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CVE Vulnerability Database

CVE-2026-7754: Langflow SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-7754 is a server-side request forgery flaw in Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 caused by insecure defaults and incomplete SSRF protections. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

CVE-2026-7754 Overview

CVE-2026-7754 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability affecting IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0, including Langflow 1.9.0. The flaw stems from insecure default configuration combined with incomplete enforcement of the built-in SSRF protection mechanism. An authenticated attacker with low privileges can send crafted requests over the network to make the Langflow server issue requests to unintended destinations. This can expose internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and other network resources normally unreachable from outside the environment. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can abuse Langflow to reach internal network resources and cloud metadata services, resulting in confidentiality impact on backend systems.

Affected Products

  • IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0
  • Langflow 1.9.0
  • Deployments running on macOS, Linux, and Windows hosts

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-07-17 - CVE-2026-7754 published to NVD
  • 2026-07-21 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-7754

Vulnerability Analysis

Langflow is an open-source framework for building applications backed by large language models. It exposes HTTP-driven components that fetch remote resources, load data, and interact with external APIs on behalf of workflow nodes. CVE-2026-7754 exists because the shipped default configuration does not restrict outbound request destinations, and the SSRF protection logic does not fully enforce the intended allowlist and blocklist boundaries.

An attacker who holds valid low-privilege credentials in a Langflow instance can define or trigger a component that issues an HTTP request to an attacker-chosen URL. Because the protection is incomplete, requests targeting loopback interfaces, private RFC1918 ranges, or cloud instance metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254 can still succeed under specific conditions.

Root Cause

The root cause is twofold. First, the default configuration ships with permissive outbound request settings. Second, the SSRF validation routine fails to cover all URL parsing edge cases, allowing bypass through techniques such as alternate IP encodings, DNS rebinding candidates, or redirect chains that the validator does not re-check after resolution.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the Langflow application and a valid authenticated session with permission to configure or execute a component that performs outbound HTTP calls. The attacker submits a request containing a URL that bypasses the SSRF filter. The Langflow server then issues that request server-side, returning response data or side effects that the attacker can observe. No user interaction is required beyond the attacker's own authenticated session.

Refer to the IBM Support advisory for CVE-2026-7754 for vendor-specific technical detail.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-7754

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP requests from the Langflow process to internal IP ranges such as 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, or 192.168.0.0/16.
  • Requests from Langflow to cloud metadata endpoints, notably http://169.254.169.254/ on AWS, Azure, or GCP hosts.
  • Unexpected DNS resolutions from the Langflow host targeting internal service hostnames or short names.
  • Component execution logs containing user-supplied URLs with encoded IPs, @ userinfo tricks, or unusual schemes.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect Langflow application logs for component executions where the target URL resolves to private, loopback, or link-local addresses.
  • Correlate authenticated Langflow user activity with outbound network flows deviating from baseline destinations.
  • Alert on any HTTP response fetched by Langflow that contains cloud instance metadata fields such as iam/security-credentials or computeMetadata.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward Langflow access, audit, and component execution logs to a centralized logging or SIEM platform for correlation.
  • Monitor egress traffic from Langflow hosts and flag connections to RFC1918, loopback, and metadata endpoints.
  • Track newly created or modified Langflow flows that include URL-fetching components, particularly by low-privilege accounts.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-7754

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Langflow to a fixed release beyond 1.10.0 as identified in the IBM Support advisory.
  • Review Langflow user accounts and revoke unnecessary access, prioritizing removal of low-trust authenticated users.
  • Rotate any cloud instance credentials that may have been reachable via the metadata service from the Langflow host.

Patch Information

IBM has published remediation guidance for CVE-2026-7754 on the IBM Support page. Administrators should apply the vendor-supplied update and validate that the SSRF protection configuration is enabled after upgrade.

Workarounds

  • Place Langflow behind an egress proxy that denies traffic to private, loopback, and link-local ranges including 169.254.169.254.
  • Enforce IMDSv2 on AWS-hosted deployments to require session-token headers that Langflow-issued SSRF requests will not carry.
  • Restrict Langflow to a dedicated network segment with strict outbound allowlists limited to required external APIs.
  • Disable or remove Langflow components that perform arbitrary URL fetching if they are not required by production workflows.
bash
# Example egress restriction using iptables on the Langflow host
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner langflow -d 169.254.169.254 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner langflow -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner langflow -d 172.16.0.0/12 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner langflow -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner langflow -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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