Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-93277 Overview
CVE-2026-93277 is a Linux kernel vulnerability in the RDMA (Remote Direct Memory Access) bnxt_re driver for Broadcom NetXtreme-E RoCE devices. The flaw stems from improper validation of userspace data (udata) in destroy callbacks. The destroy path zeroes udata output after tearing down driver resources, so if the userspace access fails, uverbs preserves the uobject and allows the destroy callback to run again against already-freed resources. Local attackers with low privileges can trigger a use-after-free condition impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Critical Impact
Local, low-privileged users can trigger repeated destroy callbacks against freed RDMA driver resources, enabling potential memory corruption and privilege escalation on affected Linux kernels.
Affected Products
- Linux kernel RDMA subsystem (drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re)
- Systems using Broadcom NetXtreme-E RoCE adapters with the bnxt_re driver
- Kernel branches prior to the fixes in commits c5643ea4f040 and d38c835925d4
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-24 - CVE-2026-93277 published to NVD
- 2026-09-25 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-93277
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in the bnxt_re RDMA driver's destroy callback paths. When the uverbs core layer invokes a destroy handler, the driver first tears down the hardware and software resources and then zeroes the udata response buffer destined for userspace. If writing that response fails because userspace supplied an invalid pointer, uverbs treats the destroy as unsuccessful, preserves the uobject, and permits the destroy callback to execute again. The second invocation then operates on resources that have already been freed, resulting in a use-after-free condition in kernel memory.
The fix calls ib_no_udata_io() before teardown so that udata failures are detected while the resource is still intact. Success is returned only after teardown completes. The patch also moves ib_respond_empty_udata() to the start of create and modify flows, preventing a hardware object leak in _rdma_create_ah() where the core layer does not fully unwind on failure.
Root Cause
The root cause is a logic ordering flaw: driver resources are destroyed before the udata response is validated and written. Combined with uverbs retry semantics for failed destroys, this produces a double-destroy of freed kernel objects classified as a Use-After-Free condition.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local access and low privileges on a system exposing /dev/infiniband/uverbs* devices through the bnxt_re driver. A malicious process opens the uverbs device, issues a destroy command (for example, destroying a queue pair, completion queue, or address handle) while passing an invalid userspace response buffer, and causes uverbs to re-invoke the destroy callback against freed memory. Successful exploitation can lead to kernel memory corruption, denial of service, or privilege escalation.
No public proof-of-concept code is available for this issue. See the upstream commit messages for implementation details: kernel commit c5643ea4f040 and kernel commit d38c835925d4.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-93277
Indicators of Compromise
- Kernel oops or panic traces referencing bnxt_re destroy functions such as bnxt_re_destroy_qp, bnxt_re_destroy_cq, or bnxt_re_destroy_ah.
- KASAN use-after-free reports originating from the RDMA uverbs destroy path on hosts running the bnxt_re driver.
- Unexpected process crashes or kernel warnings tied to /dev/infiniband/uverbs* activity from non-root processes.
Detection Strategies
- Enable KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer) on test and staging kernels to surface use-after-free conditions in the RDMA subsystem.
- Audit kernel version and loaded driver versions across fleet hosts to identify systems running vulnerable bnxt_re builds.
- Monitor dmesg and persisted kernel logs for RDMA-related faults and correlate with process execution telemetry.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on non-privileged processes opening /dev/infiniband/uverbs* where RDMA usage is not expected by application profile.
- Collect and centralize kernel ring buffer logs so repeated bnxt_re faults can be identified across hosts.
- Track package and kernel update status to confirm patched builds are deployed on all RoCE-enabled servers.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-93277
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the upstream kernel fixes referenced by commits c5643ea4f040 and d38c835925d4 or install the vendor kernel update that incorporates them.
- Inventory hosts loading the bnxt_re module and prioritize patching for systems where RDMA/RoCE is in production use.
- Restrict access to /dev/infiniband/uverbs* so that only trusted service accounts can issue uverbs commands.
Patch Information
The fix is upstream in the Linux kernel. Two commits deliver the correction: c5643ea4f040acc2f4d1e88f49bd0be51110ff2f and d38c835925d4a3bfdf0a85ff2829ee90c709c561. The change calls ib_no_udata_io() before destroying driver resources and relocates ib_respond_empty_udata() to the start of create and modify flows. Distribution-maintained kernels should pick up these commits in their stable backports; consult your Linux vendor's security advisories for exact package versions.
Workarounds
- Unload the bnxt_re kernel module (modprobe -r bnxt_re) on systems that do not require RDMA functionality.
- Blacklist the module to prevent automatic load at boot where RoCE is not needed.
- Tighten permissions on /dev/infiniband/* character devices so only required service accounts have access.
# Verify whether bnxt_re is loaded and unload if unused
lsmod | grep bnxt_re
sudo modprobe -r bnxt_re
# Prevent automatic reload at boot (where RDMA is not required)
echo "blacklist bnxt_re" | sudo tee /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-bnxt_re.conf
sudo update-initramfs -u
# Restrict access to uverbs character devices
sudo chmod 0600 /dev/infiniband/uverbs*
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

