CVE-2024-54849: CP Plus CP-VNR-3104 Information Disclosure

CVE-2024-54849 Overview

CVE-2024-54849 affects the CP Plus CP-VNR-3104 network video recorder running firmware version B3223P22C02424. The vulnerability exposes a second RSA private key embedded in the device firmware. Attackers with network access can obtain this key to decrypt sensitive data or perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against device communications. The flaw is categorized as improper certificate validation [CWE-295].

Critical Impact

Extraction of the embedded RSA private key allows adversaries to impersonate the device, decrypt intercepted traffic, and expose sensitive video surveillance data.

Affected Products

• CP Plus CP-VNR-3104 (hardware)
• CP Plus CP-VNR-3104 firmware version B3223P22C02424
• Deployments relying on the affected firmware's embedded TLS material

Discovery Timeline

• 2025-01-10 - CVE-2024-54849 published to NVD
• 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-54849

Vulnerability Analysis

The CP-VNR-3104 firmware ships with a hardcoded RSA private key used for securing device communications. Because the private key material is embedded in publicly obtainable firmware, any party that extracts the firmware image can recover the corresponding key.

Once recovered, the key defeats the confidentiality and authenticity guarantees of TLS sessions established with the device. Attackers positioned on the network path can decrypt captured traffic or terminate TLS sessions while impersonating the legitimate device. The issue tracks with [CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation], since trust in the device certificate cannot be enforced when the private key is not unique per unit.

Root Cause

The firmware image includes a static RSA private key shared across devices running B3223P22C02424. Firmware analysis techniques described in the Payatu blog on encrypted firmware illustrate how attackers extract such secrets from embedded devices. A similar class of issue is documented in NIST CVE-2020-15522 details.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to intercept or relay traffic destined for the recorder. The attacker first obtains the RSA private key from the firmware, then uses it to sign forged certificates or decrypt captured TLS handshakes that rely on RSA key transport. Successful exploitation yields plaintext access to management sessions, credentials, and surveillance data streams.

No verified public proof-of-concept code is available. See the referenced advisories for technical background on firmware key extraction workflows.

Detection Methods for CVE-2024-54849

Indicators of Compromise

• Unexpected TLS certificates presented by the CP-VNR-3104 that do not match previously observed fingerprints.
• Duplicate certificate serial numbers or public keys across multiple CP Plus devices in the environment.
• Unusual ARP or DNS activity on network segments hosting the recorder, indicative of MITM positioning.

Detection Strategies

• Perform passive TLS fingerprinting of recorder traffic and alert on certificate or key changes.
• Compare RSA public keys across CP-VNR-3104 units. Identical keys across devices confirm shared key material.
• Inspect network traffic for downgraded cipher suites or RSA key-exchange sessions where forward secrecy is expected.

Monitoring Recommendations

• Log all administrative access to the recorder and correlate with source IP anomalies.
• Monitor switch ports connected to CP-VNR-3104 units for unauthorized MAC address changes.
• Alert on new devices attempting to communicate with recorder management interfaces on ports 443 or 8443.

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-54849

Immediate Actions Required

• Isolate CP-VNR-3104 recorders on a dedicated VLAN with strict access control lists.
• Restrict management access to a jump host and disable exposure to untrusted networks.
• Contact CP Plus support to determine whether a firmware update replacing the embedded key is available.

Patch Information

No vendor advisory or patched firmware release has been published in the NVD record at the time of writing. Track updates from CP Plus (cpplusworld) for firmware later than B3223P22C02424 that regenerates per-device key material.

Workarounds

• Terminate device TLS at an upstream reverse proxy that uses independently issued certificates.
• Enforce IPsec or an out-of-band VPN tunnel for all recorder management traffic to limit MITM exposure.
• Disable remote management interfaces and require local console access for administrative changes.

# Example: restrict recorder access to a management subnet using iptables
iptables -A FORWARD -s 10.20.30.0/24 -d 192.0.2.10 -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -d 192.0.2.10 -j DROP