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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-97027

CVE-2026-97027: Flatpak Desktop Entry DoS Vulnerability

CVE-2026-97027 is a denial of service flaw in Flatpak that allows malicious apps to cause forced restarts or manipulate D-Bus activation behavior. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

CVE-2026-97027 Overview

Flatpak fails to validate vendor-extension keys when exporting an application's Desktop Entry (.desktop) and D-Bus Service (.service) files. The runtime passes arbitrary keys through unmodified instead of enforcing an allowlist. A malicious Flatpak application can abuse this behavior to trigger denial-of-service conditions such as forced application restart loops. Attackers can also influence host D-Bus and systemd activation behavior beyond the sandbox boundary. The flaw is classified under [CWE-20: Improper Input Validation]. Red Hat, the upstream Flatpak project, and downstream distributions have published advisories describing the issue and the fix.

Critical Impact

A malicious Flatpak application can escape sandbox intent by injecting arbitrary vendor-extension keys into exported Desktop Entry and D-Bus Service files, enabling local denial of service and influence over host activation logic.

Affected Products

  • Flatpak application sandboxing framework
  • Linux distributions shipping Flatpak (Red Hat products referenced in advisory)
  • Systems where users install third-party Flatpak applications

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-28 - CVE-2026-97027 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-29 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-97027

Vulnerability Analysis

Flatpak exports application metadata from inside the sandbox to the host so desktop environments can launch and activate applications. Two file types are relevant: XDG Desktop Entry files (.desktop) and D-Bus service activation files (.service). Both formats define standard keys and allow vendor-specific extension keys, typically prefixed with X-.

During export, Flatpak should restrict which keys cross the sandbox boundary to prevent applications from influencing host launch or activation behavior. Instead, Flatpak forwards arbitrary vendor-extension keys verbatim into the exported files on the host. This allows a malicious application to embed keys interpreted by the host's desktop environment, session manager, or systemd user instance.

The practical impact is limited to a local, low-privilege scope, but the sandbox violation is meaningful. Reported outcomes include forced application restart loops that constitute denial of service and manipulation of D-Bus or systemd activation semantics the sandbox was designed to contain.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing allowlist validation for vendor-extension keys when Flatpak generates host-visible .desktop and .service files. The export code copies attacker-controlled keys without filtering, violating the principle that sandboxed content must be normalized before crossing a trust boundary.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires a user to install and run a malicious Flatpak application. The attacker crafts Desktop Entry or D-Bus Service metadata containing extension keys that produce unwanted behavior when the host desktop environment or session bus processes them. No network access or elevated privileges are required, and no memory corruption is involved.

For technical specifics, see the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-v64f-hrwr-j4vh and the Red Hat CVE Report.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-97027

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected vendor-extension keys (for example, non-standard X-* entries) present in exported .desktop files under ~/.local/share/flatpak/exports/share/applications/ or /var/lib/flatpak/exports/share/applications/.
  • Unexpected keys in exported D-Bus service files under ~/.local/share/flatpak/exports/share/dbus-1/services/ or the system equivalent.
  • Repeated crash-and-restart cycles for a specific Flatpak application observed in user session logs.

Detection Strategies

  • Enumerate exported Flatpak .desktop and .service files and diff their keyset against the XDG and D-Bus specification allowlists to flag unknown extension keys.
  • Correlate systemd user-session journal entries with Flatpak application launches to identify activation loops or unexpected D-Bus service activations.
  • Track installation events from flatpak install and inspect the manifest of newly added applications for suspicious exported metadata.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Monitor filesystem writes to Flatpak export directories using audit rules and alert on unusual key content.
  • Baseline the set of D-Bus services activatable by the user session and alert on additions tied to Flatpak sources.
  • Log Flatpak application install, update, and uninstall operations to a centralized location for review.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-97027

Immediate Actions Required

  • Update Flatpak to the patched version distributed by your Linux vendor once available; consult the Red Hat CVE Report for package versions.
  • Audit installed Flatpak applications and remove any of unknown or untrusted provenance.
  • Restrict Flatpak installation sources to trusted remotes such as the official Flathub verified publishers or vendor-controlled repositories.

Patch Information

Upstream Flatpak has published a fix in GHSA-v64f-hrwr-j4vh that enforces allowlist validation of keys during Desktop Entry and D-Bus service export. Downstream package updates are tracked in the Red Hat Bug Report. Apply distribution updates through the standard package manager once the patched build is published.

Workarounds

  • Avoid installing Flatpak applications from unverified publishers or untrusted remotes until the patch is applied.
  • Remove or disable per-user Flatpak exports for suspect applications by uninstalling them with flatpak uninstall <app-id>.
  • Manually inspect and prune unknown extension keys from exported .desktop and .service files as an interim measure.
bash
# List installed Flatpak applications and their remotes
flatpak list --app --columns=application,origin,installation

# Inspect exported desktop entries for unexpected extension keys
grep -RhE '^X-' ~/.local/share/flatpak/exports/share/applications/ \
  /var/lib/flatpak/exports/share/applications/ 2>/dev/null

# Remove an untrusted Flatpak application
flatpak uninstall --delete-data <app-id>

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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