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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-63630

CVE-2026-63630: BentoPDF SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-63630 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in BentoPDF that allows attackers to force PDF digest disclosure through crafted workflow imports. This post covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-63630 Overview

BentoPDF is a self-hostable, client-side PDF toolkit. In versions 2.8.6 and earlier, the deserializeWorkflow() function accepts the Timestamp node's tsaUrl control from imported JSON without schema or destination validation. When a user imports a crafted workflow and runs it against a PDF, timestampPdf() sends an RFC 3161 TimeStampReq containing the PDF's SHA-256 MessageImprint to an attacker-selected endpoint. The default self-hosted configuration does not set VITE_CORS_PROXY_URL, so the request bypasses the proxy's ALLOWED_TSA_HOSTS checks. This information disclosure flaw is tracked under [CWE-201] and is fixed in version 2.8.7.

Critical Impact

Attackers can harvest SHA-256 digests of processed PDFs to confirm document identity and correlate the same file across users without accessing its contents.

Affected Products

  • BentoPDF versions 2.8.6 and earlier (self-hosted deployments)
  • Default configurations without VITE_CORS_PROXY_URL set
  • Any BentoPDF instance accepting imported workflow JSON files

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-24 - CVE CVE-2026-63630 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-63630

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw resides in the workflow import logic. BentoPDF allows users to share and import JSON-based workflows that chain PDF operations, including an RFC 3161 timestamp signing node. The deserializeWorkflow() function restores a Timestamp node's tsaUrl property directly from the imported JSON without validating the URL against an allowlist of trusted Timestamp Authority (TSA) hosts.

When the workflow executes, timestampPdf() constructs an RFC 3161 TimeStampReq message. This message embeds a MessageImprint structure containing the SHA-256 hash of the target PDF. The request is sent to the attacker-controlled tsaUrl, leaking the document digest to a third party.

The server-side CORS proxy enforces an ALLOWED_TSA_HOSTS list, but the default self-hosted configuration omits the VITE_CORS_PROXY_URL environment variable. As a result, the browser sends TSA requests directly, bypassing proxy-level host validation entirely.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing input validation during deserialization. The tsaUrl control is treated as trusted serialized state rather than untrusted attacker-influenced data. No schema check restricts the URL to a known TSA host before timestampPdf() dispatches the network request.

Attack Vector

An attacker crafts a malicious workflow JSON file containing a Timestamp node where tsaUrl points to an endpoint under their control. The victim imports the workflow and runs it against a sensitive PDF. The browser transmits an RFC 3161 request carrying the PDF's SHA-256 hash to the attacker. Because hashes are deterministic, the attacker can match the digest against a known file corpus to confirm the victim possesses a specific document or to correlate the same document across multiple victims.

typescript
// Patch excerpt: src/js/config/timestamp-tsa.ts
   { label: 'FreeTSA', url: 'https://freetsa.org/tsr' },
   { label: 'MeSign', url: 'http://tsa.mesign.com' },
 ];
+
+const ALLOWED_TSA_HOSTS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(
+  TIMESTAMP_TSA_PRESETS.map((preset) => new URL(preset.url).hostname)
+);
+
+export function isValidTsaRequestUrl(value: unknown): value is string {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    return url.protocol === 'http:' || url.protocol === 'https:';
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+export function isAllowedTsaUrl(value: unknown): value is string {
+  if (!isValidTsaRequestUrl(value)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return ALLOWED_TSA_HOSTS.has(new URL(value).hostname);
+}

Source: GitHub Commit b21f602

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-63630

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP or HTTPS requests from browsers running BentoPDF to unrecognized hosts carrying Content-Type: application/timestamp-query.
  • Imported workflow JSON files containing a Timestamp node with a tsaUrl value outside the known TSA preset list (freetsa.org, tsa.mesign.com).
  • BentoPDF deployments running version 2.8.6 or earlier with VITE_CORS_PROXY_URL unset.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect imported workflow JSON for tsaUrl fields and compare against an approved allowlist before loading them into BentoPDF.
  • Monitor egress proxy logs for application/timestamp-query POST requests destined for hosts not in the organization's trusted TSA list.
  • Audit the BentoPDF container or deployment configuration to confirm whether a CORS proxy is enforced.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable network telemetry on client workstations to capture TLS SNI values associated with BentoPDF browser sessions.
  • Alert on new or anomalous destinations receiving RFC 3161 timestamp requests from internal users.
  • Track BentoPDF version strings in asset inventory to identify instances still exposed to this flaw.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-63630

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all self-hosted BentoPDF deployments to version 2.8.7 or later.
  • Set the VITE_CORS_PROXY_URL environment variable so TSA requests route through the proxy enforcing ALLOWED_TSA_HOSTS.
  • Instruct users to avoid importing workflow JSON files from untrusted sources until the patch is applied.

Patch Information

The fix is published in BentoPDF v2.8.7. Commit b21f602 introduces isValidTsaRequestUrl() and isAllowedTsaUrl() helpers that restrict TSA endpoints to the preset hostname allowlist. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cx8x-7rrr-r9x8 for full disclosure details.

Workarounds

  • Configure VITE_CORS_PROXY_URL to force all TSA traffic through the proxy enforcing ALLOWED_TSA_HOSTS.
  • Block egress from client workstations to all TSA endpoints except explicitly approved providers.
  • Disable or remove the Timestamp node from available workflow operations if timestamping is not required.
bash
# Example: enforce CORS proxy for self-hosted BentoPDF
export VITE_CORS_PROXY_URL="https://proxy.internal.example.com"
export ALLOWED_TSA_HOSTS="freetsa.org,tsa.mesign.com"

# Rebuild and redeploy BentoPDF after upgrading to v2.8.7
git checkout v2.8.7
npm ci && npm run build

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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