CVE-2024-54846 Overview
CVE-2024-54846 affects the CP Plus CP-VNR-3104 network video recorder (NVR) running firmware version B3223P22C02424. The device exposes its elliptic curve (EC) private key, allowing attackers to decrypt sensitive data or conduct man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against TLS-protected sessions. The flaw maps to CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation and reflects a broader class of embedded-device cryptographic hygiene issues. Exploitation requires network positioning but no authentication or user interaction. Operators relying on CP-VNR-3104 units for surveillance face confidentiality loss across the video management channel.
Critical Impact
Recovery of the EC private key enables decryption of recorded surveillance traffic and interception of administrative sessions through MITM attacks.
Affected Products
- CP Plus CP-VNR-3104 (hardware)
- CP Plus CP-VNR-3104 firmware version B3223P22C02424
- Deployments exposing the NVR management interface to untrusted networks
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-01-10 - CVE-2024-54846 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-54846
Vulnerability Analysis
The CP-VNR-3104 ships with an embedded EC private key that can be recovered from the device firmware or runtime. Because the key material is not uniquely provisioned or adequately protected, any attacker who obtains firmware access gains the ability to impersonate the device. The weakness falls under improper certificate validation [CWE-295], where endpoints cannot distinguish a legitimate NVR from an attacker-controlled proxy. The result is a collapse of the trust model that TLS relies on to protect administrative traffic and video streams.
Root Cause
The root cause is the use of shared or extractable EC private key material embedded in firmware image B3223P22C02424. Static keys baked into firmware produce identical certificates across deployed units. Once a researcher extracts the key from one device, the same key authenticates every other unit running that firmware revision. The security assessment published on GitHub documents the extraction process, and the Payatu blog on encrypted firmware describes similar firmware-level key exposure patterns.
Attack Vector
An attacker on an adjacent or routable network path first obtains the EC private key by analyzing the firmware image or extracting it from a device under their control. The attacker then uses the key to present a valid-looking server certificate when intercepting traffic between an administrator and the NVR. TLS clients that only validate signature chains derived from the embedded certificate accept the impostor. The attacker proxies the session, captures credentials, and relays or modifies video and configuration data.
No verified public exploit code is available for this specific CVE. Technical details are documented in the CP-VNR-3104 security assessment PDF and parallel the exposure pattern described in CVE-2020-15522.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-54846
Indicators of Compromise
- Duplicate TLS certificate fingerprints observed on multiple CP-VNR-3104 units across unrelated networks.
- Unexpected TLS session renegotiations or certificate chain mismatches on the NVR management port.
- ARP spoofing, rogue DHCP, or gateway anomalies on the VLAN hosting surveillance equipment.
- Administrative logins from source IPs that do not match the operations network baseline.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory CP-VNR-3104 devices and extract their presented certificates for comparison against a known-good baseline.
- Monitor for TLS handshakes to NVR endpoints using certificates whose public key matches the firmware-embedded EC key.
- Alert on Layer 2 anomalies such as duplicate MAC-to-IP mappings on surveillance VLANs.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Log and review all administrative sessions to CP-VNR-3104 units, including source IP, user agent, and session duration.
- Capture and retain network flow data between operator workstations and NVR management interfaces.
- Correlate NVR access events with physical access and badge logs to identify unauthorized sessions.
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-54846
Immediate Actions Required
- Isolate CP-VNR-3104 devices on a dedicated management VLAN with no internet exposure.
- Restrict administrative access to the NVR to a documented allowlist of operator workstations.
- Rotate credentials used to administer the NVR and audit recent configuration changes.
- Contact CP Plus support to confirm whether firmware beyond B3223P22C02424 addresses the key exposure.
Patch Information
No vendor advisory URL is listed in the enriched data at the time of writing. Operators should contact CP Plus directly to request a firmware release that provisions unique, hardware-protected EC key material per device. Until a patch is confirmed, treat all CP-VNR-3104 units running B3223P22C02424 as susceptible to key compromise.
Workarounds
- Place the NVR behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy that presents a certificate issued by an internal certificate authority (CA).
- Enforce certificate pinning on operator workstations so only the proxy certificate is trusted for NVR access.
- Require VPN access with mutual authentication before any operator can reach the NVR management interface.
- Disable remote management features that are not required and block the management port at perimeter firewalls.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
