Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-88393 Overview
CVE-2026-88393 is a remote code execution vulnerability in WookTeam versions v1.6.6 and earlier. The flaw resides in the project task export interface at /api/project/task/export. The endpoint accepts a base64-encoded data parameter and passes the decoded value into the string2array() function in app/Module/Base.php. That function invokes eval("\$array = $data;") whenever the decoded string begins with array. An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary PHP into the eval call and execute code in the application context. The issue is tracked under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can achieve remote PHP code execution on the WookTeam host over the network with no user interaction.
Affected Products
- WookTeam v1.6.6
- WookTeam versions prior to v1.6.6
- Deployments exposing the /api/project/task/export endpoint
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-05 - CVE-2026-88393 published to NVD
- 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-88393
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is a server-side PHP code injection in the task export workflow. The export endpoint receives attacker-controlled serialized task data in the data request parameter. The server decodes the base64 payload and forwards the resulting string to string2array() inside app/Module/Base.php. When the decoded value starts with the literal array, the helper executes eval("\$array = $data;") to reconstruct a PHP array from its textual representation. Because the decoded string is interpolated directly into the eval argument, any PHP syntax inside the payload is parsed and executed by the interpreter.
Root Cause
The root cause is use of eval() as a deserialization primitive. The developer relied on the PHP parser to turn an untrusted string back into a native array, trusting a prefix check as a type guard. The array prefix is not a validator, and no sanitization, allow-list, or safe parser is used. This matches [CWE-94: Code Injection], where attacker input influences a dynamic evaluation construct.
Attack Vector
An attacker reaches the vulnerable endpoint over the network without authentication. The attacker constructs a PHP expression that begins with the token array to satisfy the prefix check, then appends additional PHP statements that are executed when eval runs. Typical payloads begin with array(); followed by calls such as system(), exec(), or file_put_contents() to run operating system commands or drop a webshell. The payload is base64-encoded and submitted in the data parameter of a request to /api/project/task/export. Full exploitation details are available in the GitHub RCE Exploit Documentation.
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Stop Exploit AttemptsDetection Methods for CVE-2026-88393
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to /api/project/task/export containing a data parameter with base64 content that decodes to strings beginning with array followed by PHP function calls such as system, exec, passthru, or shell_exec.
- New or modified PHP files in web-accessible directories after requests to the export endpoint, which can indicate webshell drops.
- Child processes of the PHP-FPM or web server worker spawning shells (/bin/sh, /bin/bash) or network utilities (curl, wget, nc).
Detection Strategies
- Deploy a web application firewall rule that decodes the data parameter on requests to /api/project/task/export and blocks payloads containing PHP function tokens outside the expected array literal grammar.
- Enable PHP logging with log_errors and monitor for eval() runtime errors originating from app/Module/Base.php.
- Hunt endpoint telemetry for php or php-fpm processes creating interactive shells or executing outbound network connections.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on anomalous POST volumes or payload sizes against /api/project/task/export.
- Baseline file integrity for the WookTeam web root and alert on unexpected .php file creation or modification.
- Capture full request bodies for the export endpoint in the SIEM to support retrospective hunts once new indicators are published.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-88393
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network access to WookTeam instances to trusted users, ideally behind VPN or SSO, until a patched version is deployed.
- Block or filter requests to /api/project/task/export at the reverse proxy or WAF where the export feature is not business critical.
- Review web server and PHP logs for prior exploitation attempts against the export endpoint and inspect the host for webshells or persistence.
Patch Information
No vendor advisory URL is included in the NVD entry at the time of publication. Operators should monitor the WookTeam project repository for a release that supersedes v1.6.6 and remediates the unsafe eval() call in app/Module/Base.php::string2array(). Technical context is available in the GitHub RCE Exploit Documentation.
Workarounds
- Replace the eval()-based array parser with a safe decoder such as json_decode() after converting legacy payloads, or use unserialize() with an allow-list of classes.
- Add server-side validation that rejects any data parameter whose decoded content contains characters outside a strict array literal grammar.
- Run the PHP process under a least-privileged account and apply SELinux or AppArmor profiles that prevent the web user from spawning shells or writing to the web root.
# Example reverse proxy block for the vulnerable endpoint
location = /api/project/task/export {
return 403;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

