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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-86467

CVE-2026-86467: Apache Airflow Amazon CSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-86467 is a cross-site request forgery flaw in Apache Airflow Amazon provider's SAML login flow that enables attackers to hijack user sessions. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-86467 Overview

CVE-2026-86467 is a login cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability [CWE-352] in the Apache Airflow Amazon provider. The AWS auth manager's Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) login flow does not bind the authentication response to the browser session that initiated it. The login handler discards the AuthnRequest ID, and the callback validates the assertion without enforcing a matching InResponseTo value. An unauthenticated attacker can trick a victim into completing a SAML login using the attacker's own assertion, silently logging the victim into the attacker-controlled Airflow account.

Critical Impact

Any work the victim performs after the forced login lands in a session controlled by the attacker, exposing uploaded data, credentials, and pipeline configurations.

Affected Products

  • apache-airflow-providers-amazon versions prior to 9.38.0
  • Apache Airflow deployments configured with the AWS auth manager
  • Deployments using SAML authentication through the AWS auth manager

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-86467 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-86467

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw resides in the SAML login flow implemented by the AWS auth manager within the Apache Airflow Amazon provider. SAML relies on a request-response correlation mechanism in which the Service Provider (SP) issues an AuthnRequest with a unique ID, and the Identity Provider (IdP) returns an assertion containing an InResponseTo attribute matching that ID. This binding ensures that the response the browser delivers to the SP was actually requested by that browser.

In the vulnerable implementation, the login handler discards the AuthnRequest ID after issuing it. The callback endpoint then accepts the SAML response without comparing InResponseTo to any stored request ID. Any valid assertion for the configured IdP is accepted, regardless of which browser initiated the login.

This issue is the same login-CSRF class previously addressed in the Keycloak auth manager as CVE-2026-40948.

Root Cause

The root cause is the absence of a server-side binding between the outbound AuthnRequest and the inbound SAML assertion. Without persistence and validation of the request ID, the SP cannot distinguish a legitimate response from one injected by an attacker who initiated their own SAML flow in a different browser.

Attack Vector

An attacker begins a SAML login against the victim's Airflow instance using attacker-controlled credentials and captures the resulting signed assertion. The attacker then hosts a page that automatically POSTs the captured assertion to the Airflow SAML callback endpoint in the victim's browser. Because the callback does not validate InResponseTo, Airflow accepts the assertion and establishes a session for the attacker's account in the victim's browser. The victim, believing they are logged into their own account, then uploads data, defines DAGs, or supplies secrets, all of which the attacker can later retrieve by logging in with their own credentials.

No Airflow account or credential is required of the attacker beyond what is needed to complete a standard SAML login as themselves. The victim only needs to load an attacker-controlled page while authenticated to the IdP.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-86467

Indicators of Compromise

  • SAML AuthnResponse POSTs to the Airflow callback endpoint that lack a corresponding outbound AuthnRequest from the same browser session.
  • Multiple distinct source IP addresses or user agents authenticating as the same Airflow user within a short interval.
  • Unexpected DAG definitions, connection objects, or variables created by accounts that normally do not perform such actions.

Detection Strategies

  • Correlate IdP-side SAML issuance logs with Airflow SP-side authentication logs to find assertions consumed by browsers that never requested them.
  • Review Airflow audit logs for session establishment events immediately followed by changes to secrets, connections, or pipeline code.
  • Alert on logins where the client IP of the callback request differs from the IP that initiated the SAML flow.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose SAML logging in the AWS auth manager to capture InResponseTo values and request IDs for forensic review.
  • Forward Airflow web server access logs and IdP authentication logs to a centralized analytics platform for cross-source correlation.
  • Monitor for anomalous creation of Airflow connections that contain cloud credentials, API keys, or database passwords.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-86467

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade apache-airflow-providers-amazon to version 9.38.0 or later, which enforces InResponseTo validation.
  • Rotate any secrets, connections, or credentials that may have been entered into Airflow during the exposure window.
  • Audit DAGs, variables, and connections for unauthorized additions or modifications since the AWS auth manager with SAML was deployed.

Patch Information

The fix is included in apache-airflow-providers-amazon 9.38.0. The patch binds the SAML AuthnRequest ID to the user's session and requires the callback to validate that the assertion's InResponseTo attribute matches the stored request ID. Review the GitHub Pull Request for Airflow and the Apache Mailing List Discussion for implementation details. The related Keycloak auth manager issue is documented in the CVE-2026-40948 Record.

Workarounds

  • If immediate upgrade is not possible, switch to an auth manager not affected by this issue until the patched provider version can be deployed.
  • Restrict access to the Airflow web interface to trusted networks via VPN or IP allowlisting to reduce the chance a victim loads an attacker-controlled page while able to reach the callback.
  • Enforce short SAML assertion lifetimes at the IdP so captured assertions have a narrow window of usability.
bash
# Upgrade the Amazon provider to the fixed version
pip install --upgrade "apache-airflow-providers-amazon>=9.38.0"

# Verify the installed version
pip show apache-airflow-providers-amazon | grep Version

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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