CVE-2026-94416 Overview
CVE-2026-94416 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform (AAP) gateway. The gateway API permits an authenticated administrator to create a new service key for the Controller service cluster. Because service-key creation is not restricted to the installer-provisioned path, an administrator-issued key is cryptographically indistinguishable from a legitimate one. An attacker with administrator access can forge a service-authentication token that impersonates the Controller service. When combined with the gateway's OpenID Connect (OIDC) workload-identity endpoint, the attacker can obtain Workload Identity Tokens (WITs) for arbitrary Controller workloads and extract secrets from trusting resource servers such as HashiCorp Vault.
Critical Impact
An authenticated administrator can forge service-authentication tokens, mint OIDC Workload Identity Tokens for arbitrary Controller workloads, and retrieve AAP-bound secrets from HashiCorp Vault beyond their authorization boundary.
Affected Products
- Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform (AAP) gateway
- AAP Controller service cluster integrations
- Deployments with FEATURE_OIDC_WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ENABLED enabled
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-24 - CVE CVE-2026-94416 published to NVD
- 2026-09-24 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-94416
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is categorized under [CWE-290] Authentication Bypass by Spoofing. The AAP gateway exposes an API that allows administrators to create arbitrary service keys for the Controller service cluster. These keys are intended to be generated only during installer-provisioned setup for legitimate service-to-service authentication.
Because the gateway does not distinguish administrator-created keys from installer-provisioned ones, any key minted through the API is treated as authoritative. An administrator can therefore issue a key, use it to sign a service-authentication token, and present that token to the gateway as the Controller service identity.
The downstream impact is amplified when the gateway OIDC workload-identity endpoint is enabled. The gateway will sign WITs on behalf of the impersonated Controller service for arbitrary workloads. Resource servers such as HashiCorp Vault that federate trust with the gateway's OIDC signing key accept the forged WIT and release the AAP credentials bound to the requested workload.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing authorization scoping on the service-key provisioning path. Service-key creation lacks an attestation that the request originated from the installer-provisioned provisioning flow. The gateway treats all keys returned by the API as equivalent to legitimate service identities, which breaks the trust boundary between administrator privilege and service-identity provisioning.
Attack Vector
An authenticated gateway administrator calls the service-key creation API for the Controller service cluster. The attacker uses the returned key to sign a service-authentication token impersonating the Controller service. With FEATURE_OIDC_WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ENABLED active, the attacker then requests WITs for arbitrary Controller workloads. The forged WITs are submitted to downstream resource servers such as HashiCorp Vault, which return the secrets bound to those workloads. The attacker obtains credentials beyond the scope their administrator role should permit.
Technical implementation details and the upstream fix are published in the Red Hat CVE record, the Red Hat Bug Report #2537465, the ansible.platform pull request, and the jewel pull request #235.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-94416
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected calls to the gateway service-key creation API outside of installer or upgrade windows.
- New service keys issued for the Controller service cluster without a corresponding change-management ticket.
- Workload Identity Token issuance events for Controller workloads that administrators do not normally access.
- Vault audit log entries showing credential reads from AAP-bound secret paths tied to unusual WIT subject claims.
Detection Strategies
- Audit gateway logs for POST requests against the service-key endpoint and correlate with administrator identity, source IP, and session context.
- Alert on any OIDC WIT issuance where the subject claim identifies the Controller service but the request originates from an administrator session rather than Controller infrastructure.
- Compare the set of active Controller service keys against the installer-provisioned baseline captured during deployment.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward AAP gateway and HashiCorp Vault audit logs into a centralized analytics pipeline for correlation.
- Track Vault secret-read events keyed by workload identity and alert when the frequency or source deviates from established baselines.
- Baseline administrative API usage and alert on first-seen administrator interactions with service-key or OIDC workload-identity endpoints.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-94416
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict and review administrator access to the AAP gateway; enforce least privilege and multi-factor authentication for all admin accounts.
- Rotate all Controller service keys and invalidate any keys not traceable to the installer-provisioned provisioning path.
- Rotate Vault credentials and tokens that could have been retrieved via forged WITs.
- Apply the upstream fixes referenced in the ansible.platform pull request and the jewel pull request #235 as soon as Red Hat publishes updated packages.
Patch Information
Red Hat tracks remediation in the Red Hat CVE-2026-94416 advisory and Bugzilla #2537465. The upstream code changes constrain service-key creation to the installer-provisioned path so that administrator-issued keys cannot be used to impersonate the Controller service. Apply vendor-released errata to all AAP gateway instances once available.
Workarounds
- Disable the OIDC workload-identity feature by setting FEATURE_OIDC_WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ENABLED to false until patches are deployed. This removes the WIT issuance path that enables secret retrieval.
- Configure HashiCorp Vault role bindings to limit which workload identities can retrieve AAP-bound secrets, reducing blast radius if a forged WIT is presented.
- Segment administrator duties so that no single account holds both gateway administration rights and Vault secret-read permissions on sensitive paths.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

