CVE-2026-65082 Overview
NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a code injection vulnerability in its migration command. A local attacker with low privileges can inject arbitrary code through the affected command, leading to code execution in the context of the vulnerable process. Successful exploitation can result in code execution, data tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code and requires local access to the affected Linux host running NemoClaw.
Critical Impact
A local, authenticated attacker can inject and execute code through the NemoClaw migration command, compromising confidentiality, integrity, and availability on the affected Linux host.
Affected Products
- NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-08-25 - CVE-2026-65082 published to NVD
- 2026-08-26 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-65082
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw resides in the migration command shipped with NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux. The command fails to properly neutralize input used to construct executable code or command syntax, allowing an authenticated local user to influence what the process executes. Successful exploitation yields code execution in the process context, along with data tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service outcomes.
Exploitation requires local access and low privileges, but attack complexity is high. The attacker must satisfy conditions outside their direct control, such as timing, environment state, or specific command inputs, before the injection succeeds. No user interaction is required once conditions are met.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper control of code generation (CWE-94) within the migration command. The command incorporates attacker-influenced data into a code or command context without adequate validation, sanitization, or safe API usage. As a result, crafted input is interpreted as executable logic rather than inert data.
Attack Vector
An attacker with local shell access and low-level privileges on the host invokes or influences the NemoClaw migration command. By supplying crafted arguments, environment values, or referenced files, the attacker causes the migration process to execute attacker-controlled code. Because the migration command may run with elevated privileges during data migration workflows, the injected code can operate beyond the attacker's original privilege boundary.
No verified proof-of-concept has been published. Refer to the NVIDIA Security Documentation for vendor-supplied technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-65082
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected child processes spawned by the NemoClaw migration command or its parent service account.
- Migration command invocations containing shell metacharacters, command substitution syntax, or unusual environment variable overrides.
- Modification of NemoClaw configuration or migration input files by non-administrative users prior to migration execution.
Detection Strategies
- Audit execve and process-lineage telemetry on Linux hosts running NemoClaw to identify anomalous children of the migration process.
- Monitor command-line arguments passed to NemoClaw utilities for injection patterns such as backticks, $(), semicolons, or pipe characters.
- Correlate local user activity with migration command execution windows to surface unauthorized invocations.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable Linux audit rules (auditd) on the NemoClaw installation directory and migration binary to log invocation and file access.
- Ship process, file, and command-line telemetry to a centralized SIEM or data lake for retention and hunting.
- Alert on privilege transitions where the migration process spawns interpreters such as bash, python, or perl outside expected workflows.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-65082
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict local access to hosts running NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux to trusted administrators only.
- Apply the vendor-supplied update referenced in the NVIDIA Security Documentation as soon as it is available.
- Review recent invocations of the migration command and validate that all executions were authorized.
Patch Information
Refer to the NVIDIA Security Documentation for the authoritative patched version and remediation guidance. Additional metadata is available in the NVD CVE Details for CVE-2026-65082 and the CVE.org Record for CVE-2026-65082.
Workarounds
- Limit execution of the NemoClaw migration command to a controlled maintenance window under administrator supervision.
- Enforce least privilege on local accounts and remove interactive shell access from service accounts that do not require it.
- Apply file-system permissions that prevent unprivileged users from modifying migration input files or configuration consumed by the command.
# Example: restrict migration binary and configuration to root
sudo chown -R root:root /opt/nvidia/nemoclaw
sudo chmod 750 /opt/nvidia/nemoclaw
sudo chmod 600 /opt/nvidia/nemoclaw/config/*.yaml
# Example auditd rule for migration command execution
sudo auditctl -w /opt/nvidia/nemoclaw/bin/migrate -p x -k nemoclaw_migrate
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
