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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-77711

CVE-2026-77711: Jetty HttpClient Information Disclosure

CVE-2026-77711 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Jetty HttpClient where proxy credentials are leaked to servers. This occurs when a server sends a 407 response, causing the client to expose authentication data.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-77711 Overview

CVE-2026-77711 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Eclipse Jetty's HttpClient component. When the client sends a request through a forward proxy, the origin server can respond with HTTP status 407 Proxy Authentication Required. The client mistakenly treats this response as originating from the proxy and retries the request with the Proxy-Authentication header attached. This behavior forwards proxy credentials directly to the origin server, which was never intended to receive them. A malicious or compromised origin server can harvest these credentials and gain access to the forward proxy infrastructure.

Critical Impact

Any HTTP server reachable through a Jetty HttpClient forward proxy configuration can trick the client into disclosing proxy authentication credentials by returning a crafted 407 response.

Affected Products

  • Eclipse Jetty HttpClient
  • Applications embedding Jetty client libraries that use forward proxy configurations
  • Downstream frameworks relying on Jetty for outbound HTTP traffic

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-15 - CVE CVE-2026-77711 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-77711

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw sits in how Jetty's HttpClient differentiates between proxy-originated and server-originated authentication challenges. The HTTP specification reserves status code 407 for proxies, while origin servers should use 401 Unauthorized. Jetty's client logic assumes compliance and interprets any 407 as a proxy challenge, regardless of which hop produced it.

When a request transits a forward proxy, the response arrives through that proxy but is generated by the origin server. A server that intentionally returns 407 triggers the client's proxy-authentication retry path. The client then attaches the configured Proxy-Authentication header to a new request and sends it to the same origin server through the proxy. The credential, which may be a Basic authentication token or a bearer value, is now readable by the server operator.

This is a classic information exposure issue tracked under [CWE-200]. The impact scales with the privilege of the leaked proxy account, since corporate forward proxies often use directory-tied credentials.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing validation of the authentication challenge source. Jetty's client does not verify that a 407 response actually originated from the configured proxy before replaying credentials. No hop-identity check or challenge binding is performed between the request path and the response.

Attack Vector

An attacker who controls or compromises any origin server that a Jetty client contacts through a forward proxy can trigger the leak. The attacker configures the server to respond with 407 Proxy Authentication Required and a Proxy-Authenticate header. The Jetty client replays the credentials, which the server logs or extracts. No user interaction is required beyond the client initiating a routine outbound HTTP request.

The vulnerability requires network reachability and a client configured with a forward proxy that holds authentication material. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-r2c5-3p8g-wpvw for technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-77711

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP requests from Jetty-based applications containing Proxy-Authentication or Proxy-Authorization headers destined for untrusted origin servers.
  • Repeated request pairs where the first response is HTTP 407 from an external host and the second request from the same client includes proxy credentials.
  • Forward proxy logs showing credential reuse from unexpected destinations or anomalous origin domains.

Detection Strategies

  • Instrument the forward proxy to log the destination host for each authenticated request and alert on hosts outside an approved allowlist.
  • Inspect egress traffic for HTTP 407 responses from non-proxy IP addresses, which indicate potential exploitation attempts.
  • Review application dependency manifests to inventory versions of org.eclipse.jetty.client in use across services.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Correlate proxy authentication events with downstream HTTP destinations in a SIEM to detect credential replay to unapproved hosts.
  • Monitor outbound TLS metadata for Jetty client user-agent strings paired with 407 responses from untrusted servers.
  • Track changes to Jetty client proxy configuration files to ensure credentials remain scoped to intended proxy endpoints.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-77711

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Eclipse Jetty HttpClient to a patched release as directed by the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-r2c5-3p8g-wpvw.
  • Rotate any proxy credentials that may have been transmitted through vulnerable clients to untrusted destinations.
  • Audit application code that constructs HttpClient instances with proxy authentication to identify exposure.

Patch Information

Refer to the vendor advisory GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-r2c5-3p8g-wpvw and the Eclipse CVE Assignment Work Item for fixed version information and remediation guidance. The patched client validates the source of authentication challenges before replaying proxy credentials.

Workarounds

  • Restrict Jetty HttpClient outbound traffic to an allowlist of trusted origin servers until the patched version can be deployed.
  • Replace long-lived proxy credentials with short-lived tokens scoped to minimal privileges to limit blast radius.
  • Terminate forward proxy authentication at a transparent proxy layer that strips Proxy-Authentication headers before requests reach the client application.
bash
# Configuration example
# Verify installed Jetty client version in a Maven project
mvn dependency:tree -Dincludes=org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-client

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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