Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-20357 Overview
CVE-2024-20357 is an out-of-bounds write vulnerability [CWE-787] in the Extensible Markup Language (XML) service of Cisco IP Phone firmware. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can send a crafted XML request to an affected phone and cause it to initiate calls or play sounds without user consent. The issue affects a broad range of Cisco IP Phone and Video Phone models running Multiplatform Firmware, including the 6800, 7800, 8800, and Video Phone 8875 series. Cisco disclosed the flaw in its advisory cisco-sa-ipphone-multi-vulns-cXAhCvS alongside related IP Phone issues.
Critical Impact
A remote, unauthenticated attacker with network access to the phone can cause the device to place calls or emit audio, enabling toll fraud, social engineering, and covert eavesdropping scenarios.
Affected Products
- Cisco IP Phone 6800 Series with Multiplatform Firmware (6821, 6841, 6851, 6861, 6871)
- Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series with Multiplatform Firmware (7811, 7821, 7832, 7841, 7861, 8811, 8832, 8841, 8845, 8851, 8861, 8865)
- Cisco Video Phone 8875
Discovery Timeline
- 2024-05-01 - CVE-2024-20357 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-20357
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw resides in the XML service exposed by affected Cisco IP Phone firmware. This service accepts XML objects used to render content, provide directory services, and drive telephony features on the phone display. The parser processes attacker-controlled XML without adequate bounds checking, corresponding to an out-of-bounds write condition classified as [CWE-787].
Exploitation does not require authentication or user interaction, but the attacker must reach the phone over the network and craft a request that triggers the vulnerable parsing path. Successful exploitation coerces the device into initiating a call or playing sounds, effectively hijacking telephony functionality. Impact is limited to integrity of device behavior; the advisory does not describe code execution or data disclosure through this specific issue.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing bounds checking during XML request parsing in the phone firmware. When the service processes a malformed or oversized element, it writes past the intended buffer boundary. Rather than corrupting arbitrary memory for code execution, the condition manipulates internal telephony state, causing the phone to act as if a legitimate call-control command had been issued.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is network-based. An attacker who can send TCP or HTTP traffic to the XML service listening on an affected phone submits a crafted XML payload. In typical deployments this requires access to the voice VLAN or another network path that reaches phone endpoints, which raises exploitation complexity in segmented networks. Once delivered, the request forces the phone to initiate outbound calls or emit sounds, which can be used for toll fraud, impersonation, or covert audio activation in a target space.
No public proof-of-concept exploit or exploitation activity is referenced in the advisory or NVD entry. Refer to the Cisco Security Advisory for authoritative technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-20357
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected outbound calls originating from IP phones outside normal user activity windows
- Phones spontaneously playing audio, ringing, or going off-hook without user interaction
- Call Detail Records (CDRs) showing short-duration calls to unfamiliar or premium-rate numbers
- Inbound TCP connections to phone XML service ports from hosts other than approved provisioning or management servers
Detection Strategies
- Inspect voice VLAN traffic for HTTP or TCP requests carrying XML payloads directed at phone endpoints from non-management sources.
- Correlate call-manager CDR anomalies with network flow data to identify phones being remotely triggered.
- Alert on any host on the corporate LAN attempting to reach the XML service of multiple IP phones in a short time window, which suggests scanning or mass exploitation.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor for unauthorized devices on the voice VLAN and enforce port security on switches connecting phones.
- Track firmware versions across the phone fleet and alert on devices running builds prior to the fixed release listed in the Cisco advisory.
- Log and review administrative and provisioning access to phones to establish a baseline of expected XML service traffic.
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-20357
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all Cisco IP Phone and Video Phone 8875 devices running Multiplatform Firmware and identify versions vulnerable per the Cisco advisory.
- Upgrade affected phones to the fixed Multiplatform Firmware release published by Cisco.
- Restrict network access to the phone XML service so that only trusted provisioning and call-control servers can reach it.
- Review recent CDRs and audio session logs for signs of unauthorized calls originating from IP phones.
Patch Information
Cisco has released fixed Multiplatform Firmware versions for the affected IP Phone models. Refer to the Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-ipphone-multi-vulns-cXAhCvS for the specific fixed-release matrix per model. There are no vendor-documented workarounds that fully address the vulnerability; patching is the required remediation.
Workarounds
- Isolate IP phones on a dedicated voice VLAN with access control lists (ACLs) that block unsolicited traffic from user or guest networks to the XML service.
- Disable the XML service or restrict its interface bindings on phones where the feature is not required, following Cisco configuration guidance for the affected model.
- Enforce authentication for XML applications where the firmware supports it, and rotate any static credentials used for provisioning.
# Example switch ACL restricting access to phone XML service (TCP/80)
# Only permit the call-control and provisioning servers to reach the voice VLAN
ip access-list extended VOICE-PHONE-XML
permit tcp host 10.10.20.10 10.20.30.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80
permit tcp host 10.10.20.11 10.20.30.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80
deny tcp any 10.20.30.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80 log
permit ip any any
!
interface Vlan30
description Voice VLAN
ip access-group VOICE-PHONE-XML in
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

