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CVE Vulnerability Database

CVE-2026-9222: Setracker2 Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-9222 is an authentication bypass flaw in Setracker2 Android Companion App that allows attackers with password hashes to gain unauthorized access. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

CVE-2026-9222 Overview

CVE-2026-9222 is an authentication design flaw in the Setracker2 Android companion app (com.tgelec.setracker) versions 3.1.5 and prior. The application authenticates with backend services using only the password hash sent from the client. An attacker who obtains this hash can authenticate to the backend and gain full access to the associated account, bypassing the intended password verification workflow. The weakness is classified under CWE-836: Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication.

Critical Impact

Attackers with knowledge of a user's stored password hash can fully authenticate to Setracker2 backend services without ever recovering the plaintext password.

Affected Products

  • Setracker2 Android Companion App com.tgelec.setracker version 3.1.5
  • Setracker2 Android Companion App com.tgelec.setracker versions prior to 3.1.5
  • Backend services trusting client-supplied password hashes for authentication

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-06-26 - CVE-2026-9222 published to NVD
  • 2026-06-26 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-9222

Vulnerability Analysis

The Setracker2 Android application performs authentication by transmitting the hashed representation of a user's password to backend services. The server accepts this hash as the credential itself rather than as a component of a challenge-response or transport-protected verification. Anyone possessing the hash — regardless of how it was obtained — can present it to the backend and be treated as the legitimate user.

This pattern collapses two distinct security properties: knowledge of the secret and verification of that knowledge. The hash effectively becomes a bearer token with no rotation, binding, or additional factor. Access is granted to the full account, meaning any data exposed through the Setracker2 backend, including data associated with tracker devices tied to the account, is reachable by the attacker.

The Exploit Prediction Scoring System places the current probability of exploitation activity at 0.242%.

Root Cause

The root cause is a design failure classified as [CWE-836]. The backend treats the password hash as equivalent to the password. There is no server-side re-hashing, salted challenge, or bound session material tying the hash to a specific request, device, or session context. Any exposure of the hash — through device compromise, backup extraction, network capture, or database leak — becomes a complete credential compromise.

Attack Vector

Exploitation occurs over the network against Setracker2 backend endpoints. An attacker who obtains a password hash — for example, from an Android device backup, insecure local storage, intercepted traffic, or a leaked backend dataset — can replay that hash to the authentication endpoint. No user interaction is required on the victim side. After authentication, the attacker inherits the full permissions of the compromised account, including access to tracker telemetry and profile data.

No verified public proof-of-concept code is available. The mechanics are described in the CISA Vulnerability Assessment Report.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-9222

Indicators of Compromise

  • Successful authentications to Setracker2 backend endpoints from IP addresses or device identifiers not previously associated with the account.
  • Repeated authentication attempts using identical hash values across multiple accounts, suggesting hash replay.
  • Access to tracker data or account settings without a corresponding interactive login pattern on the paired mobile device.

Detection Strategies

  • Instrument backend authentication logs to record source IP, device fingerprint, and hash value hashes, then alert on reuse across accounts or geographies.
  • Correlate mobile app telemetry with backend session creation to identify sessions that lack a matching app-initiated login.
  • Baseline normal login cadence per account and flag out-of-band authentications that skip interactive password entry flows.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward Setracker2 backend authentication and API access logs to a centralized analytics platform for long-term retention and correlation.
  • Monitor Android endpoints for unauthorized access to app private storage or backup extraction attempts that could expose stored hashes.
  • Track anomalous outbound connections from mobile devices to Setracker2 API hosts that do not originate from the legitimate app process.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-9222

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict or disable Setracker2 backend access for com.tgelec.setracker clients at version 3.1.5 and earlier until a fixed release is deployed.
  • Force password resets for all Setracker2 accounts to invalidate any hashes that may already be in attacker possession.
  • Audit backend authentication logs for hash reuse or logins originating from unexpected sources over the past retention window.

Patch Information

No vendor patch is referenced in the enriched CVE data at the time of publication. Consult the CISA Vulnerability Assessment Report for the current remediation status. Backend operators should redesign authentication so the server verifies the plaintext password against a server-side salted hash over an encrypted channel, and issue short-lived bound session tokens instead of accepting client-supplied hashes.

Workarounds

  • Enforce transport-layer protections and certificate pinning on Setracker2 API traffic to reduce hash interception risk.
  • Introduce a secondary authentication factor at the backend, such as a device-bound token or one-time code, so a stolen hash is not sufficient on its own.
  • Rotate account passwords frequently and remove unused accounts to limit the value of any leaked hash material.
bash
# Example: block legacy Setracker2 client traffic at an egress proxy
# until the backend authentication design is remediated
iptables -A OUTPUT -m string --algo bm \
  --string "com.tgelec.setracker/3.1.5" -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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