Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-77293 Overview
CVE-2026-77293 is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in TREK, a collaborative travel planner. Versions prior to 3.3.0 fail to validate that a target note-file belongs to the trip specified in the request path. The DELETE /api/trips/:tripId/collab/notes/:noteId/files/:fileId endpoint authorizes the caller against the attacker-controlled tripId, while the underlying deleteNoteFile function in server/src/services/collabService.ts resolves the target using only the note and file identifiers. An authenticated user with edit access to any trip can delete note-file attachments from another user's trip. Version 3.3.0 contains the fix.
Critical Impact
Any authenticated user with edit access to a single trip can permanently delete note-file attachments belonging to unrelated users' trips, with sequential identifiers making enumeration practical.
Affected Products
- TREK collaborative travel planner, versions prior to 3.3.0
- Vulnerable component: server/src/services/collabService.ts (deleteNoteFile)
- Vulnerable endpoint: DELETE /api/trips/:tripId/collab/notes/:noteId/files/:fileId
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-24 - CVE-2026-77293 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-09-25 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-77293
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw is a classic broken object-level authorization issue, categorized under [CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key]. TREK's REST route enforces authorization based on the tripId path parameter, which the attacker fully controls. The server confirms the caller has edit access to that trip, then forwards the request to the service layer. The service layer, however, looks up the file solely by noteId and fileId, bypassing any cross-check that the file actually belongs to the authorized trip.
This mismatch allows a user who holds edit rights to any trip, including a trip they created themselves, to supply identifiers belonging to other users' notes and files. The delete operation then succeeds against resources outside the authorized scope. Read operations on attachments remain correctly trip-scoped and are not affected.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing resource ownership validation in deleteNoteFile. The function trusts the composite identifier pair (noteId, fileId) as sufficient to locate the target, without joining against the parent tripId. Because trip, note, and file identifiers are sequential, an attacker can enumerate valid combinations and target arbitrary attachments at scale.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires an authenticated account with edit access to at least one trip. The attacker iterates sequential noteId and fileId values and issues DELETE requests against a tripId they control. Each successful request permanently removes a note-file attachment belonging to another user. No user interaction from the victim is required.
// Patch reference from client/src/App.tsx — version 3.3.0 (#1520)
- <div className="flex flex-col h-screen md:block md:h-auto">
+ <div className="flex flex-col h-dvh md:block md:h-auto">
<div className="flex-1 overflow-y-auto md:overflow-visible">{children}</div>
<BottomNav />
</div>
Source: GitHub Commit 19064b3. The server-side authorization fix is delivered in the same 3.3.0 release; see the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cjc5-722j-vvmf for the authoritative description.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-77293
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected DELETE requests to /api/trips/:tripId/collab/notes/:noteId/files/:fileId where the resolved file does not match the trip owner in application logs.
- Trip owners reporting missing note attachments without a corresponding audit entry from a legitimate collaborator.
- A single authenticated session issuing a high volume of DELETE requests spanning sequential noteId or fileId values.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate authentication identity, tripId, and the actual owning trip of the deleted file at the data layer; flag mismatches.
- Add server-side instrumentation to log every call to deleteNoteFile with both the requested tripId and the resolved parent tripId.
- Review web access logs for enumeration patterns against the collaboration note-file DELETE route.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert when a single user account triggers DELETE requests on note-files across trips they do not own.
- Monitor rate-limit violations on the collaboration API, particularly on DELETE methods.
- Preserve application and database audit logs for note-file deletions for incident reconstruction.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-77293
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade TREK to version 3.3.0 or later; see the GitHub Release v3.3.0.
- Audit note-file deletion activity since deployment and notify affected trip owners.
- Review user accounts for suspicious enumeration activity against collaboration endpoints.
Patch Information
The fix is delivered in TREK 3.3.0 via Pull Request #1520 and commit 19064b3. The patch adds trip-scoped validation so deleteNoteFile requires the resolved file to belong to the trip referenced in the request path. Full technical context is in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cjc5-722j-vvmf.
Workarounds
- If upgrading immediately is not possible, restrict collaboration edit access to trusted users only.
- Deploy a reverse-proxy or WAF rule that blocks DELETE requests to the vulnerable route pending the upgrade.
- Replace sequential identifiers with unguessable UUIDs where feasible to reduce enumeration risk.
# Example NGINX rule to temporarily block the vulnerable endpoint
location ~ ^/api/trips/[^/]+/collab/notes/[^/]+/files/[^/]+$ {
if ($request_method = DELETE) {
return 403;
}
proxy_pass http://trek_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

