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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-84747

CVE-2026-84747: Apache bRPC Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-84747 is an authentication bypass flaw in Apache bRPC that allows attackers to circumvent front proxy access controls through path manipulation. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-84747 Overview

CVE-2026-84747 is an interpretation conflict vulnerability in the HTTP protocol implementation of Apache bRPC versions prior to 1.18.0. The flaw allows remote attackers to bypass access control rules enforced by a front proxy. Apache bRPC dispatches HTTP paths containing empty segments, such as //flags, /flags//, and /flags//port, to the same handler as the collapsed path /flags. A front proxy enforcing an Access Control List (ACL) on the literal path forwards the padded request untouched, where bRPC resolves it to a restricted builtin service. The weakness is classified as Interpretation Conflict [CWE-436].

Critical Impact

Attackers can reach bRPC builtin services, such as /flags?setvalue=, that a front proxy intended to block, undermining perimeter access control.

Affected Products

  • Apache bRPC versions earlier than 1.18.0
  • Deployments of Apache bRPC behind a front proxy performing path-based ACL enforcement
  • bRPC servers accepting HTTP or HTTP/2 traffic from a proxy or gateway

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-84747 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-84747

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the method dispatch function FindMethodPropertyByURI() within Apache bRPC's HTTP protocol handler. The function splits the request path using a string splitter that silently skips empty fields. Consecutive slashes in a path, such as //flags or /flags//port, are therefore treated as equivalent to the collapsed path /flags. RFC 3986 defines these as distinct URIs, creating an interpretation conflict between bRPC and any upstream proxy enforcing policy on the literal path.

A second defect compounds the impact. The HTTP/2 implementation never validated the :path pseudo-header. Requests with no :path, or with a :path that neither begins with / nor equals the asterisk-form *, were accepted. RFC 9113 section 8.3.1 requires rejection of such frames.

Root Cause

The dispatcher normalizes paths too aggressively while the enforcement layer (the front proxy) does not. This differential handling of empty path segments is the structural root cause, aligning with [CWE-436] Interpretation Conflict between parsers in a layered system.

Attack Vector

An attacker crafts an HTTP or HTTP/2 request containing empty path segments targeting a bRPC builtin service that the front proxy blocks. For example, a proxy ACL blocking /flags will not match //flags?setvalue=, so the proxy forwards the request. The bRPC server collapses the duplicate slashes during dispatch and invokes the /flags builtin handler, granting the attacker access to a restricted administrative endpoint. HTTP/2 clients can additionally omit or malform the :path pseudo-header to reach code paths that should have been rejected.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-84747

Indicators of Compromise

  • HTTP or HTTP/2 request paths containing consecutive forward slashes directed at bRPC endpoints, particularly targeting builtin services such as /flags, /vars, or /status.
  • HTTP/2 requests to bRPC servers with missing :path pseudo-headers or :path values that neither begin with / nor equal *.
  • Proxy access logs showing requests like //flags?setvalue= returning successful responses from the backend.

Detection Strategies

  • Compare front proxy access logs against bRPC server access logs for the same requests, flagging any path where the proxy observed a padded form and the server dispatched a collapsed form.
  • Deploy signatures in web application firewalls to alert on consecutive-slash patterns in request-URIs targeting known bRPC service paths.
  • Inspect HTTP/2 traffic for :path pseudo-headers that violate RFC 9113 section 8.3.1.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose request logging on bRPC servers to capture the raw dispatched path for forensic correlation.
  • Alert on any successful invocation of bRPC builtin services from source networks that should be blocked by the front proxy.
  • Track configuration changes performed through /flags?setvalue= to identify unauthorized runtime modifications.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-84747

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all Apache bRPC deployments to version 1.18.0 or later, which rejects empty path segments and validates HTTP/2 :path by default.
  • Audit front proxy ACLs to confirm they inspect normalized paths rather than only literal request-URIs.
  • Review bRPC builtin service exposure and restrict them to internal management networks where feasible.

Patch Information

The fix is available in Apache bRPC 1.18.0. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately can apply the upstream patch from Apache bRPC Pull Request #3512. After patching, HTTP and HTTP/2 request paths containing consecutive slashes are rejected by default, as are non-conformant HTTP/2 :path values. Refer to the Apache Mailing List Discussion for the vendor announcement.

Workarounds

  • Configure the front proxy to normalize request paths (collapse consecutive slashes) before applying ACL decisions, so proxy and backend agree on the dispatched resource.
  • Reject HTTP/2 requests at the proxy that are missing a :path pseudo-header or carry a :path not beginning with / and not equal to *.
  • Do not enable the -http_allow_empty_path_segments gflag on servers exposed to untrusted traffic; it restores the vulnerable lenient behavior.
bash
# Configuration example
# Verify the installed bRPC version meets the fixed release
grep -R "BRPC_VERSION" /path/to/brpc/include/

# When running the patched bRPC server, leave the empty-path gflag OFF (default)
./your_brpc_server --http_allow_empty_path_segments=false

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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