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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-91855

CVE-2026-91855: Open5GS PFCP Handler DOS Vulnerability

CVE-2026-91855 is a denial of service vulnerability in Open5GS PFCP Message Handler that allows remote attackers to disrupt network operations. This post covers the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-91855 Overview

CVE-2026-91855 is a denial-of-service vulnerability affecting Open5GS versions up to and including 2.7.7. The flaw resides in the Packet Forwarding Control Protocol (PFCP) Message Handler, specifically within lib/pfcp/handler.c. An attacker can send a crafted PFCP message over the network to trigger the condition, resulting in loss of service availability on the affected 5G core component. The issue is tracked under [CWE-404: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release]. Exploit code has been published, and a fix is available in commit 028e1dbb5e3271035ccee906ef417a97fc523f71.

Critical Impact

Remote, unauthenticated attackers can disrupt Open5GS core network functions by sending malformed PFCP traffic, degrading availability of 5G control-plane services.

Affected Products

  • Open5GS versions up to 2.7.7
  • Open5GS PFCP Message Handler component (lib/pfcp/handler.c)
  • Deployments using the affected Open5GS User Plane Function (UPF) and Session Management Function (SMF)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-15 - CVE-2026-91855 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-91855

Vulnerability Analysis

Open5GS is an open-source implementation of the 5G Core and EPC. The affected code path processes PFCP messages exchanged between control-plane functions such as the SMF and user-plane functions such as the UPF or SGW-U. When the handler processes a specially crafted PFCP message, an assertion or improper resource-release condition occurs, terminating the process. Because PFCP is exposed on the network interface between core network functions, the failure translates into a full outage of the affected node. A related but distinct assertion failure in Open5GS UPF is tracked as CVE-2025-29339.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper validation of state when handling Outer Header Creation information in Create/Update Forwarding Action Rule (FAR) messages. When ogs_gtp_connect() fails, the node remains in gtpu_peer_list with ogs_sa_family == 0. A subsequent lookup via ogs_gtp_node_find_by_ip() returns this partially initialized node, and ogs_pfcp_far_f_teid_hash_set() aborts with a fatal Unknown family(0) error. This matches [CWE-404], where a resource is not properly released or cleaned up on failure.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network reachability to the PFCP interface of an Open5GS control-plane or user-plane function. No authentication or user interaction is required. An attacker that can inject PFCP messages, either from a compromised peer or an exposed management network, can trigger the abort condition and take the affected function offline.

c
// Patch: lib/pfcp/context.c — remove orphaned GTP node on connect failure
                ogs_gtp_self()->gtpu_sock, ogs_gtp_self()->gtpu_sock6, gnode);
        if (rv != OGS_OK) {
            ogs_error("ogs_gtp_connect() failed");
            /*
             * ogs_gtp_node_new() zeroes gnode->addr, and only a successful
             * ogs_gtp_connect() fills it in. On failure the node stays in
             * gtpu_peer_list with ogs_sa_family == 0, so the next request
             * carrying the same IP address finds it through
             * ogs_gtp_node_find_by_ip(), skips ogs_gtp_connect() entirely
             * and reaches ogs_pfcp_far_f_teid_hash_set(), which aborts:
             *
             *   [pfcp] FATAL: Unknown family(0) (../lib/pfcp/context.c)
             *
             * OGS_SETUP_GTP_NODE() has not run yet, so no FAR references
             * this node and removing it here is safe.
             */
            ogs_gtp_node_remove(&ogs_gtp_self()->gtpu_peer_list, gnode);
            return rv;
        }
    }

Source: GitHub Commit 028e1dbb

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-91855

Indicators of Compromise

  • Fatal log entries containing [pfcp] FATAL: Unknown family(0) originating from lib/pfcp/context.c
  • Repeated crashes or restarts of the Open5GS SMF, UPF, or SGW-U process
  • PFCP Create FAR or Update FAR messages carrying Outer Header Creation elements from unexpected source addresses

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor Open5GS service logs for abort messages and unexpected process termination tied to PFCP handling
  • Inspect PFCP traffic captures for malformed or unsolicited Create/Update FAR messages sent to core network functions
  • Alert on repeated ogs_gtp_connect() failed errors preceding fatal aborts

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Ingest Open5GS logs into a centralized logging or SIEM platform and create rules for PFCP fatal error strings
  • Track uptime metrics for SMF, UPF, and SGW-U processes and alert on unexpected restarts
  • Capture and baseline PFCP peer relationships so that traffic from unauthorized IPs is flagged promptly

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-91855

Immediate Actions Required

  • Update Open5GS to a version that includes commit 028e1dbb5e3271035ccee906ef417a97fc523f71 or later
  • Restrict network access to PFCP interfaces so that only trusted core network functions can reach them
  • Review Open5GS deployments exposed to untrusted networks and place them behind segmentation controls

Patch Information

The fix is provided in Open5GS commit 028e1dbb5e3271035ccee906ef417a97fc523f71, titled [PFCP] Validate Outer Header Creation in Create/Update FAR. The patch removes the orphaned GTP node from gtpu_peer_list when ogs_gtp_connect() fails and returns OGS_PFCP_CAUSE_SYSTEM_FAILURE when ogs_pfcp_setup_far_gtpu_node() fails in src/sgwu/sxa-handler.c. Full details are available at the GitHub Commit Details and GitHub Issue #4699.

Workarounds

  • Enforce firewall rules that permit PFCP (UDP/8805) traffic only from authorized peers
  • Deploy network segmentation so that PFCP interfaces are unreachable from user-plane or external networks
  • Enable process supervision (systemd, container orchestrator) to automatically restart failed Open5GS services while a patch is scheduled
bash
# Example: restrict PFCP (UDP/8805) to trusted SMF peer using iptables
iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 8805 -s 10.0.0.10 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 8805 -j DROP

# Verify Open5GS version and apply upstream patch
git -C open5gs log --oneline | grep 028e1dbb5e3271035ccee906ef417a97fc523f71 \
    || git -C open5gs cherry-pick 028e1dbb5e3271035ccee906ef417a97fc523f71

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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