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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2024-10603

CVE-2024-10603: Google gVisor Information Disclosure Flaw

CVE-2024-10603 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Google gVisor involving predictable TCP/UDP source ports and header values. Attackers can exploit weaknesses in port generation to predict network traffic patterns. This article covers technical details, affected versions, security impact, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2024-10603 Overview

CVE-2024-10603 affects Google gVisor, an application kernel that provides a sandboxed container runtime. The vulnerability stems from weaknesses in how gVisor generates TCP/UDP source ports and other network header values. An external attacker can predict these values under certain circumstances, undermining assumptions that protect network sessions from off-path attacks. The weakness maps to [CWE-340: Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers]. Google addressed the issue through multiple patches that randomize source port selection, strengthen IPv6 fragment ID generation, and route randomness through a cryptographically secure RNG.

Critical Impact

Predictable transport-layer identifiers enable off-path network attackers to guess source ports and header fields, facilitating connection fingerprinting, traffic injection, and session interference against sandboxed workloads running on gVisor.

Affected Products

  • Google gVisor (all versions prior to the fix commits)
  • Google gVisor release 20231106.0
  • Container workloads using gVisor's netstack networking backend

Discovery Timeline

  • 2025-01-30 - CVE-2024-10603 published to NVD
  • 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2024-10603

Vulnerability Analysis

gVisor implements its own user-space TCP/IP stack called netstack. Three subsystems in that stack produced identifiers that were insufficiently random. TCP source ports were selected deterministically rather than randomized, IPv6 fragment identifiers were derived from a hash function (hash/fnv) rather than a secure source, and the general-purpose RNG used for non-Linux builds was not guaranteed to be cryptographically secure. An attacker who can observe or guess any of these values gains a foothold for off-path attacks that normally require on-path access, including TCP reset injection, data injection into unencrypted sessions, and fragment-based identification of a sandboxed host.

Root Cause

The root cause is predictable identifier generation [CWE-340]. The pkg/tcpip/ports/ports.go port allocator relied on atomicbitops counters without random selection. The pkg/tcpip/network/ipv6/ipv6.go fragment ID path used encoding/binary with FNV hashing. The pkg/rand/rand.go package on non-Linux platforms did not consistently use crypto/rand for security-sensitive consumers.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to a workload sandboxed by gVisor but no authentication or user interaction. An off-path adversary can predict upcoming TCP source ports or IPv6 fragment IDs, then forge packets that match in-flight sessions. The impact is bounded to confidentiality and integrity degradation of network flows rather than full code execution.

go
// Patch: Randomize TCP source port selection in pkg/tcpip/ports/ports.go
 import (
 	"math"
 
-	"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/atomicbitops"
 	"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/rand"
 	"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/sync"
 	"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip"

Source: gVisor commit cbdb2c6

go
// Patch: Replace FNV hash with secure source for IPv6 fragment IDs in pkg/tcpip/network/ipv6/ipv6.go
 package ipv6
 
 import (
-	"encoding/binary"
 	"fmt"
-	"hash/fnv"
 	"math"
 	"reflect"
 	"sort"

Source: gVisor commit 5d2bf25

go
// Patch: Use cryptographically secure RNG in pkg/rand/rand.go
 //go:build !linux
 // +build !linux
 
-// Package rand implements a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
-// generator.
 package rand
 
 import "crypto/rand"

Source: gVisor commit 83f7508

Detection Methods for CVE-2024-10603

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected TCP RST floods targeting established connections from sandboxed workloads
  • Repeated IPv6 fragmented packets with sequential or guessable identification fields
  • Anomalous spikes in packets matching active connection 5-tuples from external sources

Detection Strategies

  • Collect netstack logs from gVisor runsc instances and alert on repeated connection resets originating from untrusted networks
  • Analyze packet captures for IPv6 fragment IDs that lack entropy across sampled flows
  • Correlate workload-level connection termination events with concurrent off-path probe traffic

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Ingest gVisor runtime and host network telemetry into a central analytics pipeline for cross-session correlation
  • Monitor the installed gVisor commit or release version across container hosts to confirm patched builds are deployed
  • Baseline source-port distributions from sandboxed workloads and alert when distributions collapse to narrow ranges

How to Mitigate CVE-2024-10603

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade gVisor to a release that includes commits cbdb2c6, 5d2bf25, and 83f7508
  • Audit container platforms that embed gVisor (such as GKE Sandbox) and apply vendor-shipped updates
  • Restrict direct network exposure of sandboxed workloads to untrusted sources where possible

Patch Information

Google merged three fixes into gVisor: TCP source port randomization in commit cbdb2c6, IPv6 fragment ID algorithm change in commit 5d2bf25, and consistent use of a cryptographically secure RNG in commit 83f7508. Technical background is published in the NDSS 2025 paper.

Workarounds

  • Terminate sensitive sessions inside TLS or IPsec tunnels so predictable transport headers do not expose plaintext for injection
  • Place sandboxed workloads behind stateful firewalls that validate connection ownership before forwarding packets
  • Prefer IPv4 where feasible until IPv6 fragment ID randomization is confirmed deployed
bash
# Verify installed gVisor runtime version on container hosts
runsc --version

# Pull a patched release and reinstall
curl -fsSL https://storage.googleapis.com/gvisor/releases/release/latest/x86_64/runsc -o runsc
chmod +x runsc && sudo mv runsc /usr/local/bin/
runsc --version

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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