Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-78162 Overview
CVE-2026-78162 is a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in the Apache Camel camel-hazelcast component. The flaw affects Apache Camel releases from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5 and from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. Two configuration paths in Camel create Hazelcast instances without applying the default JavaSerializationFilterConfig introduced by CVE-2026-43865. An attacker who can publish into the Hazelcast cluster can trigger deserialization of an arbitrary Java object, achieving remote code execution inside the Camel process. Hazelcast clusters ship without authentication or TLS by default, so no deliberate misconfiguration is required to expose the vector.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated attackers with Hazelcast cluster reachability can execute arbitrary Java code inside affected Camel deployments through unrestricted deserialization in ReplicatedHazelcastAggregationRepository and client-mode Hazelcast endpoints.
Affected Products
- Apache Camel 4.0.0 through 4.18.4
- Apache Camel 4.19.0 through 4.22.0
- Apache Camel 4.14.x and earlier (end of life, no fix)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-78162 published to NVD
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-78162
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is classified as Deserialization of Untrusted Data [CWE-502]. The camel-hazelcast component normally applies a default JavaSerializationFilterConfig to Hazelcast instances it creates. That protection was added as the fix for CVE-2026-43865. The fix did not reach two internal configuration paths that build Hazelcast instances outside the main bootstrap. Both paths continue to create members or clients whose Java deserialization is unrestricted. An attacker who can write to the shared Hazelcast cluster delivers a crafted serialized payload. Hazelcast's own serialization layer then reconstructs the object before Camel ever processes the exchange. Because gadget chains available on the classpath can trigger code execution during object construction, the result is remote code execution inside the Camel JVM.
Root Cause
Two code paths miss the serialization filter. ReplicatedHazelcastAggregationRepository extends HazelcastAggregationRepository but overrides doStart() without calling super.doStart(). It keeps its own copy of the bootstrap block and never installs the filter when a route uses it without supplying a hazelcastInstance. Separately, HazelcastDefaultComponent#getOrCreateHzClientInstance() builds its own ClientConfig when hazelcastMode=client is selected and neither a referenced ClientConfig nor hazelcastConfigUri is supplied. That path also applies no filter, so client-mode endpoints behave differently from node-mode endpoints for an otherwise identical configuration.
Attack Vector
The attack is network-based and requires no authentication. An attacker needs the ability to publish entries into the Hazelcast cluster that the Camel instance has joined. Default Hazelcast deployments lack authentication and TLS, so any party reachable on the cluster's network can write. For the replicated aggregation repository path, the attacker places a serialized Java object into the backing ReplicatedMap. For the client-mode path, the attacker injects a payload into any structure the client subsequently reads. In both cases deserialization occurs inside Hazelcast before Camel route processing, yielding code execution as the Camel user. See the Apache Camel Security Advisory CVE-2026-78162 for the vendor description.
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Stop Exploit AttemptsDetection Methods for CVE-2026-78162
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected child processes spawned by Camel JVMs, such as shells, curl, wget, or compiler invocations originating from processes using camel-hazelcast.
- java.io.ObjectInputStream.readObject entries in stack traces or crash logs referencing Hazelcast serialization classes without a configured filter.
- Hazelcast cluster membership changes or inbound connections from unexpected IP addresses on ports 5701-5801.
- Outbound network connections from Camel hosts to attacker-controlled infrastructure immediately following cluster write activity.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory running Camel versions and flag deployments in the 4.0.0-4.18.4 and 4.19.0-4.22.0 ranges that load the camel-hazelcast component.
- Audit route definitions for ReplicatedHazelcastAggregationRepository usage and for endpoints using hazelcastMode=client without an explicit ClientConfig or hazelcastConfigUri.
- Monitor JVM process trees for anomalous child process creation originating from Camel workloads.
- Inspect Hazelcast member logs for serialization exceptions or ClassNotFoundException entries referencing unexpected gadget classes.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Capture network flow telemetry for Hazelcast ports and alert on new peers joining established clusters.
- Forward Camel and Hazelcast application logs to a centralized analytics platform for retrospective hunting on deserialization errors.
- Enable JVM-level auditing of the jdk.serialFilter property to detect instances running without a restrictive filter.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-78162
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache Camel to version 4.23.0, 4.22.1, or 4.18.5 depending on the active release stream.
- Migrate deployments on 4.14.x or earlier to a supported release, since those lines will not receive a fix.
- Restrict network access to Hazelcast cluster ports so only trusted members can connect.
- Enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to prevent unauthenticated writes.
Patch Information
The fix is tracked in Apache Camel Pull Request #25566, Apache Camel Pull Request #25595, Apache Camel Pull Request #25599, and Apache Camel Pull Request #25600, with issues CAMEL-24413 and CAMEL-24420. Upgrade to 4.23.0 for the mainline fix, 4.22.1 for the 4.22.x stream, or 4.18.5 for the 4.18.x stream.
Workarounds
- Supply an explicit Hazelcast configuration carrying a JavaSerializationFilterConfig, since a user-supplied configuration is never overwritten by Camel.
- Inject a pre-built HazelcastInstance into the Camel component instead of relying on default instantiation.
- Set the JVM-wide filter -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.;java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!* to restrict classes eligible for deserialization.
- Enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to limit who can reach the cluster and publish entries.
# Configuration example
java -Djdk.serialFilter='!java.net.;java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!*' \
-jar camel-application.jar
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

