CVE-2026-8982 Overview
CVE-2026-8982 identifies two undocumented privileged accounts embedded in Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through version V1.03.51. The accounts rely on vendor-defined password derivation logic that computes credentials from device-specific values. An attacker who understands the derivation algorithm and possesses the required inputs can authenticate to the web management interface with administrative privileges. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials) and affects a network-connected electric vehicle charging device.
Critical Impact
Remote attackers can obtain administrative access to the charger web management interface without prior authorization, enabling full device takeover.
Affected Products
- Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51
- Web management interface exposed by the affected firmware
- Devices deployed with default vendor firmware and no additional network isolation
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-07-21 - CVE-2026-8982 published to NVD
- 2026-07-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-8982
Vulnerability Analysis
The Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware ships with two privileged accounts that are not documented for end users or integrators. These accounts authenticate to the web management interface and grant administrative privileges once accessed. Because the accounts are embedded in firmware, they persist across reboots and configuration resets. The web management interface accepts these credentials over the network, giving remote attackers a direct authentication path if they can reach the device.
Root Cause
The root cause is the use of hard-coded credentials [CWE-798] delivered through a vendor-defined password derivation mechanism. Passwords are generated from device-specific values rather than random secrets under user control. Once the derivation algorithm and required inputs are known, credentials for any affected charger can be reproduced. Users cannot disable, remove, or rotate these accounts through the standard management interface.
Attack Vector
An attacker with network access to the charger and knowledge of the derivation algorithm computes the administrative password from device-specific identifiers. The attacker then authenticates to the web management interface as a privileged user. From there, the attacker can modify charger configuration, disrupt charging sessions, tamper with billing or telemetry data, and pivot to adjacent network segments. No user interaction is required, and no prior authentication is needed. Technical details are documented in the CyberDanube Security Research advisory.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-8982
Indicators of Compromise
- Successful web management interface logins from unexpected source IP addresses or geographic regions
- Authentication events tied to account names not created by the operator or integrator
- Unexpected configuration changes, firmware updates, or session terminations on the charger
- Outbound connections from the charger to hosts outside its normal management infrastructure
Detection Strategies
- Enumerate all local accounts on the charger and flag any that were not provisioned by the operator
- Capture and inspect HTTP/HTTPS traffic to the web management interface for logins outside approved administrative workflows
- Correlate charger authentication logs with source IP allowlists and known administrator identities
- Monitor for repeated authentication attempts that succeed on the first try from previously unseen sources
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward charger logs to a central SIEM or data lake for retention and correlation with network telemetry
- Alert on any administrative action performed outside scheduled maintenance windows
- Track firmware version inventory to identify devices still running V1.03.51 or earlier
- Baseline normal management traffic volume and alert on deviations that indicate credential abuse
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-8982
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network access to the charger web management interface using firewall rules or VLAN segmentation
- Place affected chargers behind a management VPN and block direct Internet exposure
- Audit charger authentication logs for any signs of unauthorized administrative access
- Contact Autel for a firmware version that removes or disables the undocumented accounts
Patch Information
No patched firmware version is referenced in the currently available advisory. Operators should track vendor communications from Autel and apply firmware updates once released. Until a fix is available, network-level controls are the primary defense. Refer to the CyberDanube Security Research advisory for the latest disclosure status.
Workarounds
- Isolate chargers on a dedicated management network with strict ingress and egress filtering
- Require operators to reach the management interface only through a jump host with logged sessions
- Disable remote management features that are not required for daily operations
- Deploy an intrusion detection sensor on the charger management network to alert on unexpected HTTP authentication activity
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
