Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-85080 Overview
CVE-2026-85080 affects Silicon Labs EmberZNet version 9.1.1 and earlier. A malformed GetGroupMembership Zigbee cluster message triggers an out-of-bounds write that crashes the receiving device. The flaw requires the sender to already be joined to the Zigbee network and only impacts devices that support the Group Cluster. Researchers observed that only a limited number of values can be written through this condition, so no path to remote code execution has been demonstrated. The practical impact is denial of service against affected Zigbee endpoints.
Critical Impact
An authenticated Zigbee network participant can crash any device running EmberZNet 9.1.1 or earlier that supports the Group Cluster by sending a crafted GetGroupMembership message.
Affected Products
- Silicon Labs EmberZNet SDK 9.1.1 and earlier
- Zigbee devices implementing the Group Cluster on EmberZNet
- Mesh network stacks derived from the affected EmberZNet releases
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-22 - CVE-2026-85080 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-85080
Vulnerability Analysis
The defect is a stack-based out-of-bounds write classified under [CWE-121]. The EmberZNet Zigbee Cluster Library (ZCL) handler for the GetGroupMembership command parses an inbound list of group identifiers without fully validating length fields against the destination buffer. When a joined device issues a malformed request, the handler writes past the allocated boundary and corrupts adjacent stack data, which causes the firmware to crash.
The advisory notes that only a limited number of values can be written, which constrains the attacker's ability to pivot the memory corruption into arbitrary code execution. The practical outcome is a reliable crash of the Zigbee stack, which translates to a denial of service for the affected endpoint.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper validation of attacker-controlled length and count fields in the inbound GetGroupMembership command frame. The handler trusts the sender-supplied count when iterating group identifiers and writes to a fixed-size response or working buffer without bounds checking.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network adjacency on the Zigbee mesh and prior membership in the network, which raises the bar compared to an unauthenticated remote attack. Any device already joined to the network and able to address the target's Group Cluster endpoint can send the malformed command. Refer to the Silicon Labs Security Advisory A-00000590 for the vendor's technical description.
// No verified exploit code is available. The vulnerability is triggered
// by a malformed ZCL GetGroupMembership command with a crafted group
// identifier count that exceeds the receiver's buffer capacity.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-85080
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected reboots or watchdog resets of Zigbee endpoints that implement the Group Cluster
- Zigbee network traffic containing GetGroupMembership commands with abnormally large group count fields
- Repeated loss of a specific device from the Zigbee network coordinator's active node list
Detection Strategies
- Capture Zigbee traffic with a sniffer and inspect ZCL GetGroupMembership frames for malformed length and count fields
- Correlate coordinator logs showing child device drop-offs with the arrival of Group Cluster commands from a specific source address
- Alert on repeated firmware crash reports or coredumps from endpoints running EmberZNet 9.1.1 or earlier
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable persistent logging on Zigbee coordinators and gateways to retain source addresses of malformed frames
- Monitor mesh network health metrics such as node availability and link quality for sudden regressions
- Track firmware version inventory to identify endpoints still running vulnerable EmberZNet builds
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-85080
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all Zigbee devices built on EmberZNet and identify those running 9.1.1 or earlier
- Apply the Silicon Labs fixed EmberZNet SDK release and redistribute updated firmware to deployed devices
- Review the trust model for Zigbee network membership and remove unused or unknown joined devices
Patch Information
Silicon Labs addresses the issue in a release following EmberZNet 9.1.1. Consult the Silicon Labs Security Advisory A-00000590 for the fixed version, patch commits, and firmware update guidance for affected product families.
Workarounds
- Restrict Zigbee network joining with install codes and disable open-join windows on coordinators
- Segment untrusted or third-party Zigbee devices onto separate networks that do not share Group Cluster endpoints with critical devices
- Monitor for and remove rogue joined devices that could originate malformed Group Cluster traffic
# Configuration example
# Close the Zigbee network to new joiners on a Silicon Labs coordinator
# (vendor-specific CLI; adjust to your gateway's management interface)
zigbee permit-join 0
zigbee network-info
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

