Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-1682 Overview
CVE-2024-1682 affects the Python Requests library documentation, which referenced an unclaimed Amazon S3 bucket named codeconf. The bucket, previously hosting an audio file linked from docs/community/out-there.rst, was claimed by an external party after being abandoned. Users following documentation links could be redirected to attacker-controlled content hosted in the reclaimed bucket. The issue is categorized under [CWE-840] (Business Logic Errors) and affects data integrity and user trust rather than the library's runtime behavior.
Critical Impact
An external actor controlling the codeconf S3 bucket could serve malicious content to anyone following the documentation link, enabling phishing, malware delivery, or further pivoting attacks.
Affected Products
- Python Software Foundation (PSF) requests library documentation
- docs/community/out-there.rst documentation file
- Downstream projects redistributing the affected documentation
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-11-14 - CVE-2024-1682 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-1682
Vulnerability Analysis
The requests project documentation referenced an audio file hosted at an Amazon S3 bucket, codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com, which had been abandoned by its original owner. S3 bucket names are globally unique within AWS but become available for re-registration once released. An external party registered the abandoned bucket, gaining control over any content served through the documented URL. Users consulting the Requests community documentation and following the audio link could receive arbitrary content from the attacker.
This category of flaw is commonly referred to as a dangling resource or subdomain takeover variant applied to cloud object storage. It does not affect the runtime behavior of the requests library itself.
Root Cause
The root cause is an unclaimed cloud resource reference persisted in source-controlled documentation. The link to https://codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pycodeconf/talks/...m4a remained in the out-there.rst file after the original bucket was decommissioned. Because the documentation is published alongside the library, downstream consumers trusted the link as authoritative content from the PSF.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires user interaction: a reader must click or render the embedded audio link within the Requests community documentation. Once the request reaches the attacker-controlled bucket, the attacker can serve malware, phishing payloads, tracking resources, or redirect responses. No authentication or elevated privileges are required to serve this content.
// Patch from docs/community/out-there.rst
Integrations
============
-Python for iOS
---------------
-
-Requests is built into the wonderful `Python for iOS ...`_ runtime!
-
-To give it a try, simply::
-
- import requests
-
-
Articles & Talks
================
-- `Python for the Web ...`_ teaches how to use Python ...
- `Daniel Greenfeld's Review of Requests ...`_
-- `My 'Python for Humans' talk ...` ( `audio <https://codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pycodeconf/talks/PyCodeConf2011%20-%20Kenneth%20Reitz.m4a>`_ )
-- `Issac Kelly's 'Consuming Web APIs' talk <https://issackelly.github.com/...>`_
+- `Issac Kelly's 'Consuming Web APIs' talk <https://issackelly.github.io/...>`_
Source: GitHub Requests Commit 6106a63. The patch removes the defunct link entirely rather than attempting to reclaim the bucket.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-1682
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests to codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com from developer workstations or documentation build servers.
- Downloads of .m4a or other files from the codeconf bucket originating from browsers rendering Requests documentation.
- Local or mirrored copies of docs/community/out-there.rst still containing the codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com reference.
Detection Strategies
- Grep repositories and vendored documentation for the string codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com to identify unpatched copies.
- Monitor web proxy and DNS logs for resolutions and connections to the affected bucket hostname.
- Review documentation CI pipelines for external resource fetches that resolve to third-party-owned S3 buckets.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on first-seen connections to S3 bucket hostnames that have not previously appeared in network telemetry.
- Track SBOMs and documentation bundles for references to the psf/requests versions shipping the vulnerable .rst file.
- Validate upstream library documentation during dependency updates to catch dangling cloud resource links.
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-1682
Immediate Actions Required
- Update the requests library and its bundled documentation to a version that includes commit 6106a63.
- Remove or rewrite any internal mirrors, forks, or re-published copies of out-there.rst that still reference the codeconf bucket.
- Block egress to codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com at web proxies until documentation is confirmed clean.
Patch Information
The fix is contained in the PSF Requests repository commit 6106a63eb6c0fa490efa73d44388ac25b1b08af4, which removes the defunct audio link and other outdated references from docs/community/out-there.rst. See the Huntr Bounty Report for the original disclosure.
Workarounds
- Strip or sanitize the affected link from locally built documentation if upgrading is not immediately feasible.
- Add a network-layer deny rule for codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com to prevent user interaction with attacker-controlled content.
- Instruct developers and documentation readers not to follow legacy audio links in older Requests documentation builds.
# Scan a codebase for lingering references to the unclaimed bucket
grep -rI --line-number 'codeconf\.s3\.amazonaws\.com' .
# Example proxy block (Squid)
acl dangling_s3 dstdomain codeconf.s3.amazonaws.com
http_access deny dangling_s3
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

