes to encrypted object prefixes.

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-14763

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade the Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java to version 4.0.0 or later across all consuming applications.
  • Audit S3 bucket policies and IAM roles to restrict s3:PutObject permissions on instruction file prefixes to the minimum set of principals.
  • Review CloudTrail data events for the past 90 days to identify unauthorized writes to .instruction objects.

Patch Information

AWS released a fix in Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java v4.0.0. Details are documented in AWS Security Bulletin 2025-032 and the corresponding GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-x44p-gvrj-pj2r. Update Maven or Gradle dependency declarations and redeploy affected services.

Workarounds

  • Store the EDK in S3 object metadata rather than an instruction file when using unpatched clients, which removes the split-object attack surface.
  • Enable S3 Object Lock in compliance mode on instruction file objects to prevent overwrites during the retention period.
  • Restrict bucket write access to a single trusted producer role and deny writes from all other principals through an explicit bucket policy.
bash
# Example Maven dependency update to the fixed version
# pom.xml
<dependency>
  <groupId>software.amazon.encryption.s3</groupId>
  <artifactId>amazon-s3-encryption-client-java</artifactId>
  <version>4.0.0</version>
</dependency>

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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