Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-98260 Overview
CVE-2026-98260 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's POSIX CPU timer handling during the execve() system call. When a non-leader thread with an armed per-thread CPU timer executes a new program, a race between de_thread() and failure paths in exec_mmap(), unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), or exec_task_namespaces() can leave a freed k_itimer node queued in the task's posix_cputimers rbtree. A subsequent release_task() triggers timerqueue_del() on the freed node, corrupting kernel memory.
Critical Impact
Local attackers with the ability to create threads and timers can trigger kernel memory corruption, potentially leading to privilege escalation on affected Linux systems.
Affected Products
- Linux kernel (upstream) prior to the commits referenced in the stable tree
- Linux distributions shipping affected kernel versions
- Systems with per-thread POSIX CPU timers enabled
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-06 - CVE-2026-98260 published to NVD
- 2026-10-07 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-98260
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in the Linux kernel's exec() code path interacting with POSIX per-thread CPU timers. A per-thread CPU timer created via timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID) holds a reference to the owning thread's PID. When armed, the timer's node is queued in the thread's posix_cputimers structure, and the task is subsequently looked up by that PID.
When a non-leader thread calls execve(), de_thread() reassigns PID ownership from the calling thread to the group leader via exchange_tids(). After this swap, pid_task(timer->it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) returns NULL for the original thread. The function timer_lock_sighand() interprets this failed lookup as evidence that the node is already dequeued and performs no cleanup.
Under normal flow, begin_new_exec() invokes posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) shortly after, removing the stale node. However, bprm->point_of_no_return is set before de_thread() executes. If any subsequent step fails before posix_cpu_timers_exit() runs, the thread exits via do_exit(), which calls exit_itimers() and frees the k_itimer while the node remains queued.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper ordering of cleanup operations in the kernel's exec() implementation. POSIX timer cleanup occurs too late in begin_new_exec(), after multiple fallible operations that can send the task to do_exit() with stale timer state intact. The upstream fix moves posix_cpu_timers_exit() to execute immediately after de_thread(), before any failure window opens.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local code execution with the ability to create threads, create per-thread CPU timers, and invoke execve(). An attacker crafts a non-leader thread that arms a CPU timer, then triggers execve() while concurrently inducing a failure in one of the intermediate exec steps (for example, by sending SIGKILL during exec_mmap()). When the parent later reaps the thread, cleanup_timerqueue() dereferences the freed k_itimer, producing a use-after-free in the rbtree manipulation code.
See the kernel patches referenced in the upstream commit 6f1977c for technical details on the fix.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-98260
Indicators of Compromise
- Kernel oops or panic messages referencing timerqueue_del, cleanup_timerqueue, or posix_cpu_timers_exit in dmesg and /var/log/kern.log
- KASAN use-after-free reports involving k_itimer structures on debug kernels
- Unexpected process crashes immediately following execve() calls from multithreaded programs using CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID timers
Detection Strategies
- Monitor kernel ring buffer for use-after-free signatures involving POSIX timer symbols
- Deploy audit rules on execve() and timer_create() syscalls to correlate suspicious sequences from unprivileged processes
- Review crash dumps for stack traces containing release_task to cleanup_timerqueue call chains
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable CONFIG_KASAN on test and staging kernels to surface use-after-free conditions before production exposure
- Collect kernel crash telemetry via kdump and forward to centralized logging for pattern analysis
- Alert on repeated process termination patterns from the same unprivileged UID that correlate with timer syscall activity
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-98260
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the latest stable Linux kernel update from your distribution that incorporates the upstream fix
- Inventory systems running affected kernel versions, prioritizing multi-tenant hosts, container platforms, and shared compute infrastructure
- Restrict local shell access on sensitive systems to trusted users until patches are deployed
Patch Information
The fix moves the POSIX timer cleanup to execute right after de_thread(), before any later failure conditions can route the task into do_exit() with queued timer nodes. Upstream commits are available at kernel patch 6f1977c, kernel patch 75aa08b, kernel patch acb03d3, kernel patch d602877, and kernel patch d9ae467. Consult your distribution vendor for backported package versions.
Workarounds
- No reliable configuration workaround exists; the issue is intrinsic to the kernel code path
- Reduce attack surface by minimizing local untrusted code execution on affected hosts
- Apply seccomp filters where feasible to restrict timer_create() and execve() combinations in sandboxed workloads
# Verify running kernel version and check for patch
uname -r
# After update, confirm the stable commit is present (distro-specific)
rpm -q --changelog kernel | grep -i "posix.*timer\|de_thread"
# Or on Debian/Ubuntu systems
apt changelog linux-image-$(uname -r) | grep -i "posix.*timer\|de_thread"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

