Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-74755 Overview
CVE-2026-74755 is an integer underflow vulnerability [CWE-191] in the mcpack2pb component of Apache bRPC versions prior to 1.18.0. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can crash a bRPC server by sending a request containing a string field with a value_size of zero. The underflow triggers an uncaught std::length_error exception during request parsing, which aborts the server process with SIGABRT. The flaw affects bRPC servers that accept nshead frames wired to the ubrpc mcpack2 adaptor. Stock open-source bRPC registers the ubrpc/nshead_mcpack protocols as client-only, so default server configurations are not affected.
Critical Impact
A single unauthenticated request can terminate an affected bRPC server process, enabling denial of service against production RPC endpoints.
Affected Products
- Apache bRPC versions prior to 1.18.0
- bRPC servers deploying NsheadService + UbrpcMcpack2Adaptor
- Downstream services linking the vulnerable mcpack2pb parser
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-74755 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-74755
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in UnparsedValue::as_string() within src/mcpack2pb/parser.cpp. The function resizes an output string to _size - 1, where _size is the value_size of a string field read directly from untrusted network input. When value_size is zero, the unsigned size_t subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX.
The subsequent call to resize() attempts to allocate a string of maximum representable length. The C++ standard library responds by throwing std::length_error. The request parsing path in mcpack2pb does not catch this exception, so it propagates up the stack. The runtime invokes std::terminate, aborting the process with SIGABRT.
This is a classic integer underflow leading to denial of service. The impact is limited to availability, but the trigger requires no authentication and only a single malformed request.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing validation of _size before performing arithmetic on it. The code assumes _size is at least 1, which holds for well-formed messages but not for attacker-controlled input. Combined with the absence of exception handling on the request parsing path, any underflow translates directly into process termination.
Attack Vector
An attacker sends a crafted ubrpc/mcpack2 request over the network to a bRPC server that exposes NsheadService with UbrpcMcpack2Adaptor. The request contains a string field whose value_size field is set to 0. The parser invokes UnparsedValue::as_string(), triggers the underflow, and the server process aborts. No authentication, user interaction, or chained primitives are required.
See the Apache Mailing List Thread for the upstream disclosure details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-74755
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected SIGABRT terminations of bRPC server processes with stack traces referencing UnparsedValue::as_string or mcpack2pb/parser.cpp.
- Core dumps containing std::length_error thrown from std::basic_string::resize.
- Repeated short-lived connections from a single source immediately preceding server crashes.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect bRPC server logs for abort signals correlated with inbound nshead_mcpack or ubrpc traffic.
- Deploy network-layer inspection to flag mcpack2 messages where a string field declares value_size = 0.
- Monitor service restart counters and crash-loop behavior on hosts running NsheadService with UbrpcMcpack2Adaptor.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on bRPC process restart frequency exceeding baseline on exposed RPC endpoints.
- Capture and retain core dumps from bRPC services to enable post-crash forensics.
- Track inbound traffic volume on ports bound to NsheadService for anomalous single-packet patterns preceding outages.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-74755
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache bRPC to version 1.18.0 or later, which includes the fix.
- Audit server configurations for custom registration of the ubrpc or nshead_mcpack protocols as server-side handlers.
- Restrict network exposure of bRPC services deploying NsheadService + UbrpcMcpack2Adaptor to trusted clients only.
Patch Information
The upstream fix is tracked in Apache bRPC Pull Request #3450. The patch validates _size before performing the _size - 1 subtraction, preventing the underflow. Operators who cannot immediately upgrade should backport the PR against their deployed branch.
Workarounds
- Remove or disable server-side registration of the ubrpc_mcpack2 protocol if the service does not require it.
- Place bRPC endpoints behind a reverse proxy or filter that drops mcpack2 messages with zero-length string fields.
- Enforce network ACLs restricting access to RPC ports to authenticated internal clients.
# Confirm installed bRPC version and upgrade
git -C brpc describe --tags
git -C brpc fetch origin
git -C brpc checkout 1.18.0
# Rebuild and redeploy the server binary linking the patched mcpack2pb parser
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

