Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-87425 Overview
CVE-2026-87425 affects Broadcom Brocade Active Support Connectivity Gateway (ASCG) versions before 3.5.0. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated adjacent-network attacker to upload a Certificate Authority (CA) certificate to an unauthenticated management interface. The injected CA is added to the TLS client trust store, causing the gateway to trust attacker-controlled certificates.
This trust store corruption enables Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks against outbound TLS sessions between ASCG and managed Brocade switches or peer nodes. The flaw is categorized under CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation.
Critical Impact
An attacker on an adjacent network can poison the ASCG trust store without credentials, intercept management-plane TLS traffic, and manipulate communications with managed fabric switches.
Affected Products
- Broadcom Brocade Active Support Connectivity Gateway (ASCG) versions prior to 3.5.0
- Deployments exposing the ASCG management interface to adjacent networks
- Fabric environments where ASCG manages outbound TLS connections to switches and peer nodes
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-08 - CVE-2026-87425 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-08 - Broadcom publishes Security Advisory 38392
- 2026-10-14 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-87425
Vulnerability Analysis
The ASCG management interface exposes a function that accepts CA certificates and inserts them into the local TLS client trust store. This function performs no authentication of the caller and no authorization check against the submitted certificate. Any party with network reachability to the management interface can register a trusted root.
Once an attacker-controlled CA is present in the trust store, ASCG validates any certificate chained to that CA as legitimate. Outbound TLS connections to managed switches and peer nodes become susceptible to interception because the client no longer distinguishes legitimate server certificates from attacker-signed ones.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper certificate validation combined with a missing authentication control on a trust-store modification endpoint. The management interface treats CA installation as an unprivileged operation, violating the principle that trust anchors must only be modifiable by authenticated administrators. [CWE-295] describes this class of flaw where certificate trust decisions are made against an untrusted or tampered trust store.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires adjacent-network access to the ASCG management interface. The attacker submits an unauthorized CA certificate through the exposed interface, waits for ASCG to initiate outbound TLS sessions, and then presents a server certificate signed by the planted CA from a MITM position on the path to managed switches or peer nodes. Because the trust store now anchors the attacker's CA, TLS validation succeeds and the session is intercepted or modified in transit.
No verified public proof-of-concept exploit is available. Refer to the Broadcom Security Advisory 38392 for vendor-provided technical details.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-87425
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected CA certificates present in the ASCG TLS client trust store that do not match the organization's issued or vendor-provided roots
- Unauthenticated HTTP or HTTPS requests to the ASCG management interface targeting certificate-upload endpoints
- Unexplained TLS session resets or certificate changes on outbound connections to managed switches and peer nodes
Detection Strategies
- Enumerate the ASCG trust store and compare against a known-good baseline of approved CA certificates
- Capture and inspect management-plane network traffic for certificate upload requests originating from untrusted adjacent subnets
- Monitor outbound TLS handshakes from ASCG for issuer mismatches or newly observed intermediate CAs
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward ASCG audit logs and management-interface access logs to a centralized SIEM for correlation and retention
- Alert on any modification to the TLS trust store outside of change-approved maintenance windows
- Instrument switch management interfaces to log TLS peer certificate fingerprints and detect deviations
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-87425
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade all Brocade ASCG instances to version 3.5.0 or later as directed by Broadcom
- Restrict network access to the ASCG management interface to trusted administrative subnets only
- Audit the current TLS trust store on every ASCG deployment and remove any unauthorized CA entries
Patch Information
Broadcom addresses CVE-2026-87425 in Brocade ASCG 3.5.0. Full remediation guidance is published in Broadcom Security Advisory 38392. Apply the vendor-supplied upgrade package following standard change-control procedures and validate the trust store contents after upgrading.
Workarounds
- Place the ASCG management interface behind a network segmentation boundary that blocks adjacent-network reachability from untrusted hosts
- Enforce strict access control lists (ACLs) on management VLANs so only authorized jump hosts can reach the gateway
- Continuously baseline and reconcile the TLS trust store, removing any CA that was not provisioned by an approved change
# Example network-level restriction (illustrative)
# Permit only the admin jump host to reach the ASCG management interface
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -s <admin_jump_host_ip> --dport 443 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

