Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2024-10026 Overview
CVE-2024-10026 affects Google gVisor, an application kernel that provides sandboxing for container workloads. The vulnerability stems from a weak hashing algorithm combined with undersized seeds and secrets in the networking stack. A remote attacker can leverage these weaknesses to calculate a local IP address and a per-boot identifier. These calculated values can aid in tracking a device across network interactions under specific conditions. The flaw is tracked under CWE-326 (Inadequate Encryption Strength) and CWE-328 (Use of Weak Hash).
Critical Impact
Remote attackers can derive a device's local IP address and a per-boot identifier, enabling tracking of sandboxed workloads over the network.
Affected Products
- Google gVisor (versions prior to the patched commits)
- Container environments relying on gVisor's netstack for isolation
- Workloads using gVisor's TCP stack for Initial Sequence Number generation
Discovery Timeline
- 2025-01-30 - CVE-2024-10026 published to NVD
- 2026-06-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2024-10026
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in gVisor's user-space network stack (netstack). The TCP implementation used the Jenkins hash function combined with a 32-bit seed to generate Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs). The small seed space and non-cryptographic hash allow an off-path attacker to observe TCP sequence numbers and reverse-engineer the internal state. From that state, the attacker can compute the local IP address assigned inside the sandbox and a per-boot identifier that remains stable across sessions.
This information disclosure undermines network privacy guarantees. Even without achieving code execution, an attacker can correlate connections and track devices or workloads over time.
Root Cause
Two cryptographic weaknesses contribute to the vulnerability. First, the TCP stack used the Jenkins hash, a non-cryptographic function suitable for hash tables but not for secret-dependent constructions. Second, the seed material was only 32 bits, which is small enough to be brute-forced or inferred from observed ISN patterns. The pseudorandom number generator used in portions of netstack was also not cryptographically secure, compounding the predictability of generated values.
Attack Vector
An unauthenticated remote attacker interacts with the gVisor network stack over normal TCP connections. By observing the ISNs returned in response to crafted probes, the attacker recovers the hash seed. With the seed known, the hash output can be inverted against the local address and port tuple to recover the local IP and a per-boot identifier.
// Patch excerpt: switch from 32-bit seed to 16-byte secret with SHA-256
// Source: https://github.com/google/gvisor/commit/e54bfde79278cafadedbf73c68ee10cb5982f2af
// generateSecureISN generates a secure Initial Sequence number based on the
// recommendation here https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6528#page-3.
-func generateSecureISN(id stack.TransportEndpointID, clock tcpip.Clock, seed uint32) seqnum.Value {
+func generateSecureISN(id stack.TransportEndpointID, clock tcpip.Clock, seed [16]byte) seqnum.Value {
isnHasher := sha256.New()
- seedBuf := make([]byte, 4)
- binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(seedBuf, seed)
- _, _ = isnHasher.Write(seedBuf)
+ _, _ = isnHasher.Write(seed[:])
_, _ = isnHasher.Write(id.LocalAddress.AsSlice())
_, _ = isnHasher.Write(id.RemoteAddress.AsSlice())
The companion patch in commit f956b5a replaces the jenkins hash import with crypto/sha256 across the TCP protocol code, and commit 83f7508 ensures pkg/rand uses a cryptographically secure RNG where appropriate.
Detection Methods for CVE-2024-10026
Indicators of Compromise
- Repeated TCP SYN probes from a single remote source designed to collect ISN samples from the same gVisor endpoint
- Unusual volumes of short-lived TCP handshakes against sandboxed services with no accompanying application traffic
- External correlations of workloads across network segments that should be isolated by sandbox boundaries
Detection Strategies
- Inventory gVisor-managed workloads and verify the running commit against the patched versions listed in the vendor advisories
- Monitor network telemetry for scan patterns that enumerate ISNs or probe for predictable sequence number generation
- Review build pipelines and container base images to confirm that updated gVisor binaries have been deployed
Monitoring Recommendations
- Centralize flow logs from hosts running gVisor and alert on sustained SYN-only traffic from untrusted peers
- Track gVisor release metadata through configuration management and flag drift from approved versions
- Correlate outbound connection metadata to detect tracking attempts that reuse per-boot identifiers across sessions
How to Mitigate CVE-2024-10026
Immediate Actions Required
- Update gVisor to a release that includes commits 83f7508, e54bfde, and f956b5a
- Rebuild and redeploy container images that embed gVisor runtimes to pick up the patched runsc binary
- Restart affected sandboxes after upgrade so the new 16-byte secret and SHA-256 hashing take effect per boot
Patch Information
Google addressed the vulnerability through three upstream commits. Commit 83f7508 introduces rng.go in pkg/rand and switches netstack to a cryptographically secure RNG. Commit e54bfde widens the TCP ISN secret from a 32-bit seed to a 16-byte secret processed with SHA-256. Commit f956b5a replaces the Jenkins hash with SHA-256 throughout the TCP protocol implementation. Technical background is published in the NDSS 2025 paper.
Workarounds
- Restrict inbound TCP access to sandboxed services using network policies or firewall rules until the patch is applied
- Place gVisor workloads behind reverse proxies that terminate TCP, preventing attackers from directly observing ISNs
- Rotate sandbox lifetimes more frequently to shorten the window in which a per-boot identifier remains valid
# Verify installed gVisor version includes the fixed commits
runsc --version
# Example: pull a patched release and update the runtime binary
curl -fsSL https://storage.googleapis.com/gvisor/releases/release/latest/x86_64/runsc -o /usr/local/bin/runsc
chmod 755 /usr/local/bin/runsc
# Restart container runtime to load the updated runsc
systemctl restart containerd
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

