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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-98632

CVE-2026-98632: Linux Kernel Bluetooth Use-After-Free

CVE-2026-98632 is a use-after-free flaw in Linux Kernel Bluetooth management that occurs when mesh transmission entries are freed while still queued for processing. This article covers technical details, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-98632 Overview

CVE-2026-98632 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel Bluetooth management (mgmt) subsystem. The flaw affects the mesh transmission cancellation path within send_cancel(). When pending mesh_tx objects are freed via mesh_send_complete(), any transmission already queued onto hdev->cmd_sync_work_list by mesh_next() retains a raw pointer to the freed object. The kernel worker hci_cmd_sync_work later dereferences this stale pointer when executing mesh_send_sync and its destroy callback mesh_send_start_complete, triggering a use-after-free condition. The upstream fix dequeues the pending mesh_send_sync entry before completing the mesh_tx object and advances the queue after lock release.

Critical Impact

Local attackers with Bluetooth mesh access can trigger use-after-free in kernel memory, potentially leading to privilege escalation or kernel memory corruption.

Affected Products

  • Linux kernel Bluetooth subsystem (net/bluetooth/mgmt.c)
  • Builds including Bluetooth mesh send/cancel management commands
  • Distributions shipping affected stable kernel branches prior to the backport commits

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-18 - CVE-2026-98632 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-98632

Vulnerability Analysis

The defect lives in the Bluetooth mesh transmission management logic. The function send_cancel() iterates over hdev->mesh_pending, removes mesh_tx entries, and frees them through mesh_send_complete(). Prior to cancellation, mesh_next() may have already queued a work item onto hdev->cmd_sync_work_list that holds a raw pointer to that same mesh_tx object. Once send_cancel() frees the object, the worker thread hci_cmd_sync_work later picks up the queued entry and invokes both mesh_send_sync and its destroy callback mesh_send_start_complete against freed memory.

The queued work neither takes a reference on mesh_tx nor coordinates with the cancellation path. This produces a classic use-after-free [CWE-416] race between a user-driven cancel operation and the asynchronous HCI command sync worker.

Root Cause

The root cause is unsynchronized lifetime management between hdev->mesh_pending entries and work items placed on hdev->cmd_sync_work_list. The cancellation path assumes exclusive ownership of the mesh_tx object, but a parallel queued work item still references it. The fix invokes hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() for mesh_send_sync against the target mesh_tx before completing it, letting the destroy callback free the object when a queued entry is found.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires local access to the Bluetooth management interface and the ability to issue mesh send and cancel commands via the mgmt API. An attacker races a send_cancel() call against an in-flight mesh_next() queue insertion to trigger the dangling pointer dereference. Successful exploitation corrupts kernel memory and can be chained toward local privilege escalation on systems where Bluetooth mesh is enabled.

No verified public exploit code is available. Technical details are documented in the upstream Linux kernel stable commits referenced in the NVD advisory.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-98632

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected kernel oops or panic messages referencing mesh_send_sync, mesh_send_start_complete, or hci_cmd_sync_work in dmesg or /var/log/kern.log.
  • KASAN use-after-free reports in Bluetooth code paths on kernels built with address sanitizers enabled.
  • Abnormal Bluetooth management (mgmt) command sequences repeatedly issuing mesh send followed by cancel operations.

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor kernel crash dumps for stack traces originating in net/bluetooth/mgmt.c touching mesh_tx lifecycle functions.
  • Audit userspace processes that hold CAP_NET_ADMIN and interact with Bluetooth mesh socket APIs.
  • Correlate Bluetooth subsystem errors with the specific kernel version to confirm whether patched stable commits are applied.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable kernel audit rules for Bluetooth mgmt socket activity on servers and embedded Linux systems with Bluetooth hardware present.
  • Centralize kernel logs and alert on crash signatures involving cmd_sync_work_list processing.
  • Track installed kernel package versions against distribution advisories referencing the stable commits for this CVE.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-98632

Immediate Actions Required

  • Apply the vendor kernel update that includes the stable commits referenced in the NVD advisory.
  • Disable the Bluetooth kernel module (rmmod bluetooth) on systems that do not require Bluetooth functionality.
  • Restrict access to Bluetooth management sockets by limiting CAP_NET_ADMIN to trusted service accounts.

Patch Information

The Linux kernel maintainers resolved the issue across multiple stable branches. Refer to the upstream commits: 03ced4687fb7, 084be9094863, 2189a219397d, 718a8ffa180d, 71af682ba469, and f84e52829021. The patch calls hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() for mesh_send_sync on the target mesh_tx before completion and advances the queue after releasing hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock to avoid deadlock.

Workarounds

  • Unload the Bluetooth stack with modprobe -r bluetooth on systems without a hardware or operational Bluetooth requirement.
  • Blacklist the Bluetooth kernel module through /etc/modprobe.d/ on servers and infrastructure hosts to prevent accidental load.
  • Enforce strict access control on Bluetooth mgmt sockets so only vetted system services can issue mesh send and cancel commands.
bash
# Configuration example: block Bluetooth module load on non-Bluetooth hosts
echo "blacklist bluetooth" | sudo tee /etc/modprobe.d/disable-bluetooth.conf
echo "blacklist btusb" | sudo tee -a /etc/modprobe.d/disable-bluetooth.conf
sudo modprobe -r btusb bluetooth 2>/dev/null || true
sudo update-initramfs -u

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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