Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-76787 Overview
CVE-2026-76787 is a null pointer dereference [CWE-476] in the Zephyr RTOS UpdateHub firmware-over-the-air client. The function z_impl_updatehub_probe() in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c parses CoAP probe responses using Zephyr's JSON library, which treats every descriptor field as optional. When a response omits the sha256sum field, the code reaches strlen(...objects.sha256sum) + 1 with a NULL pointer and faults. By default, the client uses plain CoAP over UDP on port 5683 with no peer authentication, allowing an on-path attacker or DNS spoofer to deliver malformed metadata.
Critical Impact
A remote attacker can trigger a repeatable denial of service on Zephyr devices polling UpdateHub, halting the system on every poll interval.
Affected Products
- Zephyr RTOS UpdateHub subsystem (subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c)
- Deployments with CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS unset (default configuration)
- Targets with protected low-address ranges, including MMU-based architectures, builds using CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_DWT/_MPU/_PMP, TrustZone non-secure images, and SoCs such as nRF54L
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-76787 published to NVD
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-76787
Vulnerability Analysis
The UpdateHub client parses CoAP probe responses with json_obj_parse(), which returns a bitmask of successfully decoded fields rather than failing on missing ones. A response omitting sha256sum leaves the corresponding const char * NULL inside the zero-initialised struct resp_probe_any_boards or struct resp_probe_some_boards.
Both metadata branches then compute sha256size = strlen(...objects.sha256sum) + 1 before validation. The subsequent SHA256_HEX_DIGEST_SIZE check runs on a value derived from the faulting read and cannot prevent it. A probe response as simple as "objects":[[{}],[{}]] is sufficient to trigger the condition.
Impact is availability only. There is no memory write, and copied bytes are only compared against the locally computed image hash, so no information-disclosure channel exists. On classic Cortex-M targets with the vector table readable at address zero, the walk typically terminates and the length check rejects the request, making the outcome configuration- and SoC-dependent.
Root Cause
The Zephyr JSON decoder treats optional descriptor fields as absent-is-success. The UpdateHub metadata handler assumes sha256sum is always present and dereferences it with strlen() before any NULL check. Combined with zero-initialised response structs, this produces a direct read at address zero when the server omits the field.
Attack Vector
The metadata originates entirely from the network peer. probe_cb() accepts the datagram, invokes coap_packet_parse(), and copies the payload with no token matching and no cryptographic check. With CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS unset, start_coap_client() uses unauthenticated UDP on port 5683 and resolves the server via unauthenticated DNS.
An on-path attacker, a DNS spoofer, or an off-path attacker who wins the race with a forged source address can deliver the malformed response. No user interaction is required because updatehub_autohandler() polls on CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_POLL_INTERVAL. When CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS=y, the trigger narrows to a malicious or compromised update server.
// Security patch from upstream commit 6fc4f27a
goto cleanup;
}
+ if (metadata_any_boards.objects[1].objects[0].objects.sha256sum == NULL) {
+ LOG_ERR("SHA256 is missing from the metadata");
+ ctx.code_status = UPDATEHUB_METADATA_ERROR;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
sha256size = strlen(
metadata_any_boards.objects[1].objects[0].objects.sha256sum) + 1;
// Source: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/6fc4f27a74021b52c509e4f7912d68145dfa7728
The fix adds an explicit sha256sum == NULL check that returns UPDATEHUB_METADATA_ERROR ahead of the strlen() call in both metadata branches.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-76787
Indicators of Compromise
- Device fatal fault logs referencing a load at address 0x0 immediately after an UpdateHub poll cycle
- Repeated system halts or reboots aligned with CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_POLL_INTERVAL
- Inbound CoAP responses on UDP port 5683 containing minimal payloads such as "objects":[[{}],[{}]]
- Unexpected DNS responses resolving the configured UpdateHub server to attacker-controlled addresses
Detection Strategies
- Inspect CoAP traffic on UDP port 5683 for probe responses missing the sha256sum descriptor field
- Correlate device crash telemetry with the preceding UpdateHub poll timestamp to identify remotely triggered faults
- Flag DNS responses for UpdateHub endpoints that deviate from established baselines
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_LOG_LEVEL at a level that surfaces metadata errors in device logs forwarded to central logging
- Monitor fleet-wide crash and reboot rates for correlated spikes that would indicate a targeted denial-of-service campaign
- Collect CoAP flow metadata from gateways to identify unauthenticated UDP sessions on port 5683 originating from unexpected peers
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-76787
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the upstream Zephyr patch adding the sha256sum == NULL check in z_impl_updatehub_probe()
- Enable CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS=y to restrict the attack surface to compromised or malicious update servers
- Restrict outbound CoAP traffic to known UpdateHub server addresses via network ACLs
Patch Information
The fix is available in Zephyr commit 6fc4f27a and documented in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-82gq-cmqw-xgx2. The patch adds an explicit NULL check for sha256sum and returns UPDATEHUB_METADATA_ERROR before any strlen() call in both metadata branches.
Workarounds
- Disable UpdateHub polling by unsetting CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_AUTOMATIC until the patch is deployed
- Deploy devices behind a trusted gateway that validates CoAP responses and filters malformed payloads
- Pin UpdateHub server resolution via static host entries to reduce exposure to DNS spoofing
# Harden UpdateHub configuration in prj.conf
CONFIG_UPDATEHUB=y
CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS=y
CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU=y
# Increase poll interval to reduce DoS re-trigger frequency during remediation
CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_POLL_INTERVAL=1440
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

