Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-89035 Overview
CVE-2026-89035 is a session token replay vulnerability affecting MikroTik RouterOS through version 7.24.5. The flaw resides in the WebFig management interface, where captured session tokens can be replayed across new Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) sessions to bypass authentication. The makeSessionKey function in libucrypto.so generates tokens using fixed salts without binding them to channel-specific or session-specific input. The user service then validates tokens against the login store without verifying channel context. Attackers can gain persistent administrative access until the token store is explicitly cleared. This issue extends the transport-layer exposure first identified in CVE-2025-61481.
Critical Impact
Successful token replay grants persistent administrative control over RouterOS devices, enabling full configuration manipulation and lateral movement into the network.
Affected Products
- MikroTik RouterOS versions through 7.24.5
- WebFig web management interface
- Devices exposing WebFig to untrusted networks
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-89035 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-89035
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is categorized as an Insufficient Session Expiration weakness [CWE-613] and functions as an authentication bypass. WebFig uses ECDH to establish a secure channel between client and router. After the key exchange, the router issues a session token tied to the authenticated user. The expectation is that each token belongs to one specific ECDH channel.
In RouterOS through 7.24.5, that binding is absent. The makeSessionKey routine in libucrypto.so derives tokens using fixed salts rather than incorporating per-session entropy or channel identifiers. The user service then accepts any valid token from its login store regardless of which channel presents it. An attacker who captures a token can replay it inside a freshly negotiated ECDH session and inherit the original administrator's privileges.
Root Cause
The root cause is cryptographic token generation decoupled from session context. Fixed salts in makeSessionKey produce tokens that remain valid independent of the ECDH channel that originally received them. Server-side validation compounds the issue by not re-binding tokens to the active channel. The login store retains tokens until explicit administrative clearing occurs.
Attack Vector
An attacker with network observation capability captures a legitimate WebFig session token. This may follow interception described in CVE-2025-61481. The attacker then opens a new connection to the target router, completes a standard ECDH negotiation, and submits the captured token to the user service. The service accepts the token and grants administrative access without requiring credentials.
See the VulnCheck Advisory for MikroTik for additional technical analysis.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-89035
Indicators of Compromise
- Multiple WebFig sessions authenticated to the same user account originating from different source IP addresses in a short time window.
- Administrative configuration changes performed without a preceding interactive login event in RouterOS logs.
- Unexpected additions of users, scheduler scripts, or SSH keys following WebFig activity.
- Persistent WebFig sessions that remain valid across router reboots when they should not.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate WebFig authentication events with source IP, user agent, and ECDH session identifiers to detect reuse across channels.
- Alert when a session token is observed in sessions originating from geographically or network-topologically distant sources.
- Baseline normal WebFig access patterns per administrator and flag deviations in session duration or source address.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward RouterOS logs to a central SIEM and retain WebFig authentication records for correlation.
- Monitor for configuration export, user creation, and firewall rule changes immediately following a WebFig login.
- Track outbound traffic from RouterOS devices for signs of attacker tunneling or command-and-control beaconing.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-89035
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict WebFig access to trusted management networks using firewall rules on the input chain.
- Disable the www and www-ssl services on devices where WebFig is not required.
- Rotate all RouterOS administrative credentials and clear the active session token store.
- Enforce management access only over a VPN that provides its own authenticated transport.
Patch Information
As of the last NVD update on 2026-10-22, MikroTik has not published a fixed RouterOS version addressing CVE-2026-89035. Monitor the VulnCheck Advisory for MikroTik and MikroTik release notes for an updated build that binds session tokens to their originating ECDH channel.
Workarounds
- Replace WebFig management with SSH key-based access protected by firewall allowlists.
- Terminate WebFig behind a reverse proxy that enforces mutual TLS and additional authentication.
- Schedule periodic clearing of the RouterOS session token store to limit the lifetime of any captured token.
- Segment management interfaces onto a dedicated out-of-band VLAN unreachable from user networks.
# Example RouterOS firewall rules restricting WebFig to a management subnet
/ip service set www address=10.10.0.0/24
/ip service set www-ssl address=10.10.0.0/24
/ip service disable www
/user active remove [find]
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

