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CVE Vulnerability Database

CVE-2026-7874: Langflow Information Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2026-7874 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 caused by weak encryption allowing credential exposure. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

CVE-2026-7874 Overview

CVE-2026-7874 affects IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0. The vulnerability allows disclosure of all stored credentials because Langflow uses a weak and reversible key derivation mechanism for encryption at rest. An attacker who obtains access to the encrypted credential store can derive the encryption key and recover plaintext secrets. This includes API keys, database credentials, and third-party integration tokens managed by Langflow. The flaw is classified under [CWE-338] Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator. Langflow is widely deployed as a low-code framework for building agentic AI workflows, so compromised secrets can pivot into connected LLM providers, vector databases, and enterprise systems.

Critical Impact

Attackers can reverse the key derivation to decrypt every credential stored by Langflow, exposing downstream systems and AI service accounts.

Affected Products

  • IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0
  • IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.1 through 1.9.x
  • IBM Langflow OSS 1.10.0

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-06-30 - CVE-2026-7874 published to NVD
  • 2026-07-02 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-7874

Vulnerability Analysis

Langflow encrypts sensitive credentials at rest before persisting them to its database. The encryption relies on a key derivation mechanism that produces predictable or trivially reversible keys. An attacker who reads the credential table or database file can reconstruct the derivation input and regenerate the encryption key without brute forcing. Once the key is recovered, every stored credential decrypts to plaintext.

The attack does not require authentication to Langflow itself if the attacker can reach the backing store through a separate exposure. Because Langflow orchestrates connections to LLM providers, cloud services, and internal APIs, the leaked material typically includes long-lived tokens. Attackers can then move laterally into those integrated systems and exfiltrate model outputs, training data, or business records.

Root Cause

The root cause is the use of a weak key derivation function that fails to incorporate sufficient entropy, a random salt, or a computationally expensive transform. Under [CWE-338], the derivation output is predictable given knowledge of the algorithm and any static inputs shipped with the product. This turns encryption at rest into obfuscation rather than a cryptographic control.

Attack Vector

The vulnerability is exploitable over the network when the credential store is reachable, and it produces high confidentiality and integrity impact. An attacker who obtains a copy of the Langflow database, a backup, or a snapshot can perform offline decryption. Exploitation requires no user interaction and no privileges within Langflow.

No public proof-of-concept code is available for CVE-2026-7874. Refer to the IBM Support Document for vendor-supplied technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-7874

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected read access to the Langflow database, credential tables, or on-disk configuration files containing encrypted secrets.
  • Use of API keys or service tokens managed by Langflow from IP addresses or user agents that do not match legitimate workflow executions.
  • New outbound connections from Langflow hosts to attacker-controlled infrastructure following database access events.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit Langflow database access logs for queries against credential storage tables issued outside of application service accounts.
  • Correlate authentication events at integrated LLM providers and SaaS platforms with Langflow workflow runtimes to spot token reuse from unrelated sources.
  • Hunt for file access to Langflow SQLite files, PostgreSQL dumps, or Kubernetes secrets referencing the Langflow deployment.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable database audit logging on the Langflow backend and forward events to a centralized analytics platform.
  • Monitor for backup and snapshot operations against volumes hosting Langflow data, especially those initiated by non-administrative identities.
  • Alert on API key usage anomalies for tokens known to be stored inside Langflow, including geographic and time-of-day deviations.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-7874

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Langflow to a fixed release as identified in the IBM Support Document.
  • Rotate every credential, API key, and token stored in Langflow, assuming prior exposure until proven otherwise.
  • Restrict network access to the Langflow database so it is reachable only from the application tier.
  • Review backups and snapshots of Langflow data and treat any copies stored outside hardened locations as compromised.

Patch Information

IBM has published remediation guidance in the IBM Support Document. Administrators should apply the vendor-recommended fixed version for Langflow OSS and confirm the encryption subsystem is reinitialized with a strong key derivation configuration after upgrade.

Workarounds

  • Move Langflow credential storage to an external secrets manager such as HashiCorp Vault or a cloud KMS-backed store, so Langflow references rather than stores secrets.
  • Encrypt the underlying database volume with a platform key that is independent from Langflow to add a second layer of protection.
  • Limit Langflow deployments to isolated networks and enforce strict role-based access control on administrative interfaces until the patch is applied.
bash
# Configuration example: rotate and externalize Langflow secrets after patching
langflow superuser --reset-encryption-key
export LANGFLOW_SECRET_KEY="$(openssl rand -base64 48)"
export LANGFLOW_DATABASE_URL="postgresql://langflow@db.internal:5432/langflow"
# Point integrations at an external secrets manager rather than storing raw keys
export LANGFLOW_VARIABLES_TO_GET_FROM_ENVIRONMENT="OPENAI_API_KEY,ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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