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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-68922

CVE-2026-68922: MobSF Path Traversal Vulnerability

CVE-2026-68922 is a path traversal vulnerability in MobSF that allows authenticated attackers to read server files and exploit file existence oracles. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Updated:

CVE-2026-68922 Overview

CVE-2026-68922 is a path traversal vulnerability [CWE-22] in Mobile Security Framework (MobSF), an open-source mobile application security testing tool. The flaw resides in the find_icon_path_zip function within mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/icon_analysis.py. The function uses the android:icon value from the Android manifest to construct paths under the scan resource directory without rejecting directory traversal sequences or verifying containment. An authenticated user can upload a crafted ZIP or APK to read arbitrary server files matching allowed extensions. The issue is fixed in MobSF version 4.5.1.

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can read server files with ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS suffixes via the /download/ endpoint and use the icon_path report field as a file-existence oracle.

Affected Products

  • Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) versions prior to 4.5.1
  • mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/icon_analysis.py component
  • Static analyzer icon extraction workflow

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-08-18 - CVE-2026-68922 published to NVD
  • 2026-08-19 - Last updated in NVD database
  • Fix released - MobSF version 4.5.1 published on GitHub with the patch

Technical Details for CVE-2026-68922

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability affects the static analyzer path that processes Android application archives. When MobSF parses an uploaded APK or ZIP, it reads the android:icon attribute from the Android manifest and uses that value to build a filesystem path inside the scan resource directory. The find_icon_path_zip function does not sanitize traversal sequences such as ../ and does not confirm that the resolved path stays within the intended directory.

An authenticated user can craft an APK whose manifest declares an android:icon value pointing at an arbitrary server location. MobSF then resolves this path, copies the target file into DWD_DIR under a predictable name ending in -icon.<ext>, and exposes it through the /download/ endpoint. The same code path leaks information via the icon_path field in the analysis report, providing a file-existence oracle even when the file cannot be retrieved.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing input validation on attacker-controlled manifest data used in path construction. MobSF trusts the android:icon string and joins it to a base directory without normalizing the result or asserting containment. Any file on disk whose extension matches ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS becomes reachable through the icon resolution logic.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an authenticated MobSF account. The attacker uploads a malicious APK or ZIP that embeds a traversal payload in the manifest's android:icon attribute. After scanning, the attacker downloads the copied file from /download/ or reads the icon_path field to confirm target existence. Since the attack traverses the network and requires only a valid session, exposed MobSF instances are the primary risk surface.

python
# Patched imports centralize traversal and injection checks in mobsf.MobSF.security
# mobsf/DynamicAnalyzer/views/common/device.py
from mobsf.MobSF.views.authentication import (
    login_required,
)
from mobsf.MobSF.security import is_safe_path
from mobsf.MobSF.utils import (
    is_md5,
    print_n_send_error_response,
    read_sqlite,
)
# Source: https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/62563ca429a75b3e5d47a13b958e1d2e7d5e2bbf

The patch consolidates path-safety helpers such as is_safe_path and is_attack_pattern into a dedicated mobsf.MobSF.security module, ensuring uploaded artifact paths are validated before use. Full technical context is available in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-8j49-mmcx-4mp5 and the MobSF Pull Request Discussion.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-68922

Indicators of Compromise

  • Files under DWD_DIR named with the pattern <hash>-icon.<ext> that contain content unrelated to a legitimate application icon.
  • Analysis reports where the icon_path field references paths outside the expected scan resource directory or contains ../ sequences.
  • HTTP GET requests to the /download/ endpoint referencing icon files immediately after an APK or ZIP upload from a non-administrator account.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect stored AndroidManifest.xml artifacts from prior scans for android:icon values containing ../ or absolute path prefixes.
  • Correlate MobSF authentication events with upload activity and subsequent /download/ requests to identify anomalous access patterns.
  • Alert on MobSF instances running versions earlier than 4.5.1 discovered through software inventory.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose web-server logging for the MobSF application and retain upload and download telemetry for at least 90 days.
  • Track process file-access events on the MobSF host to detect reads of files outside the expected scan directories.
  • Monitor the DWD_DIR directory for icon files whose MIME type or content diverges from expected image formats.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-68922

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all MobSF deployments to version 4.5.1 or later, available in the MobSF v4.5.1 Release.
  • Rotate MobSF user credentials and API keys if the instance was accessible to untrusted users prior to patching.
  • Audit the DWD_DIR directory and remove any icon files sourced from suspicious scans.

Patch Information

The fix is delivered in MobSF 4.5.1 via commit 62563ca429a75b3e5d47a13b958e1d2e7d5e2bbf. The patch introduces a centralized mobsf.MobSF.security module that exposes is_safe_path, is_attack_pattern, and cmd_injection_check helpers. The find_icon_path_zip code path now validates that the resolved icon location remains within the expected scan resource directory before any copy or download operation.

Workarounds

  • Restrict MobSF access to trusted analysts only and place the service behind an authenticated reverse proxy or VPN.
  • Disable or gate self-service account registration to prevent untrusted users from obtaining upload rights.
  • Run MobSF under a low-privilege system account so any traversed reads cannot reach sensitive host files.
bash
# Upgrade MobSF to the fixed version
git fetch --tags
git checkout v4.5.1
pip install -r requirements.txt
./run.sh 127.0.0.1:8000

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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